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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness that 
is metaphysically compatible with most contemporary theories of consciousness, insofar as 
it is intended to fix the conceptual level to which the study of consciousness belongs. In the 
first chapter, I analyze different uses of the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ and three 
approaches to the concept of consciousness that can be drawn from three popular kinds of 
theories of consciousness. My goal is to show that those approaches are based on the 
identification of three discernible features of conscious states, namely, intentionality, 
reflexivity and phenomenality. In the second chapter, I introduce an interpretation of the 
concept of consciousness where the above features are characterized as components of the 
concept, unifying them into a single conceptual space. Such interpretation allows me to 
explore how the conceptual space can be adjusted to build models of consciousness. In the 
third chapter, I argue that conscious states are internal states that are described in terms of 
the components of the concept of consciousness and their relations. In the fourth chapter, I 
show how my view can be implemented to theorize about non-human consciousness by 
analyzing two kinds of non-human systems, namely, dolphins and bees. 
Keywords: conceptual space, practice of conceptualization, discernible feature, 
intentionality, reflexivity, phenomenality.  
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Introduction 
To explain consciousness is one of the biggest scientific challenges of our time, yet 
it seems to be something with which we are very well acquainted: we have felt headaches, 
entertained thoughts, seen objects, heard sounds, etc. In a broad sense, we could all agree 
that consciousness is experience, i.e., a particular mode of interacting with ourselves and the 
external world that contrasts with purely mechanical things, like watches and windmills. 
However, there does not seem to be a clear way to explain why experience is the way it is 
and how it emerges. Moreover, although we consider ourselves the paradigm of conscious 
beings, we frequently attribute at least some aspects of consciousness to non-human beings, 
like dogs and elephants, which means that consciousness might not be an exclusively human 
trait. 
After centuries of scientific reasoning and experimentation, there is no definite 
explanation of how and why consciousness emerges from, say, a bunch of interconnected 
neurons. No matter how close we look, we cannot seem to find the sweetness of an apple or 
the mental representation of a cat in our brains. From the theoretical point of view, explaining 
how consciousness emerges involves answering a set of questions called the easy problems, 
while explaining why it emerges is considered the hard problem of consciousness 
(Chalmers, 1995). Although it is reasonable to assume that, at some point, we will have the 
tools to explain the easy problems, theorists often point out that the hard problem will still 
remain, insofar as an explanation of the neural mechanisms that underly consciousness is 
not an explanation of why experiences are the way they are. Thus, we find ourselves in a 
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situation where there are many plausible theories of consciousness and no clear reason to 
rule out any of them. 
A particularly challenging fact about consciousness is that, in contrast to most 
scientific subject-matters, it cannot be directly measured nor observed; consider that I am 
only acquainted with my own experiences and that I can only infer what you are experiencing 
under certain circumstances. In fact, I can only affirm that you are a conscious being 
indirectly, for instance, by means of interpreting your behavior and brain activity as signs of 
your having conscious states. For this reason, many theorists have argued that the study of 
consciousness requires a new methodological paradigm. Although I concur with this 
observation, I think that the reason why we are in need of a different methodology is that the 
study of consciousness belongs to an irreducible conceptual level. 
Since I cannot decide where I stand regarding the debate on the nature of 
consciousness, I will attempt an alternative approach. Instead of providing reasons to 
endorse a kind of theory over another, I will analyze our understanding and use of the 
concept of consciousness, hoping to provide a way of studying it that avoids some of the 
most pressing issues concerning its nature. Hence, the interpretation of the concept of 
consciousness that I will present here does not directly oppose any particular theory of 
consciousness because it says nothing about its nature; this is the reason why I will hold that 
my proposal is metaphysically compatible with most current theories of consciousness. 
My interpretation of the concept of consciousness can be seen as a sort of pragmatic 
approach to the study of conscious systems, similar to Dennett’s (1971) stance-based 
account of intentional systems. To paraphrase Dennett’s words (p. 87), I will hold that “a 
particular thing is a [conscious] system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is 
trying to explain and predict its behavior”. In consequence, my interpretation of the concept 
of consciousness will not imply that current theories of consciousness are mistaken, but that 
adopting a conceptual approach enables the identification of what all of them have in 
common, namely, they are different ways to interpret a single conceptual space. Hence, my 
approach is not only metaphysically compatible with most contemporary theories of 
consciousness, but also with different views on the ultimately correct analysis of the concept 
of consciousness1, insofar as it admits the customization of the conceptual space according 
to our theoretical interests or strategies. 
 
1 I thank Luke Roelofs for calling my attention to this characteristic of my proposal. 
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In support of this conceptual approach, consider that the history of science is full of 
cases where the proper characterization of a concept has led to a satisfactory explanation of 
a certain phenomenon. Analogously, I will suggest that a different characterization of the 
concept of consciousness might lead to new ways of theorizing about it. As Sheldrake points 
out, “[m]any scientific concepts –from time to chemical bonds to genes to species– lack 
stable definitions but remain helpful categories to think with” (2020, pp. 17–18). Thus, 
although the term ‘consciousness’ seems to lack a stable definition, my plan is to build a 
case for Chalmers’s suggestion that “the concept of consciousness is irreducible, being 
characterizable only in terms of concepts that themselves involve consciousness” (1996, p. 
106) In particular, I will argue that a proper characterization of the concept of consciousness 
has to be given in terms of the concepts of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
 In the first chapter, I analyze different uses of the terms ‘awareness’ and 
‘consciousness’, which enables the conceptual distinction between the functional basis of 
consciousness and consciousness itself, as well as three ways to define consciousness that 
are based of the identification and conceptualization of three paradigmatic features exhibited 
by conscious states, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. My suggestion is 
that those ways to define consciousness correspond to different theoretical strategies or, as I 
rather call them, practices of conceptualization. Accordingly, I argue that, since 
intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are discernible features of conscious states, or 
aspects of consciousness, their concepts point to three characters exhibited by some internal 
states. 
In the second chapter, I introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness 
that combines the concepts of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality to form a three-
dimensional conceptual space. The purpose of this interpretation is to highlight the 
conceptual interdependence between the concept of consciousness and the concepts of its 
features. Then, I explore three general ways to reconfigure the conceptual space to build 
models of consciousness. My goal is to show that there are different ways to interpret said 
conceptual space that depend on our theoretical interests, not different concepts of 
consciousness. 
 In the third chapter, I rely on my interpretation of the concept of consciousness to 
present a way to characterize conscious states. I start by elaborating on my claim that the 
concepts of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality point to three paradigmatic 
characters exhibited by some internal states to claim that conscious states are descriptions of 
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those internal states. Thus, I introduce a classification of conscious states in terms of three 
general categories, namely, intentional, reflexive and phenomenal states. The aim of this 
chapter is to argue that our attributions of consciousness rely on our ability to identify and 
conceptualize the characters exhibited by some internal states. 
 In the fourth chapter, I employ my interpretation of the concept of consciousness to 
assess two possible kinds of conscious systems, namely, dolphins and bees. My goal is to 
illustrate how my view can be implemented to theorize about non-human consciousness. 
The methodology that I adopt there is that of interpreting recent scientific observations of 
dolphin and bee behavior in terms of my interpretation of the concept of consciousness. My 
aim is to show that the concept of consciousness can be modelled according to the specific 
characters exhibited by the internal states of each kind of system, thus producing a 
conceptualization of the kind of consciousness that the system appears to entertain. Hence, 
what I call dolphin consciousness and bee consciousness are different configurations of the 
conceptual space of the concept of consciousness, not independent concepts of 
consciousness. 
 It should be clear from the outset that this research is about a way to approach 
consciousness that does not depend on taking a stand regarding its ontological status. 
Consequently, my view does not oppose any current theory of consciousness because it says 
nothing about its ultimate nature. My intention is to present a conceptual background that 
merely relies on the conceptual space of the concept of consciousness to support the 
hypothesis that the study of consciousness belongs to an irreducible conceptual level. Hence, 
regardless of the ontological status of consciousness or the ultimate characterization of its 
concept, my suggestion is that consciousness must be studied in its own terms.  
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Chapter 1: Ways to Define Consciousness 
Defining consciousness is problematical 
not just because of the elusive, will-o-the-wisp nature of the 
phenomenon itself but because we can mean so many different things 
by the one word. 
Marian Stamp Dawkins (1998, p. 4) 
 
To most of us, it is clear that consciousness is a real phenomenon. However, there is 
no general agreement on how to characterize its nature or its concept. In scientific contexts, 
the term ‘consciousness’ is often a synonym of ‘awareness’ that denotes a function or set of 
functions carried out by the brain; in philosophical contexts, the term may refer, among many 
other alternatives, to a substance, a property, a feature, a character, or a mode. Moreover, the 
study of consciousness is often associated to a series of perplexing theoretical problems 
within Western philosophy and science2, such as the mind-body problem, the problem of 
other minds, the binding problem, the palette problem, and the explanatory gap. 
In the last few decades, theorists have proposed several ways to explain the nature of 
consciousness. Some have argued that it is part of the natural world (Chalmers, 1996), others 
have tried to explain it in terms of something else (Baars, 1988), and still others have claimed 
that there is no place for it in our scientific endeavors (Churchland, 1995). All of these 
 
2 This does not mean that explaining consciousness is exclusively a Western issue. What it means is that the 
contemporary study of consciousness originated from the Western interpretation of human nature; that 
consciousness is nowadays investigated worldwide is a consequence of the globalization of academic 
education. In contrast, there are cultures that characterize consciousness in ways that prevent its study from the 
perspective of standard academic science and philosophy (Maffie, 2008; Tinker, 2004). 
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metaphysical alternatives somehow determine the nature of consciousness, insofar as they 
fix its ontological status. From the philosophical perspective, most theorists either adopt a 
dualistic or a monistic ontology, thus creating an independent realm for consciousness, 
placing it inside the natural world, or eliminating it from reality. According to a further group 
of theorists, like McGinn (1991b) and Pinker (2009), the ultimate nature of consciousness is 
beyond our reach. 
In this chapter, I will adopt a different approach, namely, I will examine how we use 
the term ‘consciousness’ to examine our understanding of the concept of consciousness. 
Thus, the starting point of this chapter, and the main premise of this whole research, 
somehow opposes the usual way to approach consciousness: I will assume that, since the 
term ‘consciousness’ can mean many different things, perhaps we are not really acquainted 
with its referent, i.e., maybe we do not know what consciousness is. 
To avoid misinterpretations, I will refer to conscious things as systems, instead of 
using the more frequent terms ‘subject’ or ‘mind’. The term ‘system’ does not presuppose 
the object/subject distinction and it does not imply that conscious things have to be 
organisms or living things. Conceptually speaking, we should not exclude the possibility of 
there being conscious systems that do not share our neurobiology or the behavioral responses 
typically associated to consciousness; contemporary ethological research (Allen & Bekoff, 
1999; Stamp Dawkins, 1998) suggests that this is not a mere possibility, but a fact. As a 
methodological tool, I will use simple quotation marks for words and terms, italics3 for 
concepts, and regular text for their referents. Thus, 
• ‘consciousness’ ⇒	(the English word) 
• consciousness ⇒ the concept of consciousness 
• consciousness ⇒ real/objective consciousness, i.e., the referent of consciousness. 
In a nutshell, the aim of this chapter is to explicate, in Carnap’s sense (1950, pp. 3–
8), our standard uses of ‘consciousness’. In the first two sections, I will analyze both ordinary 
and technical uses of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ to show that awareness is not 
identical to consciousness. In the last section, I will discuss three possible ways to 
characterize consciousness that can be drawn from contemporary theories to argue that 
theorists tend to define the concept by identifying three discernible features of conscious 
states, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
 
3 As usual, I will also use italics to make emphasis and to name views and theories. 
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1.1. Ordinary uses of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ 
Since human cultures have a longstanding propensity to anthropomorphize certain 
features of the world (Daston & Mitman, 2007), maybe we should start by distinguishing 
standard uses of ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ from their metaphorical uses, as when we 
say “such-and-such company is eco-conscious”. In this context, some theorists have assessed 
whether “ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are 
given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions” (Sytsma & Machery, 2009, p. 
21), and showed that our ordinary use of mental terms is considerably vague. Similarly, 
others have proposed that “culturally characteristic environments may afford distinctive 
patterns of perception” (Miyamoto et al., 2006, p. 113), which suggests that our attribution 
of certain properties to things in the world, and even to ourselves, might be influenced by 
how our different social environments affect our perceptual and cognitive processes. 
Throughout this chapter, I will argue in favor of the hypothesis that our attributions of 
awareness and consciousness are determined by what I call practices of conceptualization4, 
which are conventions that concern our understanding of consciousness and awareness. 
The terms ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’, as well as their cognates, are frequently 
used by native speakers of several Western languages5, so someone might object that their 
ordinary meanings are relatively clear, and that the difficulty lies in providing scientifically 
useful definitions of them. However, consider that, although both terms are often taken to 
be synonyms, they are not always interchangeable, or at least not in English. In everyday 
language we find expressions like “such-and-such company is eco-conscious” or “my cat 
was not aware of the glass door when it ran into it”, but it would be odd to say, “my dog was 
consciously eating my homework” or “my newborn cousin is aware of global warming”. I 
take this asymmetry of use as a first sign that consciousness and awareness are not the same 
concept. 
 
4 By ‘practice of conceptualization’ I intend to accentuate the fact that the attribution of consciousness, or 
awareness, is something that we put into practice once we have learned to use ‘consciousness’, or ‘awareness’, 
and that such practice is conditioned by cultural and theoretical parameters that are constantly changing in 
accordance with new scientific discoveries and historical events. Put briefly, practices of conceptualization are 
explanatory strategies that we adopt according to specifiable theoretical goals. Since these practices are shaped 
by environmental, perceptual and cognitive factors that are beyond the conceptual scope of my work, I will not 
say anything about how they are acquired. 
5 I will focus on uses of these terms in English, but the situation is similar in other Western languages. For 
instance, although the Italian word ‘consapevolezza’ is frequently translated as ‘awareness’ and ‘coscienza’ as 
‘consciousness’, they are often interchangeable. In Spanish, while ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ are both 
translated as ‘consciencia’, their meanings might vary according to the context. 
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Let us now review how we ordinarily use the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’. 
The online version of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the noun ‘awareness’ as 
“[t]he quality or state of being aware, consciousness; (also) the condition of being aware (of 
something or that something is)”. Likewise, the adjective ‘aware’ refers to something that is 
“[i]nformed, cognizant, conscious, sensible”. When people say that a system is aware of 
something or that something is the case, they mean that the system is actually perceiving, 
thinking, imagining, etc., a certain object or state of affairs. Thus, our everyday use of 
‘awareness’ is associated with being awake, having knowledge of something, or paying 
attention to something. 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish an intransitive and a transitive use of 
‘awareness’: when I wake up in the morning, I enter a general state of awareness; when I 
hear certain chimes, I become aware that my phone is ringing. In its intransitive use, “being 
aware” is equivalent to “being in a certain psychological state”. In its transitive use, noticing 
the glass door at the entrance of the office is often described as becoming aware of it. It is 
noteworthy that, while intransitive awareness conflates with intransitive consciousness, as 
in “the patient recovered awareness/consciousness”, transitive awareness rarely conflates 
with transitive consciousness: being aware of the negative effects of cocaine is not exactly 
the same as being conscious of them. Finally, in everyday language, the transitive use of 
‘awareness’ is more common than the intransitive one; consider that, if I enter the room and 
say, “I’m aware”, you will probably ask, “what is it you’re aware of?” 
Therefore, when people say that a system has awareness, they usually refer to the 
system’s ability to attend to its environment and to itself, i.e., in the transitive sense of the 
term. In contrast, the intransitive use of ‘awareness’ points to the general state of being 
awake, though not necessarily attentive. Imagine that, while reading this sentence, someone 
comes in the room and asks, “are you aware that the window is open?” Notice that the 
question is not about whether you can see the window open, but about whether you know 
that it is. Similarly, when you wonder whether you closed the refrigerator door before 
leaving the kitchen, it is because you are not aware of having done it; when you turn back 
and see that it is closed, or remember doing it, you become aware of having closed it. Notice 
that, in these last two examples, a native speaker of English would probably abstain from 
replacing the term ‘aware’ with ‘conscious’: being conscious about leaving the refrigerator 
open points to a further fact, perhaps that you are wasting electricity. 
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Let us now analyze the ordinary use of the term ‘consciousness’ and its cognates. 
The online version of the OED gives the noun ‘consciousness’ six different definitions, the 
first of which says: “internal knowledge or conviction; the state or fact of being mentally 
conscious or aware of something”. Notice that ‘conscious’ and ‘aware’ are here taken as 
synonyms. The rest of the OED’s definitions of ‘consciousness’ either point to derivative 
uses of this first definition or to uses that apply to different contexts. As for the adjective 
‘conscious’, the OED gives eleven different definitions. The first says that to be conscious 
amounts to “having awareness of one’s own wrongdoing, affected by a feeling of guilt”, 
while the second one reads, “having knowledge or awareness; able to perceive or experience 
something”. Notice that the first definition applies to moral contexts, while the second points 
to the ability to experience, which is the sense that interests us. 
Broadly speaking, most of our everyday uses of the term ‘consciousness’, and its 
cognates, refer to moral awareness. Maybe I am aware of having left the door of the 
refrigerator open without considering its environmental consequences, in which case I would 
not be morally conscious of my action. People who drive under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs might be aware of the red light, but probably they are not conscious of how dangerous 
it is to pass through it. However, it is the less common use of the term ‘consciousness’, the 
one that refers to experience, what motivates the philosophical debate. According to many 
theorists, some states of awareness are accompanied by a certain what-it’s-like-ness, though 
not all of them: sometimes soldiers are aware of their wounds without being conscious of 
the pain they cause them, and sometimes they feel an excruciating pain without being aware 
of its cause. This sense of the term ‘consciousness’ is the second sign that consciousness is 
not identical to awareness. 
This brief analysis has shown that our everyday use of ‘consciousness’ cannot be 
detached from that of ‘awareness’; in fact, the OED defines ‘consciousness’ in terms of 
awareness. Hence, it seems that consciousness and awareness must be somehow intertwined. 
However, we have also seen that the terms are not always interchangeable, which means that 
‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ do not point to the same concept. In the following section, 
I will try to identify the difference between consciousness and awareness by analyzing how 
theorists tend to use the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’. 
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1.2. Technical uses of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ 
There is no generally agreed definition of consciousness. As Van Gulick (2018) says, 
“[t]he words ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ are umbrella terms that cover a wide variety 
of mental phenomena”. Although in everyday language ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ 
coincide in many of their uses, it seems that ‘awareness’ points to a certain cognitive ability 
of some systems, while ‘consciousness’ points to the ability to experience. For instance, 
Chalmers says that “[c]onsciousness is always accompanied by awareness, but awareness 
[…] need not be accompanied by consciousness” because “[o]ne can be aware of a fact 
without any particular associated phenomenal experience” (1996, p. 28). Recall that this 
research is not about consciousness, so I will not take a stand regarding this claim. In this 
section, I will explore the conceptual reasons that might justify this kind of view, which will 
serve to identify the theoretically relevant sense of the term ‘consciousness’. 
While the use of the term ‘awareness’ in ordinary contexts seems fairly clear, this is 
not the case in philosophical and scientific contexts. Despite the fact that awareness plays a 
fundamental role in contemporary philosophy of mind, psychology, cognitive science, and 
neuroscience, it is rarely defined. Allow me to illustrate the situation. In the field of 
psychology, the online APA Dictionary of Psychology says that awareness is “perception or 
knowledge of something”, and that “it is possible to be aware of something without being 
explicitly conscious of it”. This definition is clearly about transitive awareness, but it only 
allows us to infer that the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ are not coextensive. In the 
field of cognitive science, ‘awareness’ has no entry neither in the MIT Encyclopedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences (Wilson & Keil, 1999), nor in the Dictionary of Cognitive Science 
(Houdé, 2004). Finally, in the field of philosophy, the term has no entry neither in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, nor in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Blackburn, 1996). Interestingly, the term has no entry in The Oxford Companion to 
Consciousness (Bayne et al., 2009), yet ‘awareness’ and its cognates appear more than 1,000 
times throughout the whole volume. 
Let us review how theorists use ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ to determine 
whether there are enough reasons to support my claim that consciousness is not identical to 
awareness. In 1906, Dewey published a brief analysis of six different uses of the terms 
‘consciousness’ and ‘conscious’. Two of those uses are particularly interesting. The fourth 
use says that: “‘Conscious’ means aware: ‘consciousness,’ the state of being aware. This is 
a wide, colorless use; there is no discrimination nor implication as to contents, as to what 
 11 
there is awareness of, –whether mental or physical, personal or impersonal, etc.” (Dewey, 
1906, p. 40). According to this “colorless” use, ‘consciousness’ points to intransitive 
awareness. Thus, since this use makes no reference to the contents of conscious states, i.e., 
to the fact that they are often about something, ‘consciousness’ names the general state of 
being awake. 
The former use of ‘consciousness’ broadly coincides with our everyday use of the 
term ‘awareness’, which would explain why “to be conscious” and “to be aware” are often 
equivalent. Clearly, this use of ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ is restricted to their 
intransitive senses. Nevertheless, although this use might support the idea that a system must 
be aware to have conscious states, i.e., that consciousness necessitates awareness, we still 
do not know why awareness does not necessitate consciousness. In consequence, it appears 
that we must look elsewhere for the difference between consciousness and awareness. 
Dewey’s fifth use of ‘consciousness’ seems to point in the right direction. In its 
“distinctively philosophical use”, says Dewey, ‘consciousness’ “bring[s] out the difference 
between thoughts, [feelings, volitions] etc., characterizing the peculiar quality of a specific 
being or agent, and something which in general lies back of and conditions all such thoughts. 
Consciousness is now one with mind, or soul, or subject, as an underlying condition 
hypostasized into a substance” (Dewey, 1906, p. 40). While most contemporary theorists 
openly reject substance dualism (Descartes, 1984), they often characterize consciousness as, 
for instance, a concrete natural phenomenon (Chalmers, 1996, p. 128; G. Strawson, 2017, p. 
84), a biological phenomenon (Searle, 2017, p. 331), or as a fundamental property (Goff, 
2017, p. 3). 
One of the advantages of “hypostasizing” consciousness is that it becomes a 
legitimate object of philosophical and scientific study. However, this strategy also opens the 
debate about the place of consciousness in reality. Consider that, although most 
contemporary theorists agree that “[c]onsciousness is a complex feature of the world” (Van 
Gulick, 2018), some have argued that consciousness is an ill-conceived concept 
(Churchland, 1995, p. 189), or that ‘consciousness’ refers to an illusory feature of experience 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 23). In particular, the claim that consciousness exists leads to the idea that 
consciousness refers to something that characterizes a special kind of entity called subject 
or mind. 
Beyond the metaphysical implications of the views above, it should be noted that 
Dewey’s fifth use of ‘consciousness’ not only points to transitive consciousness, insofar as 
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it makes reference to the ability to entertain conscious states, like thoughts, feelings, 
volitions, etc., but also to the fact that those conscious states must be states of a system. 
While the previous “colorless” use of the term only referred to a kind of general state, this 
use refers to conscious states as internal states that characterize “the peculiar quality of a 
specific being or agent”. This is precisely the theoretically relevant sense of ‘consciousness’: 
when theorists use the term, they intend to call our attention to the fact that conscious states 
are experiences. It seems that we have found a good reason to claim that consciousness is 
not identical to awareness: to be aware of something is not the same as experiencing it. 
The above are not the only technical uses of ‘consciousness’. For instance, a different 
way to describe our use of the term is by focusing on the kinds of systems capable of having 
conscious states. This aspect of the study of consciousness is called creature consciousness 
and is usually subdivided into animal consciousness and artificial consciousness, or machine 
consciousness. However, since I take all conscious things to be systems, it does not matter 
whether some of them are animal, artificial, celestial or imaginary, because a proper 
characterization of consciousness should be equally applicable to all conscious systems, as 
long as we take into account the relevant differences between the mechanisms that enable 
their conscious states. Consider that, while we know that dogs do not perceive colors exactly 
as we do, this does not necessarily mean that they are unable to entertain visual experiences. 
If it turns out that dogs are unable to entertain visual experiences, the reason cannot be that 
they perceive color differently. 
Another technical use of ‘consciousness’ makes reference to the idea that conscious 
systems are cognitive systems. Accordingly, the system’s ontological status is superfluous, 
for conscious states could be realized by many ontologically different kinds of cognitive 
systems (Putnam, 1967). A concern about this use has to do with whether consciousness is 
binary or not, i.e., is consciousness an all-or-nothing state or does it come in degrees? Some 
have argued that it is not binary (Dennett, 1995; Lycan, 1996), while others have claimed 
that it is (Searle, 1994). Since this research is about consciousness, I do not need to address 
this debate. 
We now have a way to explicate the difference between technical uses of 
‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’: while ‘awareness’ points to a certain cognitive ability, 
‘consciousness’ points to experience. Hence, I take awareness to refer to the cognitive 
capacity to attend, discriminate, abstract, synthesize, and recall whatever a system’s 
perceptual apparatus is capable of encoding and processing. Briefly put, awareness points 
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to the functional basis of consciousness. Notice that, in contrast to Chalmers’s (1996, p. 28) 
information-based definition of awareness, my characterization of the concept is given in 
cognitive terms. Conceptually speaking, a system could have awareness without having the 
capacity to encode information as we understand it, and not everything capable of encoding 
information is necessarily aware of it. Hence, despite Chalmers’s reasoning (1996, pp. 293–
297), a thermostat may have the capacity to encode and process information, but it hardly 
qualifies as something that experiences temperature changes. 
In general, concepts can be characterized in different ways, for instance, in terms of 
the concept of its alleged fundamental property, by reducing it to another concept, or in 
relation to other concepts, i.e., by means of an inter-definition; this last approach is the one 
that I will support in the next chapter. It appears that we understand consciousness in 
different ways, i.e., according to different practices of conceptualization, even if we do not 
know exactly what consciousness is. Arguably, consciousness is not the only concept that 
can be characterized in different ways. Consider that, throughout the history of philosophy, 
meaning has been characterized in several incompatible ways, though, presumably, all of its 
characterizations point to the same phenomenon. In the following section, I will present three 
ways to characterize consciousness that can be drawn from different contemporary theories. 
With this, I intend to identify the conceptual background of those theories to determine the 
foundations of our understanding of consciousness. Hence, what follows is not an analysis 
of contemporary theories of consciousness, but a speculation about how theorists tend to 
define consciousness. 
1.3. Three approaches to consciousness 
Arguably, every theory has a conceptual background that determines the way in 
which its subject-matter is addressed. By ‘conceptual background’ I mean the 
characterization of a theory’s subject-matter and how it relates to the rest of the concepts 
that are at the basis of the theory, thus forming a structure of interrelated concepts. In my 
view, part of what differentiates competing theories of consciousness is that they have 
different conceptual backgrounds, though they presumably share the same subject-matter6. 
In other words, while I grant that most contemporary theories of consciousness are, indeed, 
about consciousness, the fact that they adopt different theoretical strategies suggests that 
 
6 All theories of consciousness are supposedly meant to explain the same phenomenon, so different 
characterizations of consciousness should at least have the same referent. Otherwise, they would be theories 
about different subject-matters, not competing theories of consciousness. 
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they explain different conceptually distinct aspects of consciousness. Thus, while many 
theorists have provided good reasons to endorse a theory over another, there does not seem 
to be a general concept of consciousness with which we could decide which theory best 
explains the nature of its referent. 
The aim of this section is to reveal the foundations of our understanding of 
consciousness and, to that end, I will present three ways to characterize the concept that can 
be drawn from the apparent conceptual backgrounds of several contemporary theories of 
consciousness. I will argue that the following approaches to consciousness are practices of 
conceptualization that rely on the identification of different discernible features7 of 
conscious states, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality, and that each of 
them assigns a higher theoretical weight to one of those features. Consequently, my intention 
is not to argue against any of those characterizations of consciousness, but to show that they 
address different aspects of consciousness. 
First, allow me to discuss one particularly influential distinction, namely, that 
between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness8 (Block, 1995). The first thing 
to note is that, since access consciousness is defined in terms of the availability of 
information for cognitive use (Block, 1995, p. 232), it is a functional feature. Thus, according 
to my previous analysis, ‘access consciousness’ does not point to consciousness, but to 
transitive awareness, insofar as a system could be able to process and use information 
without experiencing any of its internal states. This is not an argument against Block’s 
distinction because I think that it legitimately emphasizes the conceptual difference between 
the functional basis of consciousness, i.e., awareness, and consciousness. However, while 
Block presents his distinction as one between two concepts of consciousness, I believe that 
access consciousness is transitive awareness, not a concept of consciousness. Block’s second 
concept of consciousness, namely, phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995, p. 230), does 
seem to point to at least part of the theoretically relevant sense of consciousness, insofar as 
it refers to the phenomenal character of experience9. 
I will now speculate about the apparent conceptual backgrounds of different theories, 
to show that theorists mainly characterize consciousness: 1) in reference to the intentionality 
 
7 I prefer to use the term ‘feature’, instead of ‘property’, because it has less metaphysical implications. Since 
this research is mainly focused on conceptual issues, I would like to leave open the debate on whether those 
features are actual properties of consciousness. 
8 I thank Luke Roelofs and Sam Coleman for helping me improve my interpretation of Block’s distinction. 
9 I will say more about the phenomenal character of experience later in this section. 
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of conscious states; 2) in terms of their reflexivity; or 3) in relation to their phenomenality. 
Briefly put, I will argue that consciousness has been explicated in terms of intentionality, 
reflexivity or phenomenality, which are concepts that point to different aspects of 
consciousness. Bear in mind that what follows is not an interpretation of how theorists 
explain consciousness, but an analysis of how they seem to characterize consciousness10. 
1.3.1. Intentionality 
One way to define consciousness is by expressing it in terms of the intentionality of 
conscious states, though defining intentionality has proven to be as difficult as defining 
consciousness11. I will call this the intentional approach. By analyzing how theorists seem 
to explicate consciousness in terms of intentionality, I will show that the latter is a concept 
that points to a discernible feature of conscious states and that the intentional approach 
explains an aspect of consciousness. 
Broadly speaking, the intentional approach is based on the thesis that “[m]any 
thoughts and experiences are ‘about’ or ‘of’ something” (Bayne et al., 2009, p. 382). Thus, 
whenever we experience something, or that something is the case, we entertain an intentional 
state, i.e., a kind of conscious state that has about-ness. To make things clear, I take ‘about-
ness’ to point to the fact that many conscious states are about or of something12, not to how 
their contents are represented. The sense of ‘intentionality’ that interests us here is the one 
that makes reference to 
[…] the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to 
stand for, things, properties, and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s 
mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental 
representations or that they have contents (Jacob, 2019). 
Intentionality appears to be a distinctive feature of at least some conscious states, 
insofar as we seem to be able to identify and classify them according to their about-ness and 
their contents. Thus, the strategy of defining consciousness in terms of intentionality could 
be motivated by either the thesis that experiences are about or of something, or by the thesis 
 
10 Since I will not assess any theory of consciousness, my analysis of how consciousness can be characterized 
may not coincide with how theorists actually do it. My goal is to reveal the foundations of our understanding 
of consciousness by analyzing the conceptual background that seems to support each view, not the views 
themselves. 
11 Some have even argued that it is impossible to understand one without the other (McGinn, 1991a, p. 78; 
Searle, 1992, p. 132). 
12 It should be noted that ‘intentionality’ “is a philosopher’s word” (Jacob, 2019), not to be confused with the 
ordinary sense of ‘intention’ as the purpose or goal of an action. 
 16 
that experiences have contents. Notice that these are not equivalent theses13: an experience 
could be about something without having a specifiable content, while every experience that 
has a specifiable content is necessarily about something. Although we could endorse both 
theses14 and claim that the intentionality of conscious states consists in their about-ness and 
their having contents, the about-ness of a given state can still be conceptually detached from 
the state’s content. Thus, it seems that about-ness is conceptually prior to the content of an 
intentional state, insofar the state must be about something to have a content. Furthermore, 
it is to be expected that, whenever an intentional state has a content, such content should be 
specifiable somehow15, which is not always the case. 
In my view, the intentional approach exemplifies a practice of conceptualization 
where intentionality is taken as the fundamental property of consciousness. However, such 
practice is only possible once we have a relatively clear definition of intentionality. Thus, 
my suggestion is that the attribution of intentionality consists in the application of a concept. 
According to this practice of conceptualization, intentionality refers to the presentational 
character16 exhibited by some internal states. In consequence, every attribution of 
intentionality relies on the implementation of a convention regarding intentionality that 
ultimately depends on the conceptualization of the presentational character exhibited by 
some internal states. 
Our understanding of intentionality seems to be mediated by our understanding of 
about-ness, so let us look closer into the latter. While some intentionalists, like Brentano, 
seem to suggest that about-ness is a feature or aspect of intentionality, others have claimed 
that “‘aboutness’ is the mere representation of some thing in words or thought, whether or 
not it exists” (Crane, 2013, p. 9). It seems to follow that every intentional state is a 
representational state, thus binding about-ness to the thesis that intentional states have 
specifiable contents. While it may seem that every human intentional state is also somehow 
representational, insofar as we are frequently able to represent the about-ness of our 
intentional states, it is not obvious that every intentional state is representational. In 
particular, it seems that the ability to represent exceeds the about-ness of intentional states. 
 
13 Unless we take ‘about-ness’ to mean “having a content”. 
14 Some theorists even treat ‘intentionality’ and ‘about-ness’ as synonyms (Bourget & Mendelovici, 2019). 
15 For instance, as a proposition or a mental image. 
16 The reason why I use the term ‘presentational’, instead ‘representational’, is that the former refers to the 
“particular form in which something is perceived by the mind”, while the latter refers to “[s]omething which 
stands for or denotes another symbolically”, as stated in their corresponding entries in the OED. 
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According to the OED, a representation is “[a]n image, concept, or thought in the 
mind, esp. as representing an object or state of affairs in the world”, i.e., representations are 
the contents of intentional states. Note that a representation can be formed verbally or by 
other cognitive means and that this is probably the reason why Crane suggests that about-
ness consists in the representation of something “in words or thought”, where ‘thought’ 
points to non-verbal means17. However, we should not exclude the possibility of intentional 
states whose contents cannot be specified but that have about-ness18. 
Conceptually speaking, we should distinguish about-ness from the fact that some 
intentional states have contents because contents must be represented by the system. This is 
the reason why the thesis that some internal states have about-ness is not equivalent to the 
thesis that they have contents. Thus, my suggestion is that about-ness points to the 
presentational character of some internal states. Nevertheless, some have insisted that 
intentional states are representational. Brentano, for instance, argued that “[e]very mental 
phenomenon includes something as object within itself” (Brentano, 2005, p. 68), where the 
objects that constitute the contents of intentional states are called intentional objects. 
However, 
[i]t has sometimes been claimed […] that some kinds of mental state are 
not intentional. The examples usually cited are somatic experiences, such 
as pain and pleasure, and moods, such as depression and elation. On the 
face of it, a toothache is not about anything, and nor is an orgasm. 
Likewise, depression, anxiety, and elation do not appear to be about 
anything in particular. Yet all these are clearly mental phenomena (Bayne 
et al., 2009, p. 383). 
Brentano’s followers frequently reply that “somatic experiences are about 
something, after all: they are about physiological events in one’s body” (Bayne et al., 2009, 
p. 383). However, it seems that we are dealing with two senses of ‘about-ness’: on the one 
hand, the term points to the presentational character exhibited by some conscious states; on 
the other, it points to the representation of the intentionality of a state. Consider, for instance, 
the about-ness of a headache: while, in the second sense, it could be said that the headache 
is about an inflammation in my head; in the first sense, my experience of the headache is 
about its phenomenality, i.e., what it is like for me to experience the headache. Accordingly, 
 
17 I thank Sam Coleman for helping me improve my interpretation of Crane’s characterization of about-ness. 
18 Arguably, pre-linguistic children entertain states that exhibit a presentational character, i.e., that have about-
ness, thought they might not yet have the cognitive skills to represent what their states are about. Furthermore, 
though all unimpaired adult humans possibly share the same perceptual apparatus and the same representational 
skills, different cultures tend to represent similar perceptions differently (Miyamoto et al., 2006). 
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it seems that we are dealing with two different practices of conceptualization concerning 
about-ness, one directed at the conceptualization of the presentational character of an 
experience, the other at the representation of the intentionality of the experience. 
The latter analysis of the intentionality of somatic experiences evinces a close link 
between intentionality and phenomenality, insofar as the about-ness of somatic experiences 
seem to point to their what-it’s-like-ness. Additionally, since somatic experiences are actual 
states that conscious systems entertain under certain circumstances, their intentionality must 
also be linked to the system’s ability to entertain states that exhibit reflexive characters, i.e., 
its ability to be aware of itself and its own mentality. Hence, there is also a link between 
intentionality and reflexivity. I will have more to say about these links in the third chapter, 
but it should be noted that the closer we look into intentionality, the closer we get to the 
other two discernible features of conscious states, namely, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
So far, we have found a direct relation between intentionality and reflexivity, insofar 
as some intentional states require the system to be able to entertain states that exhibit 
reflexive characters. In consequence, it seems that at least some attributions of intentionality 
also involve the attribution of reflexivity, which suggests that intentionality is not 
independent from reflexivity. Thus, although intentionality can be conceptually 
distinguished from reflexivity, it does not follow that they must be independent properties 
of consciousness. This is the reason why I treat them as discernible features of conscious 
states. 
We have also seen that the intentional approach is grounded on the thesis that all 
conscious states are intentional states because they are mainly identified by their about-ness. 
However, there are cases where the intentionality of conscious states involves non-
intentional features, like the phenomenality and the reflexivity of moods, emotions, somatic 
experiences, etc. Hence, it seems that intentionality cannot be detached from reflexivity and 
phenomenality, which suggests that consciousness cannot be fully characterized in terms of 
intentionality, unless we make some further claims19. In any case, I have shown that a proper 
characterization of intentionality requires an explicit reference to phenomenality and 
reflexivity. 
 
19 For instance, an intentionalist could argue that the phenomenality of an experience is part of its intentionality 
(Tye, 1995, p. 137) and that reflexivity is not a feature of the experience, but an instance of a principle that 
applies to consciousness in general (Roelofs, 2016, p. 3205). 
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My goal here is not to say that the intentional approach is flawed or misguided. On 
the contrary, I think that the intentional approach provides a good explanation of an aspect 
of consciousness. What I have tried to argue is that consciousness could only be 
characterized in terms of intentionality by taking into account its connection to 
phenomenality and reflexivity. Otherwise, we would not be able to account for conscious 
states that do not seem to exhibit a presentational character, like moods and emotions. For 
these reasons, I do not think that there is an intentionalist concept of consciousness, i.e., 
there is nothing like intentional consciousness. In my view, the intentional approach relies 
on a specific way to characterize consciousness, namely, according to a practice of 
conceptualization where intentionality is taken as the fundamental property of 
consciousness. 
My claim is not that the intentional approach fails to capture consciousness and that, 
consequently, the theories that seem to endorse this approach are unable to explain 
consciousness. Instead, what I have tried to argue is that, while the intentional approach 
adopts a theoretical strategy where intentionality is posited as the fundamental property of 
consciousness, the way in which consciousness is characterized involves the concepts of the 
other two discernible features of conscious states, namely, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
Thus, although the intentional approach seems to be suitable for explaining an aspect of 
consciousness, it is not obvious that an explanation of the ultimate nature of consciousness 
could be given in purely intentional terms, i.e., independently of phenomenality and 
reflexivity. 
1.3.2. Reflexivity 
Another way to characterize consciousness is by referring to the reflexivity of 
conscious states. I will call this the reflexive approach. According to some theorists 
(Gennaro, 2012; Kriegel, 2009), conscious states are reflexive20, insofar as they involve self-
awareness or self-examination. Broadly speaking, the reflexive approach is grounded on the 
intuition that conscious systems have the ability to be aware of at least some of their internal 
states21. In particular, theorists tend to point out that “[h]uman beings are conscious not only 
of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their 
mental lives” (Smith, 2017). Thus, it would seem that conscious states always exhibit a 
 
20 It should be noted that, although ‘reflexivity’ is often related to ‘introspection’, ‘subjectivity’, and 
‘perspectivity’, the terms are not coextensive. 
21 I thank Sam Coleman for helping me clarify the foundations of the reflexive approach. 
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reflexive character. As in the case of intentionality, by analyzing how theorists seem to 
explicate consciousness in terms of reflexivity, I will show that the latter is a concept that 
points to a discernible feature of conscious states and that the reflexive approach explains an 
aspect of consciousness. 
In my view, the reflexive approach exemplifies a practice of conceptualization where 
reflexivity is taken as the fundamental property of consciousness. However, such practice is 
only possible once we have a relatively clear definition of reflexivity. Thus, my suggestion 
is that the attribution of reflexivity consists in the application of a concept. According to this 
practice of conceptualization, reflexivity refers to the reflexive character exhibited by some 
internal states. Thus, every attribution of reflexivity relies on the implementation of a 
convention regarding reflexivity that ultimately depends on the conceptualization of the 
reflexive character exhibited by some internal states. 
To say that conscious states are reflexive does not necessarily mean that they are 
self-referential. Actually, it could be argued that self-referentiality is not a property that is 
exclusive of conscious states22. In contrast, the advocates of the reflexive approach tend to 
argue that all conscious states exhibit a reflexive character, insofar as they involve the 
system’s ability to be aware of at least some of its internal states. Thus, according to this 
approach, a system is conscious if it can be aware of some of its internal states, not if it 
entertains self-referential states. 
In a sense, reflexivity is related to what some theorists call mine-ness because it points 
to the fact that some internal states are experienced by the system as its own states23. 
Accordingly, one might argue that reflexivity is a lower-order24 property of consciousness 
often called pre-reflective self-consciousness (Kriegel, 2009, pp. 176–181), minimal self-
awareness (Zahavi, 2005), or weak self-consciousness (Flanagan, 1995, p. 193), and it could 
also be interpreted in terms of what Roelofs (2016, p. 3205) calls the Ownership Principle. 
What matters is that reflexivity is a concept that points to the reflexive character exhibited 
by some internal states. For instance, in seeing an apple, I am conscious of my perception of 
 
22 For instance, it is often a property of linguistic expressions, works of art, mathematical and logical formulas, 
and computer programs. 
23 Nevertheless, reflexivity and mine-ness are not the same concept. While the former points to a feature of at 
least some conscious states, the latter points to how the system experiences such feature. Thus, mine-ness 
seems to result from a relation between reflexivity and phenomenality. 
24 It might seem that my discussion of the discernible features of conscious states is actually about lower-order 
properties of consciousness. However, since I am mainly interested in conceptual aspects, the discernible 
features of consciousness may not resemble the actual properties of consciousness. 
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it, even if I cannot represent myself as such-and-such. Furthermore, consider that newborns 
might not be conscious of themselves as selves, though they do seem to entertain states that 
exhibit reflexive characters (Flanagan, 1995, p. 193). 
Theorists have proposed different ways to identify the reflexive character of 
conscious states. For instance, some have pointed out that we, and possibly many other kinds 
of systems, are capable of bodily awareness: “not only do we perceive it [our body] through 
external senses, but we have also an internal access to it through bodily sensations” (de 
Vignemont, 2018). Thus, bodily awareness points to the relation we have with our bodies 
by means of our proprioceptive skills: we control, monitor and feel our own bodies “from 
the inside”. In my view, every experience of our own body is necessarily reflexive, insofar 
as it implies having awareness of the experience, i.e., there cannot be an experience of our 
body of which we are not aware because reflexivity is part of the experience itself25. 
Otherwise, we would have to claim that we could experience, say, the position of our body, 
without being aware of it. 
In any case, bodily awareness points to a kind of reflexivity that only applies to 
embodies systems and, conceptually speaking, there could be disembodied conscious 
systems. Furthermore, that conscious embodied systems tend to have bodily awareness does 
not mean that they are aware of every state of their body: I am certainly not aware of the 
level of serotonin in my body, though I can be aware of my mood26. 
The interpretation of bodily awareness is controversial and there is no general 
agreement about how to explain its referent. Notice, for instance, that bodily awareness is 
not the same as having self-monitoring mechanisms. Our bodies have several self-
monitoring mechanisms, like temperature and heart rate regulation, of which we cannot be 
aware. Analogously, computers are often programmed to monitor their internal states, but 
they do not seem to be able to experience those states. Consequently, bodily awareness 
should not be reduced to the purely mechanical processes of regulation and monitorization 
that take place in a system’s body27. 
 
25 That we are not always able to conceptualize the reflexivity of states of bodily awareness has to do with the 
fact that sometimes we are not capable of identifying their reflexive characters, not with their absence. 
26 That the level of serotonin in my body is related to my mood is not something I can experience because it is 
not part of my ability to entertain states of bodily awareness. Put briefly, I can experience mood variations, not 
changes in the level of serotonin in my body. 
27 Note that states of bodily awareness cannot be explained in terms of their physiological basis, i.e., in terms 
of awareness, because they exhibit a reflexive character that cannot be reduced to the self-monitoring 
mechanisms that enable them. 
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Moreover, that sometimes we are unable to describe the reflexive character of a state 
of bodily awareness, as when we have a sensation that we cannot describe, only means that 
some reflexive characters cannot be described in terms of intentionality. More importantly, 
since only embodied systems can entertain states of bodily awareness, a characterization of 
consciousness in terms of this kind of reflexivity would exclude the possibility of there being 
disembodied conscious systems. Besides, it seems clear that we entertain many conscious 
states that are not states of bodily awareness, though they often exhibit reflexive characters. 
Since bodily awareness points to the reflexive character of a subset of our conscious states, 
namely, those of some of the states of our body, consciousness cannot be fully characterized 
in terms of this kind of reflexivity. 
Another way to characterize the reflexivity of conscious states is by means of what 
Bermúdez (1998), Peacocke (2014) and Zahavi (2005), among others, call self-
consciousness or self-awareness28. Broadly speaking, the idea is that, “[i]f one is capable of 
self-conscious thought, […] one must be able to think in such a way that it is manifest to one 
that it is oneself about whom one is thinking” (Smith, 2017). Notice that, in contrast to bodily 
awareness, self-conscious states are reflexive in the sense that they imply having awareness 
of our own mentality, not about the states of our body. While bodily awareness specifically 
refers to embodied systems, self-consciousness points to the system’s mentality, which 
means that there could be disembodied self-conscious systems. 
Self-conscious states involve the system’s ability to be aware of itself and of its own 
mental states. Thus, a system that entertains self-conscious states is a system capable of 
experiencing its own mentality. This characteristic of self-conscious states suggests that self-
consciousness can be linked to intentionality, inasmuch as self-conscious states are states 
about the system’s internal states29. However, the reflexivity of self-conscious states does 
not necessarily imply that they also have a distinctive intentionality. From the point of view 
of the reflexive approach, one could argue that the reflexivity of a self-conscious state does 
not mean that the state has a content or even that it is about something in the relevant sense: 
I can be conscious, or aware30, of myself without being, at the same time, aware that my 
consciousness of myself is about myself or that its content is a representation of myself. 
 
28 It is noteworthy that ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ are equivalent because they both point to the 
intransitive senses of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’. 
29 I will have more to say about the link between self-consciousness and intentionality in the third chapter. 
30 Recall that ‘aware’ and ‘conscious’ are equivalent in this context because they point to the transitive senses 
of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’. 
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Briefly put, to be aware of myself and to be aware of my awareness are two different kinds 
of conscious states. 
It could also be argued that self-conscious states exhibit phenomenal characters 
because, after all, they are experienced by the system. Thus, it would seem that self-
consciousness is linked to phenomenality31. However, it is not clear how the phenomenal 
characters of self-conscious states could be described in terms of reflexivity. Moreover, at 
least from the conceptual point of view, there might be self-conscious states that do not 
exhibit phenomenal characters. Hence, it seems that, while self-consciousness points to the 
reflexivity of many of our conscious states, it cannot account for their other features, which 
means that consciousness cannot be fully characterized in terms of self-consciousness. 
A further way to characterize the reflexivity of conscious states is by means of self-
knowledge. According to some theorists (Descartes, 1984, p. 20; Locke, 1975, p. 335; 
Nozick, 1981), we are not only self-conscious, we can also adopt several propositional 
attitudes towards our mentality. Since Descartes (1984), many theorists have claimed that 
our self-knowledge is a) infallible, because it seems impossible for us to have false beliefs 
about being in a certain state; and b) omniscient, because being in a certain conscious state 
is sufficient for knowing that we are in that state. However, self-knowledge clearly refers to 
higher-order intentional states, insofar as knowing and believing are propositional attitudes 
that not only require the system to be self-conscious, but also to be able to entertain 
intentional states that target its own conscious states. Thus defined, although self-knowledge 
seems to link reflexivity and intentionality, it points to a reduced set of conscious states. 
Consider that, while my perception of an apple probably exhibits the kind of reflexivity to 
which bodily awareness points, it is not a state of self-knowledge, insofar as I do not need 
to know that I am perceiving an apple to be aware of my perception of it. 
Some theorists (Fasching, 2009; Slors & Jongepier, 2014; Zahavi, 2000, 2005) have 
claimed that the reflexivity of conscious states is not an extra ingredient, nor a property of 
consciousness, because most, if not all, conscious states exhibit a reflexive character; 
conceptualizable or not. For this reason, one could claim that reflexivity is not a feature of 
conscious states, but a condition of consciousness. However, it should be noted that not all 
conscious states can be described in terms of reflexivity because a description of the reflexive 
character of a state is not a description of its intentionality or its phenomenality. 
 
31 I will have more to say about the link between self-consciousness and phenomenality in the third chapter. 
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The latter suggests that consciousness cannot be fully characterized in terms of 
reflexivity because it is closely connected to intentionality and phenomenality. Moreover, it 
seems that the reflexivity of many conscious states is somehow modified by their 
intentionality and their phenomenality, as well as it also seems to modify them. Thus, I do 
not think that there is a reflexive concept of consciousness, i.e., there is nothing like reflexive 
consciousness. In my view, the reflexive approach relies on a specific way to characterize 
consciousness, namely, according to a practice of conceptualization that posits reflexivity as 
the fundamental property of consciousness. 
My claim is not that the reflexive approach fails to capture consciousness and that, 
consequently, the theories that seem to endorse this approach are unable to explain 
consciousness. Instead, what I have tried to argue is that, while the reflexive approach adopts 
a theoretical strategy where reflexivity is posited as the fundamental property of 
consciousness, the way in which consciousness is characterized involves the concepts of the 
other two discernible features of conscious states, namely, intentionality and phenomenality. 
Thus, although the reflexive approach seems to be suitable for explaining an aspect of 
consciousness, it is not obvious that an explanation of the ultimate nature of consciousness 
could be given in purely reflexive terms, i.e., independently of intentionality and reflexivity. 
1.3.3. Phenomenality 
A third way to characterize consciousness is by referring to the fact that experience 
is like something (Nagel, 1974), i.e., that there is something it is like to entertain a conscious 
state. In other words, the idea is that conscious states exhibit a phenomenal character32, 
insofar as they seem to have phenomenal properties33. I will call this the phenomenal 
approach. Phenomenalists (Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Jackson, 1986; Levine, 
1983; Nagel, 1974) often argue that a proper explanation of consciousness must account for 
its phenomenality. As in the cases of intentionality and reflexivity, by analyzing how 
theorists seem to explicate consciousness in terms of phenomenality, I will show that the 
latter is a concept that points to a discernible feature of conscious states and that the 
phenomenal approach explains an aspect of consciousness. 
The phenomenalist approach is grounded on the thesis that there is “always 
‘something it is like’ to be in a given conscious state –something it’s like for one who is in 
 
32 Often referred to as “the subjective quality of experience” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 4). 
33 Also called qualia. 
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that state– and what it’s like for you to be in a state is what makes it a conscious state of the 
kind it is” (Siewert, 2016). In consequence, according to this approach, consciousness must 
be described in terms of phenomenality or, more precisely, consciousness and phenomenal 
consciousness are coextensive. 
In my view, the phenomenalist approach exemplifies a practice of conceptualization 
where phenomenality is taken as the fundamental property of consciousness. However, such 
practice is only possible once we have a relatively clear definition of phenomenality. Thus, 
my suggestion is that the attribution of phenomenality consists in the application of a 
concept. According to this practice of conceptualization, phenomenality refers to the 
phenomenal character exhibited by some internal states. Thus, every attribution of 
phenomenality relies on the implementation of a convention regarding phenomenality that 
ultimately depends on the identification of the phenomenal character exhibited by some 
internal states. 
Broadly speaking, phenomenality points to the what-it’s-like-ness of experience 
which, according to my view, is a conceptualization of the phenomenal character of 
conscious states. Hence, we must start by exploring what-it’s-like-ness. According to many 
theorists, the what-it’s-like-ness of conscious states is constituted by phenomenal features 
that are irreducible to their cognitive/psychological and functional features. Moreover, it 
seems that specific kinds of experiences, like perceptions, have specific phenomenal 
features. For instance, we can focus on our perception of a tomato and describe its color in 
terms of what it is like for us to perceive it. Furthermore, according to some theorists (G. 
Strawson, 2004), thoughts and beliefs also have distinguishable phenomenal features: the 
what-it’s-like-ness of thinking about global warming seems to be characteristically different 
from the perception of a tomato. Hence, one could argue that the what-it’s-like-ness of 
experience is at least partially determined by the modality34 of the experience which means 
that each modality is accompanied by different phenomenal features. 
A further characteristic of the what-it’s-like-ness of experience is that it is context-
sensitive (Roelofs, 2014, p. 64), in the sense that the phenomenal features of an experience 
depend on environmental, physiological and cultural factors: perceptions are certainly 
constraint by external conditions, a system’s perceptual and cognitive mechanisms influence 
how the system experiences under different circumstances, and the cultural environment of 
 
34 These modalities are the different means through which a system could entertain conscious states, namely, 
sensory perception, proprioception, thought, belief, etc. 
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a system shapes the way in which the system interprets its experiences. Besides these three 
elements, there is the cognitive/psychological element that concerns the overall mentality of 
the system, like its previous experiences and its general state of consciousness35. Thus, the 
what-it’s-like-ness of, say, my belief in global warming results from the integration of these 
four elements. 
Another way to characterize what-it’s-like-ness is by means of subjectivity. It is often 
said that there is a certain epistemic asymmetry between our own conscious states and those 
of others: “Facts about conscious experience can be at best incompletely understood from 
an outside third person point of view” (Van Gulick, 2018). We might be able to somehow 
share with others some phenomenal features of our conscious states (Roelofs, 2016, pp. 
3217–3218; Velmans, 2009, p. 212), but this phenomenon cannot be explained by means of 
the standard third-person methods of contemporary science (Velmans, 2009, pp. 219–221). 
Thus, the subjectivity of conscious states consists in the fact that their what-it’s-like-ness 
could only be indirectly accessed by having a conscious state of the same sort (Velmans, 
2009, pp. 212–213). Furthermore, some have claimed that the subjectivity of our conscious 
states can only be understood “by creatures like us” (Nagel, 1974, p. 440), which implies 
that the phenomenality of conscious states is relative to each kind of conscious system. 
It is noteworthy that subjectivity does not point solely to the phenomenality of 
experience, but also to its reflexivity and its intentionality36: arguably the phenomenality of 
my perception of a tomato is not identical to yours, though their phenomenal features might 
be the similar37, and it could also happen that the phenomenality of my belief in global 
warming is different from yours, though both of our beliefs would be about the same thing38. 
Thus, it would seem that an explanation of the phenomenality of a given experience cannot 
be detached from its intentionality or from the fact that it is experienced by some system. 
Moreover, it is plausible that the phenomenality of conscious states is relative to the kind of 
system that entertains them and, perhaps, to each particular system. Indeed, pain may feel 
differently for different kinds of systems, but it must be painful. If squirrels are capable of 
 
35 Namely, the system’s intransitive consciousness. 
36 I will say more about this in the third chapter. 
37 For instance, my cultural environment, which influences the reflexivity of my conscious states, could modify 
the what-it’s-like-ness of my perception, thus making it different from the what-it’s-like-ness of your 
perception. 
38 Variations in the way in which the content of a belief is represented often lead to variations in the 
phenomenality of the belief. Suppose that we both believe in global warming, but we represent it differently. 
For instance, one of us could further believe that we are at least partially responsible for it, while not the other. 
Although we both believe in global warming, the variations in our representations of it will probably generate 
a difference in the phenomenality of our beliefs. 
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feeling pain, it must certainly be painful to them, even if we cannot access the particular 
what-it’s-like-ness of their painful experiences. Consequently, a characterization of 
phenomenality in terms of subjectivity would require making explicit its connections to 
intentionality and reflexivity because it seems that the what-it’s-like-ness of an experience 
can be modified by the experience’s intentionality and reflexivity. 
A further way to characterize what-it’s-like-ness is through the idea that 
consciousness seems to be a unified phenomenon, in the sense that the features of conscious 
states seem to be integrated. For instance, it is plausible that the intentionality of our 
perceptions results from the integration of different aspects of our perceptual field: “We can 
say that two states of consciousness are objectually unified when they are directed at the 
same object” (Chalmers & Bayne, 2003, p. 24). Analogously, our conscious states seem to 
be phenomenally unified: “[i]t is difficult or impossible to imagine a subject having two 
phenomenal states simultaneously, without there being a conjoint phenomenology for both 
states” (Chalmers & Bayne, 2003, p. 37). 
According to the thesis that consciousness is a unified phenomenon, my perception 
of a tomato is not only intentionally unified, but also phenomenally, insofar as the what-it’s-
like-ness of my perception is not just a composition of independent phenomenal features. 
Analogously, when we are at a music concert, although we experience several perceptions 
that come from different senses, they all seem to be unified into a single 
representational/phenomenal field. This characterization of what-it’s-like-ness evinces a 
close link between phenomenality and intentionality, insofar as the unity of the what-it’s-
like-ness of an experience seems to be relative to the unity of its intentionality, and vice 
versa. 
My analysis of the above ways to define what-it’s-like-ness suggests that 
consciousness cannot be fully characterized in terms of phenomenality because the 
phenomenalityof experience is often linked to its intentionality and its reflexivity. As a 
matter of fact, it would seem that the phenomenality of many conscious states depends or is 
somehow modified by their intentionality and their reflexivity. Accordingly, I do not think 
that there is a phenomenal concept of consciousness, i.e., there is nothing like phenomenal 
consciousness. In my view, the phenomenal approach relies on a specific way to characterize 
consciousness, namely, according to a practice of conceptualization where phenomenality is 
posited as the fundamental property of consciousness. 
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My claim is not that the phenomenal approach fails to capture consciousness and 
that, consequently, the theories that seem to endorse this approach are unable to explain 
consciousness. Instead, what I have tried to argue is that, while the phenomenal approach 
adopts a theoretical strategy where phenomenality is posited as the fundamental property of 
consciousness, the way in which consciousness is characterized involves the concepts of the 
other two discernible features of conscious states, namely, reflexivity and intentionality. 
Thus, although the phenomenal approach seems to be suitable for explaining an aspect of 
consciousness, it is not obvious that an explanation of the ultimate nature of consciousness 
could be given in purely phenomenal terms, i.e., independently of intentionality and 
reflexivity. 
In this chapter, I have argued that intentionality, reflexivity, and phenomenality are 
discernible features of conscious states. According to my analysis of how intentionality, 
reflexivity, and phenomenality are often defined, they can be employed to characterize 
consciousness in different ways, by means of adopting different practices of 
conceptualization. However, it seems that our characterizations of intentionality, reflexivity, 
and phenomenality involve their interrelations, which is the reason why I treated them as 
features, instead of properties. What I have shown in this section is that consciousness can 
be defined according to different strategies and that each one of them addresses different 
aspects of consciousness, not that they are fundamentally mistaken. Hence, I suspect that the 
adoption of any of the approaches above is a pragmatic choice, in Dennett’s sense (1971), 
while it is not obvious whether any of them provides the ultimate characterization of our 
subject-matter. 
The aim of this chapter was to show that consciousness can be explicated in different 
ways, which opposes the thesis that there are many concepts of consciousness. Indeed, our 
uses of ‘consciousness’ and our understanding of consciousness may be vague, but that does 
not mean that different characterizations point to different referents. Regardless of what 
consciousness is, consciousness must be a single concept that points to a single referent. In 
the next chapter, I will introduce an interpretation of consciousness that takes intentionality, 
reflexivity and phenomenality as its components, thus unifying the different characterizations 
analyzed in this section in terms of a single conceptual space.  
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Chapter 2: The Concept of Consciousness 
Bart: Um, Dad? 
Homer: Yeah? 
Bart: What is the mind? Is it just a system of impulses, or is it something tangible? 
Homer: Relax! What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind. 
The Simpsons, ‘Good night’, 1987 
In the previous chapter, I have analyzed our uses of the terms ‘awareness’ and 
‘consciousness’, as well as three possible ways to characterize consciousness that can be 
drawn from different theories of consciousness. According to that analysis, our 
characterization of consciousness is mediated by our characterization of intentionality, 
reflexivity and phenomenality, and the way in which we characterize consciousness depends 
on our theoretical interests. The goal of that chapter was to show that there are different ways 
to characterize a single concept according to different practices of conceptualization, not 
independent concepts of consciousness. 
In this chapter, I will explore the hypothesis that the competing approaches to 
consciousness that I presented in the previous chapter can be reconciled by highlighting the 
interdependence between intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. Thus, the goal of this 
chapter is to provide an interpretation of consciousness that is general enough to fit those 
three seemingly independent ways to characterize the concept, which is why I believe that 
my interpretation of the concept is metaphysically compatible with most contemporary 
theories of consciousness and with different views on the ultimately correct analysis of 
consciousness. While theorists normally take intentionality, reflexivity and/or 
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phenomenality to be properties of consciousness, I will argue that their concepts are 
components of consciousness and that their interdependence constitutes a single conceptual 
space. Hence, it might turn out that my interpretation of consciousness does not resemble 
the nature of its referent, though it is meant to correspond to it. Accordingly, my goal is not 
to present a theory of consciousness, but a conceptual background on which an alternative 
kind of theory could be based. 
2.1. An interpretation of the concept of consciousness 
One way to introduce my interpretation of consciousness is by explaining why I think 
that intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are the discernible features of conscious 
states, instead of others. Surely, conscious states appear to have other features that are not 
reducible to the former, so it might seem that my interpretation of consciousness will not be 
able to fully capture the concept39. 
I believe that all conscious states can be described in terms of relations between 
intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. Although I will elaborate on this idea in the 
next chapter, a few examples might illustrate my view. Self-consciousness, understood as 
the capacity to have states about what it is like to be a particular system, can be interpreted 
as a relation between the reflexive and the phenomenal characters of some internal states. 
Hence, self-consciousness could be characterized in terms of reflexivity and phenomenality40. 
Self-knowledge, understood as the capacity to hold propositional attitudes towards our 
mentality, can be interpreted as a relation between the reflexive and the intentional characters 
of some internal states. Thus, self-knowledge could be characterized in terms of reflexivity 
and intentionality41. Subjectivity, understood as the particular way in which some states are 
like for a particular system, can be interpreted as a combination of all three features, insofar 
 
39 Keep in mind that I did not claim that the three approaches of consciousness that I discussed in the previous 
chapter are mistaken. What I argued is that they address conceptually distinct aspect of consciousness because 
they are motivated by different theoretical interest or practices of conceptualization. Put briefly, they all 
characterize the same concept differently, namely, by privileging one of the discernible features over the others. 
40 Intentionality is also involved, insofar as we are dealing with states that exhibit presentational characters. 
However, it should be noted that the about-ness of self-conscious states often points to their phenomenality, so 
their intentionality originates from the relation between their reflexive and their phenomenal characters. 
41 Although this kind of conscious state could also exhibit phenomenal characters, their phenomenality is not 
what characterizes them, so phenomenality is not essential to understanding self-knowledge. Consider that the 
phenomenal character of knowing that I had a pizza last night does not seem to be relevant to describe it as a 
state of self-knowledge. Furthermore, notice that self-knowledge is not equivalent to self-consciousness 
because a self-conscious system does not need to be able to hold propositional attitudes towards its own 
mentality to experience what it is like to be the system it is. 
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as subjective states are about what the state is like for a particular system. Therefore, 
subjectivity could be characterized in terms of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality42. 
Another way to introduce my interpretation of consciousness is by distinguishing the 
terminology usually employed to study the nature of consciousness from the one that I will 
adopt to characterize its concept. Theorists normally differentiate subjects, or referents, from 
their properties. Accordingly, as I have shown in the previous chapter, they often argue that 
consciousness, which is a subject or referent, can be explained by characterizing its alleged 
properties, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. Of course, theorists do not 
universally agree on whether the latter are all properties of consciousness, but their 
approaches follow a similar methodology: to explain consciousness, we must identify and 
characterize its fundamental property or properties. 
Since I do not know what consciousness is, or at least this is the initial assumption 
of my view, I only take for granted that consciousness is something, it is our subject-matter. 
Accordingly, I also do not know whether intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are 
actual properties of consciousness, though it seems that they are at least features of conscious 
states43 and, for that reason, I call them discernible features of conscious states. The idea is 
that, regardless of whether they are actual properties of consciousness, they are conceptually 
distinct aspects of it. Now, in the previous chapter, I showed that consciousness can be 
characterized by means of the concepts of the discernible features, namely, intentionality, 
reflexivity or phenomenality. Because these are concepts, not properties, I call them 
components of the concept of consciousness. Notice that intentionality and reflexivity could 
be features of other things, besides conscious states, though not phenomenality because the 
latter is generally characterized in relation to consciousness or even identified with it. In any 
case, it seems that the concepts of the discernible features are somehow intertwined with 
consciousness, which is evinced by the ways in which theorists seem to characterize 
consciousness. Finally, it should be noted that, just as any other subject-matter, 
consciousness, and especially conscious states, presents itself in specific ways. I call those 
ways or modes of presentation characters. 
I will focus on the characters of conscious states in the next chapter, but it is 
noteworthy that they are at the base of our conceptualizations of the discernible features, i.e., 
 
42 Notice that subjectivity is not equivalent to self-consciousness because the former points to the ability to 
entertain states about what a particular conscious state is like for a particular system, not just about what it is 
like to be that system. 
43 Whatever they are from the metaphysical point of view. 
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the components of consciousness, in the sense that we identify and describe conscious states 
depending on how they present themselves. In other words, the characters of conscious states 
are the ways in which consciousness manifests itself, and they are conceptualized as 
intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. Thus, in contrast to the usual terminology, 
based on subjects and properties, I will introduce my interpretation of consciousness in terms 
of features, components and characters. 
In a sense, my interpretation of consciousness is based on a circular reasoning44 
because I will claim that our understanding of consciousness is mediated by our 
understanding of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality, while our understanding of 
those concepts relies on our understanding of consciousness. However, in my view, 
consciousness, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are interdependent concepts, 
which means that their characterization results from how we conceive their relations, not 
from the primacy of any of them45. Hopefully, the circularity of my proposal will become 
sufficiently “wide, revealing, and illuminating” (Strawson, 1992, pp. 19–20) to undermine 
the objection. 
In my view, consciousness is constituted by intentionality, reflexivity and 
phenomenality, thus creating a sort of three-dimensional conceptual space46 where each of 
the concepts of the discernible features of conscious states is a dimension of the space. Put 
briefly, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are the components of the conceptual 
space of consciousness. Notice that, since I am dealing with concepts, not with their 
referents, what my interpretation implies is that the components of consciousness can be 
rationally distinguished from each other47, though they are interrelated with respect to the 
conceptual space of consciousness. Thus, the conceptual space of consciousness results from 
the interrelations between its components. In contrast to the approaches that I have analyzed 
in the previous chapter, this interpretation suggests that there is one concept of consciousness 
and that its conceptual space can be modified according to our theoretical interests, as I will 
 
44 I thank Glorymar Hernandez for calling my attention to this issue. 
45 This is another reason why I believe that my view is compatible with different views regarding the ultimately 
correct analysis of consciousness. Later in this chapter, I will argue that the conceptual space of consciousness 
can be customized to form models of consciousness and such models will correspond to different 
interpretations of the nature of consciousness. 
46 My interpretation of consciousness could be put in terms of what Márquez Velasco (2013, p.101) calls a 
spatio-conceptual coordinate, insofar as it is meant to make explicit “a series of potential connections” 
(Márquez Velasco, 2013, p. 100) between consciousness and its components. It could also be put in terms of 
Gärdenfors’s (2000) Conceptual Space Theory, where consciousness is formed by three integral quality 
dimensions. 
47 This is the reason why I call the features of conscious states discernible. 
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argue later in this chapter. Accordingly, there are different configurations of the same 
conceptual space, not different concepts of consciousness. 
There are two reasons why I have decided to represent consciousness as a three-
dimensional conceptual space: a) it provides a conceptual background with which different 
approaches to consciousness can be assessed; and b) it motivates an alternative way of 
theorizing about consciousness. Regarding a), it should be noted that the three approaches 
to consciousness that I have analyzed in the previous chapter can be seen as different 
configurations of the conceptual space that assign a higher theoretical weight to a subset of 
the components of consciousness. As for b), I can advance that it will be the target of the 
next chapter, where I will introduce a way to describe conscious states that solely relies on 
my interpretation of consciousness. 
The foundation of my interpretation of consciousness is the thesis that paradigmatic 
conscious states exhibit either of three identifiable characters, namely, the presentational, 
the reflexive and the phenomenal. My previous analysis of different approaches to 
consciousness showed that intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are discernible 
features of conscious states, and that some of those states can only be identified by means of 
conceptualizing the relations between the characters they exhibit, which is why I take the 
concepts of those features to be interrelated or interdependent. Hence, my proposal is that, 
although consciousness can be characterized according to different theoretical interests, its 
conceptual space results from the interrelations between its components. My interpretation 
of consciousness is meant to highlight that the connections between intentionality, reflexivity 
and phenomenality can be interpreted in terms of a single conceptual space. For illustrative 
purposes, the conceptual space of consciousness can be thus represented: 
 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Space of Consciousness 
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The conceptual space of consciousness is a heuristic device that says nothing about 
the ultimate nature of consciousness because I have built it from the concepts of the 
discernible features of conscious states, not from examining the alleged properties of 
consciousness48. More importantly, my interpretation of consciousness does not say how 
each of the dimensions of the conceptual space are to be scaled because this is to be 
determined according to our theoretical interests. In particular, I think that each of the 
approaches to consciousness that I have analyzed in the previous chapter determines a 
specific way to scale the conceptual space. For instance, an intentionalist could elaborate a 
scale for the intentionality dimension in terms of how abstract the contents of conscious 
states can be and suggest that the scales of the other two dimensions are relative to the first. 
Analogously, a phenomenalist could argue that the phenomenality dimension is to be scaled 
in terms of the intensity of the what-it’s-like-ness of each conscious state and that the scales 
of the other two dimensions are relative to the first. 
The aim of my interpretation of consciousness is to provide a common ground for 
the study of consciousness that unifies different approaches according to a single conceptual 
space, by specifying the conceptual level to which the study of consciousness belongs. For 
instance, we could interpret the intentional approach as a configuration of the conceptual 
space where the reflexive and the phenomenal characters of conscious states are determined 
by their presentational characters, which means that reflexivity and phenomenality are to be 
explained in terms of intentionality. Analogously, we could interpret the reflexive approach 
as a configuration of the conceptual space where intentionality and phenomenality are to be 
explained in terms of reflexivity. Finally, the phenomenal approach can be seen as a 
configuration of the conceptual space where intentionality and reflexivity are to be explained 
in terms of phenomenality. Notice that all three of these approaches assign a higher 
theoretical weight to one of the dimensions of the conceptual space, which does not mean 
that they eliminate the other two; what it means is that those other dimensions somehow 
depend on the fundamental one. I grant that each of these configurations of the conceptual 
space is a viable candidate for explaining aspects of consciousness, but I see no reason to 
privilege any of them as the best model to explain consciousness in general. 
 
48 It might turn out that intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality are not properties of consciousness, but 
conceptualizations of our ways to identify it. However, if this were the case, that would not mean that my 
characterization of consciousness does not correspond to consciousness. 
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Since consciousness is constituted by intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality, 
the dimensions of its conceptual space are irreducible. However, the irreducibility of the 
dimensions could be interpreted in two different ways49. On the one hand, it could mean that 
all conscious states have all three features at the same time, i.e., that they are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a state to be conscious. On the other hand, it could mean that every 
conscious state could be described in terms of the components of consciousness or 
combinations of them. Recall that I do not know what consciousness is, neither what its 
actual properties are, so I cannot assess the first option. In particular, since my view concerns 
our characterizations of consciousness, which are always determined by our chosen practices 
of conceptualization, the status of the features of consciousness or of the components of its 
concept as sufficient or necessary conditions varies according to those theoretical interests. 
Hence, the second reading is the one I am proposing, insofar as I am discussing the 
irreducibility of the dimensions of the conceptual space of consciousness, not of the 
properties of consciousness. 
In my view, our attributions of consciousness are enabled by our ability to identify 
and conceptualize the characters exhibited by conscious states. Thus, when we describe a 
conscious state in terms of, say, intentionality, such description does not mean that the state 
cannot also exhibit reflexive and/or phenomenal characters50. Consider that we identify the 
characters of another person’s state indirectly. For instance, I cannot inspect the 
phenomenality of your current state, though I have learned some practices of 
conceptualization that would allow me to infer it, given the proper circumstances. In general, 
we cannot determine the specific characters of another system’s state, unless we have the 
proper conceptual/theoretical tools to do so51. However, that does not prevent us from 
attributing consciousness. What I want to highlight by saying that the dimensions of the 
conceptual space of consciousness are irreducible is that a proper characterization of the 
concept cannot disregard any of its components. 
To show the interdependence between the components of consciousness, let us 
consider the case of Mary (Jackson, 1986). When Mary thinks about the physiology of the 
 
49 I thank Luke Roelofs for calling my attention to this issue. 
50 I will elaborate on this thesis in the next chapter. 
51 Since I have no training in neuroscience, for instance, I cannot attribute consciousness to a given system by 
analyzing what the screen of a brain scanner shows; by this I mean that I do not have the proper tools to draw 
the kind of conclusions that neuroscientists are capable of drawing by interpreting what the screen shows, not 
that they attribute consciousness solely on the basis of what the screen shows. However, other practices of 
conceptualization would allow me to attribute consciousness to a system by observing, say, its behavior. In 
fact, this is how we attribute consciousness to other humans in everyday life. 
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perception of the color of a ripe tomato in her black and white lab, she arguably entertains a 
conscious state that is different from the conscious state she entertains when she leaves the 
lab and sees a ripe tomato. The question is why they are different conscious states, 
considering that they are both about the color of ripe tomatoes. In my view, the answer is 
that the presentational and the phenomenal characters of her states are different52. 
The states under discussion are: 1) Mary’s thinking about the physiology of the 
perception of the color of a ripe tomato, and 2) her visual perception of a ripe tomato. In 
contrast to the way in which theorists normally address the problem of determining the 
difference between Mary’s states53, my interpretation of consciousness suggests the 
following. Regarding intentionality, we could say that 1) is about a piece of non-perceptual 
information concerning the physiology of the perception of the color of ripe tomatoes, while 
2) is about the what-it’s-like-ness of the visual perception of a ripe tomato. Hence, though 
they are both about the color of ripe tomatoes, their presentational characters are different. 
Regarding phenomenality, it is often argued that the states have a different what-it’s-like-
ness, considering that 2) is a perception of the color of a ripe tomato and 1) is not. Of course, 
this means that their phenomenal characters cannot be identical, not that 2) lacks 
phenomenality. Thus, we can distinguish both states in terms of intentionality and 
phenomenality by clarifying that their presentational and their phenomenal characters are 
different. Put briefly, Mary’s states are different because they exhibit different characters, 
not because one has a character that the other lacks. 
My interpretation of consciousness might lead to the thought that we are actually 
dealing with different concepts of consciousness and, consequently, with different subject-
matters. However, I have argued that different characterizations of consciousness correspond 
to different practices of conceptualization, not to independent concepts of consciousness. As 
a matter of fact, one of the purposes of my interpretation of consciousness is to show that 
our understanding of the concept is more general than what most characterizations of it 
suggest. In particular, it seems that we can modify the way we understand consciousness to 
 
52 Although both states could be described as conscious states in terms of reflexivity, it does not seem that we 
could then explain why they are different; after all, we can assume that Mary is aware of her own conscious 
states (Coleman, 2015a, p. 75). 
53 Many theorists, including Jackson, claim that the difference between Mary’s states has to do with the 
phenomenology of her states, by apparently endorsing a phenomenal approach to consciousness. However, we 
have seen that consciousness is not identical to phenomenal consciousness. 
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fit different contexts and to highlight different features of conscious states which, after all, 
is what enables us to attribute consciousness. 
My proposal also shows that consciousness is not identical nor reducible to any of 
its components. I think that the relation between consciousness, intentionality, reflexivity 
and phenomenality is similar to the relation between a spiderweb and the strings that preserve 
its shape and integrity: if I pull a single string, the rest of the web will be disturbed; if I rip 
one of the web’s structural strings, the whole web will fall apart. Just as a proper 
characterization of any of the components of consciousness requires a proper 
characterization of the other components, a proper characterization of consciousness 
requires a proper characterization of all of its components and their relations54. 
A consequence of my interpretation of consciousness is that the difference between 
conscious states is not a matter of degrees or levels, but of ways to conceptualize the 
characters they exhibit55. In particular, their differentiation has to do with alternative ways 
to configure the conceptual space according to different practices of conceptualization. 
Hence, I endorse the thesis that “the notion of a level of consciousness is ill-suited […], for 
it implies that global states of consciousness can be ordered in terms of a single dimension” 
(Bayne et al., 2016, p. 412). Accordingly, Mary’s perception of a ripe tomato, for instance, 
could be described as an intentional state or as a phenomenal one, depending on whether we 
are interested in the intentionality of her perception or in its phenomenality. In both cases, 
we would be dealing with different configurations of the conceptual space of consciousness, 
not with different concepts of consciousness. 
My proposal also implies that consciousness is a system-based concept, i.e., a 
concept that needs to be customized according to the sensory/cognitive skills of each kind 
of system. Hence, a characterization of the kind of consciousness that a given system 
entertains can only be given by adjusting the conceptual space according to the system’s 
sensory/cognitive skills. Put briefly, what such an investigation would require is a 
customization of the conceptual space of consciousness56. 
One possible objection against my interpretation of consciousness is that it seems 
epistemically vacuous, in the sense that my aim to provide a view that is metaphysically 
 
54 This is the circularity to which I have made reference above. 
55 I will elaborate on this thesis in the next chapter. 
56 In the fourth chapter, I will concentrate on this thesis to explore how my interpretation of consciousness 
could be employed to characterize non-human kinds of consciousness. 
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compatible with most current theories of consciousness might render my proposal 
insufficient for assessing those theories or for grounding an alternative explanation of our 
subject-matter. Relatedly, Crane has pointed out this risk in relation to the concept of mind: 
“we already have a rough conception of our subject-matter; what we are looking for is not 
an explicit definition, but a description of the mental phenomena which is sufficiently clear 
and detailed for us to recognize it as a description of the thing of which we have this 
conception” (Crane, 2001, p. 3). However, notice that I have not provided an “explicit 
definition” of consciousness, but an explication (Carnap, 1950, pp. 3–8) of consciousness. 
Furthermore, my interpretation only delimits the conceptual level to which the study of 
consciousness belongs, not its ultimate nature. It may be that we already have a “rough 
conception” of consciousness, but the constellation of competing theories available evinces 
that our subject-matter is not “sufficiently clear”; this is why I also believe that my proposal 
is compatible with different views regarding the ultimately correct analysis of consciousness. 
Another possible objection could be that it is not clear whether my proposal implies 
that all conscious states exhibit all three characters or if one of them is enough for us to 
qualify a state as a conscious one57. Indeed, to claim the first would mean that any state that 
does not exhibit all three characters is not a conscious state, while to claim the second would 
make my proposal extremely vague and impractical, for it would be very difficult to draw a 
clear line between conscious and unconscious states. However, my proposal does not entail 
either of the former theses, insofar as it is not about consciousness. My proposal concerns 
our ability to identify and conceptualize the characters exhibited by a given internal state58, 
which is what enables the attribution of consciousness. 
In the next section, I will elaborate on my interpretation of consciousness to show 
how its conceptual space can be adjusted to build what I call models of consciousness. As I 
will show, a model of consciousness is not a concept of consciousness, but a reconfiguration 
of the conceptual space that corresponds to a particular theoretical interest. To illustrate this, 
 
57 I thank Luke Roelofs and Sam Coleman for calling my attention to this issue. 
58 We might be able to identify the three characters in a given state, and we might only be able to identify a 
subset of them. What would change is our description of the state, not our attribution of consciousness. 
Consider that, although the intentionality of somatic experiences does not seem to be specifiable, we can 
legitimately describe them as conscious states in terms of, say, phenomenality. Analogously, that thinking 
about a mathematical equation does not seem to have a characteristic phenomenality does not imply that it 
cannot not be described as a conscious state. In the next chapter, I will explore different ways to describe 
conscious states that exhibit different combinations of the characters. 
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I will review some popular theories of consciousness and show that they can be seen as 
exemplifications of different models of consciousness. 
2.2. Three models of consciousness 
The interpretation of consciousness that I have introduced in the previous section 
resulted from my analysis of the features that are normally attributed to conscious states, 
namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. However, my proposal says nothing 
about what consciousness is or what its actual properties are, so one might wonder how it 
could be implemented in a scientific context. Recall my claim that the approaches to 
consciousness that I have analyzed in the previous chapter are practices of conceptualization 
that correspond to different theoretical interests. Analogously, my interpretation of 
consciousness is a practice of conceptualization but, unlike those approaches, it does not rely 
on any metaphysical view regarding the nature of consciousness. Thus, what distinguishes 
my proposal from most current theories of consciousness is that it is intended to provide a 
conceptual background for the study of consciousness, not a specific metaphysical thesis 
about its nature, nor a definite characterization of the concept. 
In this section, I will explore three ways to build models of consciousness by 
adjusting the conceptual space of consciousness. I will show that a model of consciousness 
is a reconfiguration of the conceptual space. Arguably, the following models could lead to 
novel methods to identify and measure consciousness, insofar as they can be adapted to 
different kinds of systems without the need to redefine consciousness. In particular, as I will 
show in the fourth chapter, the following models of consciousness could be employed to 
characterize kinds of non-human consciousness. 
It is reasonable to think that different kinds of conscious systems entertain different 
kinds of conscious states, either because they have a different physiology or because they 
have different sensory/cognitive skills; to investigate this would lead to an explanation of 
the functional basis of the kind of consciousness that those kinds of systems entertain, i.e., 
of their awareness mechanisms. However, we should all agree that, if a system entertains 
conscious states, we should be able to characterize the kind of consciousness that it entertains 
in terms of a single concept, namely, consciousness. Hence, the study of consciousness must 
be relatively independent from the study of awareness, insofar as, say, pain must be painful 
regardless of whether it is experienced by a human, a dog, a Martian or an asteroid. I am not 
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saying that we can study consciousness without considering the mechanisms that enable it, 
what I am saying is that the study of consciousness belongs to a different conceptual level. 
My suggestion is that the conceptual space of consciousness can be customized 
according to our theoretical interests and in consideration of the reasons we may have to 
attribute the paradigmatic features of conscious states to the internal states of a given system. 
Hence, such customizations of the conceptual space are determined by pragmatic criteria; 
similarly to what Dennett (1971) argues concerning intentional systems. For instance, if we 
have reasons to believe that a certain kind of system might entertain states that exhibit 
phenomenal characters but not reflexive ones, we might want to leave aside the reflexivity 
dimension to concentrate on the other two; this certainly would not imply that the system is 
unable to entertain states that exhibit reflexive characters. 
There are, at least, three ways to adjust the conceptual space of consciousness, i.e., 
three models of consciousness. Each model involves different subsets of the dimensions of 
the conceptual space. I will call them one-dimensional consciousness, two-dimensional 
consciousness, and three-dimensional consciousness. 
One-dimensional consciousness is a model based only on one of the components of 
consciousness. Consequently, there are three kinds of one-dimensional consciousness, one 
for each component. This model accounts for the conceptual background of those theories 
that privilege one of the discernible features of conscious states over the others. From the 
metaphysical point of view, this would be the model adopted by those theories that posit one 
of the features as the fundamental property of consciousness. 
There are many theories of consciousness that could be interpreted as adopting a one-
dimensional model of consciousness. Crane’s (2001) intentionalism takes intentionality as 
the fundamental property of all mentality, which suggests that all conscious states exhibit a 
presentational character or at least that they could all be described in terms of intentionality. 
Thus, Crane’s intentionalism can be interpreted as a thesis that explains reflexivity and 
phenomenality in terms of intentionality. Similarly, Block’s (1995) concept of phenomenal 
consciousness implies that phenomenality is the fundamental property of consciousness, 
insofar as he takes consciousness to be equivalent to phenomenal consciousness. Thus, 
Block’s thesis should be able to explain intentionality and reflexivity in terms of 
phenomenality. Finally, Coleman’s (2015b) quotational higher-order thought theory could 
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be interpreted in terms of a one-dimensional model that privileges intentionality59. According 
to Coleman, “[c]onscious states comprise sensory content plus subjective awareness of that 
content”, where “what is conscious –what is like something for the subject– is a content” 
(2015b, p. 2718). Thus, it would seem that the conceptual background of Coleman’s theory 
is a one-dimensional model that explains reflexivity and phenomenality in terms of 
intentionality. Note that these theories do not necessarily reduce or eliminate two of the 
dimensions of the conceptual space of consciousness. Adopting a one-dimensional model of 
consciousness is a strategy that concerns the conceptual background of a theory, not the 
ultimate nature of consciousness. 
One-dimensional consciousness is a good model for explaining the characters 
exhibited by conscious states in isolation. Suppose, for instance, that we want to explain the 
intentionality of human belief. Endorsing a one-dimensional model would allow us to isolate 
and describe the contents of human belief, regardless of the other characters that human 
beliefs might exhibit. Accordingly, a theory like Crane’s would seem to be appropriate, 
insofar as it would allow us to isolate the intentionality of human beliefs from their other 
features. However, it should be noted that a one-dimensional model based on intentionality 
would be insufficient to explain, say, the intentionality of somatic experiences because, as I 
have argued in the first chapter, their intentionality seems to consist in their phenomenality. 
Thus, it would seem that we would need to endorse a different model of consciousness to 
account for conscious states that exhibit combinations of the characters. 
Two-dimensional consciousness is a model that privileges two of the components of 
consciousness. Accordingly, there are three kinds of two-dimensional models, one for each 
pair of components: intentionality and reflexivity; reflexivity and phenomenality; and 
intentionality and phenomenality. In general, two-dimensional models of consciousness 
highlight the relationship between two of the dimensions of the conceptual space and allow 
us to describe some complex features of conscious states, insofar as they not only involve 
two dimensions, but also their relations. 
In general, Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness could be interpreted as 
adopting two-dimensional models, insofar as they tend to “analyze the notion of a conscious 
mental state in terms of reflexive meta-mental self-awareness” (Van Gulick, 2018) which I 
interpret as the combination of intentionality and reflexivity. Despite their differences, most 
 
59 Although I grant that Coleman’s characterization of intentionality is not identical to mine. 
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HO theorists (Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 1993) claim that “what-it’s-likeness enters only when 
we become aware of that first-order state [the one that serves as the content of the higher-
order state] and its qualitative properties by having an appropriate meta-state directed at it” 
(Van Gulick, 2018). Thus, HO theories seem to interpret phenomenality in terms of the other 
two discernible features, in the sense that they seem to suggest that phenomenality results 
from the system’s awareness of the phenomenal characters of its intentional states. Similarly, 
Kriegel’s (2009) self-representational theory could also be interpreted as adopting a two-
dimensional model. According to Kriegel (2009, p. 2), “phenomenally conscious states have 
qualitative character [what I call phenomenal character] in virtue of representing 
environmental features [what I call presentational character] and subjective character [what 
I call reflexive character] in virtue of representing themselves [what I called self-
referentiality]”. Thus, his theory should be able to explain phenomenality in terms of 
intentionality and reflexivity, insofar as the phenomenal characters of experience are 
characterized as “a matter of a complex compresence of qualitative character and subjective 
character” (Kriegel, 2009, p. 11)6061. 
In any case, while theories that adopt a two-dimensional model seem to be able to 
account for more complex features of conscious states, they also require a more sophisticated 
theoretical framework; in particular, they need to provide an explanation of the relations 
between the two components involved. It should be noted that one-dimensional and two-
dimensional models are adequate for their theoretical interests and that, for that reason, they 
should not be compared. What I am arguing is that the conceptual backgrounds of those 
theories can be described according to two different configurations of the conceptual space 
of consciousness, not that they are theories about different kinds of consciousness. 
Finally, there is the three-dimensional model of consciousness, where conscious 
states are described in terms of all three components of consciousness. Of course, compared 
to the latter two models, three-dimensional consciousness is a highly complex model that 
requires considering the relations between the three dimensions of the conceptual space. 
Consequently, although this model might seem to be the most suitable for the study of, say, 
human consciousness, its implementation also corresponds to certain theoretical interests. 
Consider that we seem to be able to describe most of our conscious states according to one 
 
60 I thank Sam Coleman for helping me improve my interpretation of Kriegel’s theory. 
61 Certainly, there are other theories that adopt two-dimensional models of consciousness. For instance, the 
view called phenomenal intentionality (Mendelovici, 2018; Pitt, 2004) seems to adopt a two-dimensional 
model based on intentionality and phenomenality. 
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or two of the components of consciousness, even if some of them somehow exhibit all three 
characters. For instance, when I analyzed Jackson’s argument about Mary, I distinguished 
her thinking about the color of ripe tomatoes from her visual perception of a ripe tomato in 
terms of intentionality and phenomenality; although I acknowledge that both states also seem 
to exhibit a reflexive character, insofar as Mary is arguably aware of both states. 
To my knowledge, there is no theory that could be interpreted as adopting a three-
dimensional model of consciousness. However, I grant that most contemporary theories 
make reference to all three components of consciousness in different ways and according to 
different theoretical interests. Perhaps, the reason why no theory of consciousness seems to 
adopt the three-dimensional model is that it is the least attractive from the methodological 
point of view, insofar as it requires an account of aspects that might not be relevant for the 
study of a specific kind of conscious system. What seems to be the case is that our everyday 
attributions of consciousness are somehow based on this model, for we tend to describe 
conscious states according to different combinations of all three components of 
consciousness. 
In contrast to most current theories of consciousness, my proposal does not rely on 
any metaphysical thesis about the nature of consciousness, but merely on a general 
characterization of consciousness. Hence, I am not claiming that intentionality, reflexivity 
and phenomenality are properties that are present in every conscious state, nor that they are 
the actual properties of consciousness. As far as I can tell, the nature of consciousness could 
be very different from my interpretation of consciousness, though they are meant to 
correspond. 
 In the next chapter, I will focus my attention on conscious states to present a way to 
identify and categorize them that entirely relies on my interpretation of consciousness. My 
aim there is not to provide an explanation of the nature of conscious states, but a conceptual 
framework that accounts for our different ways to describe and categorize them. In 
particular, I intend to show that conscious states can be classified into three broad categories: 
intentional, reflexive and phenomenal states. Accordingly, I will argue that those categories 
result from assigning a higher theoretical weight to each of the dimensions of the conceptual 
space of consciousness.  
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Chapter 3: Conscious States 
An individual experience, taken by itself, is unanalyzable. Experiences, taken as a 
manifold, can be compared and ordered, and only through their order result the (quasi) 
constituents of the individual experiences. 
Rudolf Carnap (2003, p. 149) 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that consciousness can be represented as a 
three-dimensional conceptual space formed by intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
Furthermore, I presented three ways to reconfigure its conceptual space, which I called 
models of consciousness, and maintained that they can be employed to study consciousness 
according to different theoretical interests. However, since my intention was only to provide 
an interpretation of consciousness, I did not elaborate on our identification and description 
of conscious states. 
In this chapter, I will introduce a view where conscious states are descriptions of 
internal states. The idea is that conscious states are those internal states that exhibit either of 
the paradigmatic characters62 to which intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality point, or 
combinations of them. I will argue that conscious states can be categorized according to our 
ability to conceptualize the paradigmatic characters and their combinations. In particular, I 
will maintain that conscious states can be classified according to three general categories: 
intentional, reflexive, and phenomenal states. Given the conceptual nature of this work, those 
 
62 Namely, the presentational, the reflexive and the phenomenal characters. 
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categories should be interpreted as labels that enable the description and classification of 
some internal states in terms of consciousness, not as an ultimate account of their nature. 
Intentional, reflexive and phenomenal states are categories that represent three ways 
to describe a particular kind of internal states, called conscious states, i.e., they are three 
practices of conceptualization that emerge from my interpretation of consciousness and, as 
such, their implementation depends on pragmatic reasons. I will show that each of those 
categories assigns a higher theoretical value to a component of consciousness, while 
preserving their interdependence. Overall, what I have done so far is isolate the conceptual 
level that, in my view, corresponds to the study of consciousness, and the result could be 
thus illustrated: 
 
Figure 2: Ways to Describe Internal States 
In the previous chapters, I focused on the light-colored areas. In what follows, I will 
elaborate on the dark-colored ones. Notice that the above illustration does not determine the 
nature of conscious states, neither that the categories cannot overlap. In fact, I will show that 
the same conscious state could be described according to different categories. Furthermore, 
conscious states could also be described as, say, functional, cognitive, or neural states, 
depending on our theoretical interests. My view implies that conscious states must be 
described according to consciousness, not that they are an independent kind of state; this is 
the foundation of my claim that the study of consciousness belongs to an irreducible 
conceptual level. 
3.1. Intentional states 
Many internal states exhibit a presentational character, which we identify as their 
about-ness, and their description as conscious states relies on how their about-ness is 
 46 
conceptualized. Accordingly, intentional states are internal states that are mainly described 
in terms of intentionality. I will argue that the classification of some internal states as 
intentional states is a practice of conceptualization that consists in assigning a higher 
theoretical weight to the intentionality dimension of the conceptual space of consciousness, 
though that does not mean that intentional states only exhibit presentational characters. On 
the contrary, I will show that many of them also exhibit the other characters and that the 
conceptualization of their intentionality often depends on specifying the relation between 
their presentational characters and their other characters. 
In my view, our ability to identify and conceptualize the presentational characters of 
a system’s internal states enables the attribution of intentionality. I will not elaborate on how 
such identification is done because, presumably, each kind of system has its own 
mechanisms. However, at least from the human perspective, it seems that the identification 
of the presentational character of a state can be done directly, as when we identify the about-
ness or the contents of our own states, or indirectly, by examining, for instance, the behavior 
and/or the brain activity of a system. 
Once we have identified the presentational character of a given state, we can 
conceptualize it according to different theoretical strategies. It is very likely that newborns 
perceive whatever stimulates their senses, even if they are not yet able to represent what 
their perceptions target, and that is enough to conjecture that some of their internal states can 
be described as intentional states. Analogously, my niece’s cat, Jack, is perfectly capable of 
distinguishing the food container from the water container, even if we have no reason to 
believe that it can represent those objects as “a food container” and as “a water container”. 
So, in a sense, Jack seems to be able to entertain internal states that exhibit presentational 
characters, even if we have no reason to believe that it can represent the objects of those 
states. In contrast, since the internal states of, say, a digital thermometer do not seem to 
exhibit presentational characters, it would be odd to attribute intentionality to its states. 
Hence, the attribution of intentionality to some of the internal states of other systems 
somehow parallels the way in which we attribute it to our own states: we project our ways 
of identifying and conceptualizing the presentational characters of our own states into those 
of other systems. 
In view that the dimensions of the conceptual space of consciousness are deeply 
interconnected, my suggestion is that intentional states are a category of conscious states 
that is grounded on a practice of conceptualization that privileges the intentionality 
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dimension and describes the other characters in terms of how they relate to the presentational 
character of a given state. According to that practice of conceptualization, intentional states 
could be distinguished by their objects or targets, i.e., by what they are about. Bear in mind 
that intentional states can be about objects, collections of objects, situations, events, 
concepts, propositions, beliefs, etc. Thus, my use of ‘object’ refers to the targets of 
intentional states63, not to objects in the metaphysical sense of the term; after all, an event is 
not an object, though it can be what a state is about. 
Many of our conscious states are about what I call perceptible objects. By 
‘perceptible object’ I mean the presentation of whatever we internally or externally perceive. 
Perceptible objects, then, include the presentations of whatever stimulates our senses and 
those of the states of our bodies64. Hence, whenever we perceive, we entertain states about 
perceptible objects. Notice that not all perceptible objects can be specified, as when we hear 
something that we cannot identify or when we have an internal sensation that we cannot 
describe. In consequence, that perceptible objects are the targets of perceptions does not 
mean that every perceptible object is necessarily represented in the mind. The intentional 
states that are about perceptible objects are what I call perceptual states. 
Every system capable of entertaining states about what stimulates its senses or about 
at least a subset of the states of its body is an embodied conscious system, which means that 
only embodied systems can entertain perceptual states. Accordingly, the ability to entertain 
perceptual states is what we normally call perception. It is noteworthy that perception cannot 
be reduced to the sensory/cognitive mechanisms that underlie or enable it because, while it 
would seem reasonable to claim that a system that is able to adapt to its environment has 
sensory/cognitive mechanisms, that would not mean that the system perceives its 
environment in the sense of entertaining states that exhibit presentational characters. Self-
driving cars, for instance, have sensors and mechanisms that enable their navigation, but that 
is not enough to conjecture that they entertain states about their surroundings in the relevant 
sense. 
An appealing way to investigate perceptual states is to focus on states whose contents 
we can represent. For instance, a system that solves a maze could be described as a system 
capable of representing the maze, thus implying that the system entertains perceptual states. 
 
63 I thank Sam Coleman for helping me clarify my use of ‘object’. 
64 At least the states of our bodies of which we can become aware according to our mechanisms of bodily 
awareness. 
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However, this functionalization of perception in terms of sensory/cognitive skills would 
imply the reduction of the presentational characters of perceptual states to their basis, i.e., 
the reduction of consciousness to awareness65. In contrast, my characterization of perceptual 
states includes states whose contents cannot be specified from a third-person perspective. In 
the first chapter, I argued that the intentionality of somatic experiences, moods, emotions, 
etc., consists in their phenomenality, which is a kind of presentational character that cannot 
be accounted for in terms of sensory/cognitive mechanisms. Consider that the intentionality 
of, say, a headache consists in its what-it’s-like-ness, insofar as the target of the perception 
of the headache is its phenomenal character. 
The presentational characters of some perceptual states can be described in terms of 
a relation between intentionality and phenomenality. Let us reconsider the system that solves 
a maze puzzle. It is not the fact that the system is able to find the exit what enables our 
attribution of perceptual states to it, but how it solves the puzzle. For instance, a system that 
learns to identify relevant cues to find the exit could be said to entertain perceptual states, 
insofar as the identification of those cues would suggest that the system has states about 
those cues and not mere awareness of its surroundings; in fact, mere awareness would not 
enable the system to identify cues. In a simplified manner, we could describe the system’s 
internal states as perceptual states about its surroundings and the cues, which would be a 
description in terms of intentionality. However, it could be that the system’s learning process 
involves the identification of phenomenal features, like odors and colors, as cues, in which 
case we would have to describe the intentionality of the system’s perceptual states in terms 
of a relation between intentionality and phenomenality. Accordingly, we could describe the 
system’s internal states as perceptual states that target phenomenal features, which would 
imply that those states also exhibit phenomenal characters. Thus, in my view, phenomenal 
features can be described as perceptible objects because they are what some perceptual states 
are about66. 
There are also perceptual states whose intentionality has to be described by means of 
reflexivity. In particular, those perceptual states that target the states of the system’s body67. 
In my view, what characterizes this kind of perceptual state is that their intentionality 
 
65 I will return to these methodological issues in the fourth chapter. 
66 That the features of the phenomenal characters of our experiences are often conceptualized as properties, 
namely, as what theorists call qualia, corresponds to a different practice of conceptualization that concerns the 
metaphysics of phenomenality, which exceeds the scope of this work. 
67 In the first chapter, we saw that the ability to entertain this kind of conscious state is called bodily awareness. 
 49 
partially consists in their reflexivity, insofar as they involve the system’s awareness of the 
states of its body. For instance, my perception of the orientation of my body involves my 
awareness of the relation between my body and my surroundings, which implies that I 
perceive my body in a way that fixes its relation to the rest of the perceptible objects around 
me. Thus, my perception of the orientation of my body can only be described by making 
explicit that its intentionality is at least partially constituted by my awareness of the state of 
my body and, consequently, its description relies on a relation between intentionality and 
reflexivity; possibly, the description would also involve phenomenality, under the 
assumption that experiences about our own bodies tend to exhibit phenomenal characters68. 
Not all intentional states are perceptual states, some are what I call representational 
states. This further kind of intentional state targets representations, which result from the 
exercise of our representational skills. Consequently, representations are not perceived, 
insofar as they do not directly stimulate a system’s sensors. Since representations are 
themselves specifiable, they can be interpreted as the contents of representational states. 
Some representational states are about what I call individual representations, which 
stand for perceptible objects or are formed by modifying other individual representations69. 
Thus defined, individual representations include representations of perceptible objects, as 
well as representations of non-existent and fictional objects, like unicorns and Darth Vader. 
Allow me to exemplify what are representational states about individual representations. 
I have never seen an Egyptian pyramid in person, though I have seen pictures and 
drawings of them. From those pictures and drawings, which are perceptible objects, I have 
formed a representation of what an Egyptian pyramid looks like. Notice that the pictures and 
drawings are perceptible objects that are conventionally70 meant to represent the pyramid, 
but they are not the pyramid. In contrast, the representation I have formed from my 
perception of those pictures and drawings stands for the pyramid. Thus, whenever I imagine 
or think about an Egyptian pyramid, I entertain a representational state whose content is an 
individual representation of the pyramid. Indeed, a perceptual state about the actual pyramid 
and a representational state about it, are both intentional states about the actual pyramid, but 
 
68 I will address this in the next section. 
69 I call them individual precisely because they target single perceptible objects or composed representations, 
i.e., representations formed by modifying other individual representations. Of course, we can have several 
individual representations of, say, the same perceptible object, but my point is that they all share a common 
target. 
70 A system incapable of interpreting the purpose of a picture or a drawing would be unable to form a 
representation of what they depict. 
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they have different presentational characters, namely, the former is about a perceptible object 
and the latter is about a representation of it. 
There are also representational states about non-existent and fictional objects, which 
are individual representations formed by modifying other representations. For instance, 
although I could form a representation of a unicorn by looking at, say, a drawing in a book, 
such representation does not stand for a perceptible object because the drawing depicts a 
representation formed by modifying other representations; arguably, one of a horse and one 
of a horn. Similarly, imagining a unicorn is to entertain an intentional state about an 
individual representation, not about a perceptible object. Regardless of how my 
representation of a unicorn is formed, it must be an individual representation because, even 
if I can modify it in several ways71, it always targets a unicorn. 
The description of some representational states involves reflexivity and 
phenomenality. For instance, intentionality is not enough to account for some of the features 
of a representational state like imagining how it would be to have four eyes. Such 
representational state is not merely about a possible scenario, but about a possible scenario 
that concerns me, imagined from my current point of view, which is a feature that can only 
be accounted for in terms of reflexivity. Now try to imagine how it would be to face Darth 
Vader. If we limit our description of the state to the intentionality dimension, then we will 
not be able to explain the phenomenal character to which the state points because, after all, 
it is not simply a state about being in front of Darth Vader, but about the what-it’s-like-ness 
of the encounter. Thus, imagining how it would be to face Darth Vader could be described 
as an intentional state about an individual representation of the what-it’s-like-ness of facing 
Darth Vader, which would be a description of its intentionality in terms of phenomenality. 
Some other representational states are about what I call cultural objects. In general, 
cultural objects are complex representations shared by a group of systems. Among this kind 
of objects, there are concepts, propositions, beliefs, opinions, etc., and together they give 
form to the way in which a system interprets its environment. Of course, a system’s 
conceptualization of its environment does not have to involve every aspect of it. On the 
contrary, it seems that representational states about cultural objects target portions of the 
system’s environment viewed from the perspective of the system and in accordance with the 
conventions that the system shares with the members of its group. 
 
71 For instance, by representing the features of the unicorn differently. 
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Cultural objects can be formed by means of the conceptualization of perceptible 
and/or individual representations. What distinguishes cultural objects from individual 
representations is that, while the latter stand for individual objects, properties, events, etc., 
the former are labels or categories that group perceptible objects and/or individual 
representations according to the conventions of a group of systems. 
Consider, for instance, the concept of cat, i.e., cat. While cats can be perceived or 
individually represented, cat cannot. I can have perceptual states and individually represent 
cats, but I cannot have an individual representation of cat. Certainly, whenever I perceive or 
imagine a cat, I am perceiving or imagining something to which cat applies, but I cannot 
have an individual representation of cat because it would be a representation of an individual 
cat, not of the concept. My point is that the characterization of cat involves a) the 
conceptualization of a kind of perceptible object and/or individual representation, and b) the 
adoption of a convention that concerns the application of the concept. This is why I believe 
that cat is a complex representation, i.e., a cultural object. 
It might seem that representational states about cultural objects can be fully described 
in terms of intentionality. However, some of them can only be described by means of 
reflexivity and phenomenality. Consider, for instance, my belief that “cats make good pets”. 
Although my belief is about an opinion shared by many people, it also exhibits a reflexive 
character, insofar as it is about an opinion that I endorse. In other words, my belief has a 
reflexive character, inasmuch as it involves a propositional attitude that I hold towards the 
convention that “cats make good pets”. Hence, a full description of my belief must involve 
reflexivity, to properly capture its presentational character. Now consider my thought that 
“pizza is a delicious Italian meal”. While ‘pizza’ and ‘Italian meal’ point to cultural objects72, 
‘delicious’ clearly points to the conceptualization of the phenomenal character of my 
experiences tasting pizzas. Hence, a proper description of the intentionality of my thought, 
apart from involving reflexivity in the above sense, must make reference to phenomenality. 
Among cultural objects, some are what I call theoretical objects. These are a subset 
of cultural objects, insofar as they are also complex representations, but they play a key role 
in the construction of a worldview. In particular, theoretical objects are meant to transcend 
the particular worldview of a group of systems, in the sense that they are taken as universal 
 
72 That these are cultural objects should be clear from the fact that, for instance, not everything that looks and 
tastes as a pizza is a pizza; at least not for an Italian person. Analogously, what qualifies as an Italian meal 
depends on conventional factors that are beyond the place where the meal is cooked or the person who cooks 
it. 
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concepts, propositions, etc. In other words, theoretical objects are assumed to be objective 
or universally true. Accordingly, the contents of theories are theoretical objects because they 
allegedly describe facts, irrespective of how a certain culture interprets those facts. 
For instance, when we think about Newton’s law of universal gravitation, we do it 
independently of our spatio-temporal coordinates and the conventions of the group to which 
we belong because the law is supposed to hold irrespectively of those factors. However, it is 
noteworthy that Newton’s law is made true by his physical theory and by certain socio-
cultural institutions, like the Royal Society73. Hence, Newton’s law of universal gravitation 
is a cultural object that becomes a theoretical object once his physical theory is legitimized 
by an authorized socio-cultural institution. Nevertheless, the law could also lose its status as 
a theoretical object, if the theory that makes it true gets discarded74. Apart from physical 
theories, logical systems and mathematics are also constituted by theoretical objects; 
actually, their contents are supposed to be the most objective theoretical objects conceivable 
because of their apparent universality. 
A representational state about a theoretical object differs from one about a cultural 
object in the sense that the former is meant to be universally true, while the latter could be, 
for instance, a belief based on the observation of a regularity that is ruled by a convention75. 
Consider that the proposition “cats are animals” is backed by a biological theory, while the 
proposition “cats make good pets” is backed by cultural practices that might not be shared 
by all cultures or even by every member of a group76. Therefore, what characterizes 
representational states about theoretical objects is that they constitute what we call 
knowledge. 
The alleged universality of theoretical objects does not imply that representational 
states about them can be fully describe in terms of intentionality because some of them may 
also exhibit the other characters. In my view, since representational states about theoretical 
objects are a subset of representational states about cultural objects, they often have 
reflexivity and phenomenality. Consider the thought that “I am human”. ‘Being human’ is a 
 
73 Although it might be argued that the Royal Society is a scientific institution and not a socio-cultural one, I 
take scientific institutions to be a kind of socio-cultural institution because they are conformed according to 
the worldview of a certain culture. 
74 A clear example of this change of status is the displacement of ether as an object within physical theories. 
75 Consider that astrology is grounded on the conventions of different groups and that, although it is supposed 
to be universal, it relies on cultural objects, like the relation between the position of certain celestial bodies and 
the personality of a person. Thus, when I think about my horoscope, I entertain a representational state about 
a cultural object. 
76 Although I grant that the universality and/or objectivity of theoretical objects is also relative to a group. 
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theoretical object supported by a biological theory, and it is meant to say something about 
the nature of some systems in our world; this accounts for part of the intentionality of my 
thought that “I am human”. However, the thought also exhibits a reflexive character that we 
can identify by realizing that it concerns my own nature. Thus, a description of the 
intentionality of the state must involve reflexivity; after all, the though is not just about the 
nature of some systems, but about my nature. Furthermore, in this moment, while thinking 
about theoretical objects, I am entertaining an intentional state that has a distinctive, though 
probably unspecifiable, phenomenality. My current reflection on theoretical objects exhibits 
a phenomenal character that is part of its intentionality and, consequently, the intentionality 
of my current state would have to be described in terms of a relation between intentionality 
and phenomenality. 
In this section, I have introduced a classification of conscious states that assigns a 
higher theoretical weight to the intentionality dimension of consciousness, i.e., I have 
described conscious states as intentional states. However, I have shown that the 
presentational characters of some intentional states can only be fully described by making 
reference to the other two components of consciousness, namely, reflexivity and 
phenomenality. My characterization of intentional states can be thus illustrated: 
 
Figure 3: Intentional States 
In the next section, I will show a different way to describe conscious states, namely, 
as reflexive states. In contrast to intentional states, which are descriptions of conscious states 
in terms of intentionality, reflexive states are descriptions of conscious states in terms of 
reflexivity, which means that reflexive states are not necessarily a different kind of conscious 
states, but a different way to describe them. 
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3.2. Reflexive states 
Some internal states exhibit reflexive characters and their description often relies on 
how their reflexivity is conceptualized. Broadly speaking, the reflexivity of conscious states 
concerns the fact that conscious systems are often aware of themselves and their own 
mentality. Thus, those states that are mainly described in terms of reflexivity are what I call 
reflexive states. My suggestion is that reflexive states are a category of conscious states that 
is supported by a practice of conceptualization that assigns a higher theoretical weight to the 
reflexivity dimension of the conceptual space of consciousness, though they often exhibit 
the other two characters. I will show that the reflexivity of many conscious states can only 
be described by means of intentionality and/or phenomenality. 
The reflexivity of conscious states has been characterized in several ways; for 
instance, as a sense of mineness (Guillot & Garcia-Carpintero, forthcoming) or sense of 
ownership (Peacocke, 2014). However, those characterizations already point to a relation 
between reflexivity and phenomenality. In my view, a system could be aware of its own 
mentality without experiencing any particular what-it’s-like-ness, i.e., without having a 
“sense” of mineness or ownership, because reflexivity and phenomenality are conceptually 
distinguishable aspects of consciousness. Perhaps human reflexive states are always like 
something, but the connection between their reflexive and phenomenal characters is not 
necessary; arguably, reflexive characters may not even have a distinctive phenomenology 
(Bermúdez, 2011). Still, it is reasonable to believe that the relation between both characters 
produces what Coleman (2012, p. 145) calls a phenomenal perspective. In any case, these 
are ways to describe the reflexivity of at least some conscious states and it is noteworthy 
that, conceptually, they explicitly point to how some reflexive characters relate to some 
phenomenal characters. 
I will now introduce a way to characterize the reflexivity of conscious states in terms 
of my interpretation of consciousness. Broadly speaking, I intend to argue that some 
conscious states can be categorized as reflexive states by analyzing how their reflexive 
characters manifest. In particular, I will hold that reflexive characters can be externalized or 
internalized. By ‘externalized’ I mean that the reflexive character is directed towards the 
outside of the system’s mentality, while by ‘internalized’ I mean that it is directed towards 
the system’s own mentality. 
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Note that the reflexive characters exhibited by states of bodily awareness77 are 
directed outwards, i.e., externalized: I am aware of my own body, I can perceive and control 
it, and that awareness allows me to interact with my environment in different ways. Notice 
that the reflexivity of states of bodily awareness cannot be explained in terms of the 
mechanisms that enable it because a system could have, say, self-monitoring mechanisms, 
without being aware that what those mechanisms monitor are the states, or some of the states, 
of its own body. Many electronic devices have self-monitoring mechanisms, but they do not 
seem to be able to entertain states of bodily awareness, insofar as those mechanisms do not 
generate states that exhibit externalized reflexive characters. Furthermore, we are not aware 
of every state of our bodies, though our bodies have mechanisms that monitor many of their 
states: my body is said to be able to monitor my blood pressure, but I certainly cannot 
become aware of it. Hence, it would seem that the reflexivity of states of bodily awareness 
is externalized in the sense that it is projected towards the outside of the system’s mentality78. 
 States of bodily awareness often exhibit intentionality and phenomenality, which 
means that their description as reflexive states may involve intentionality and/or 
phenomenality, if our theoretical interests demand it. Consider the feeling of hunger. 
Although such state is more frequently described as a phenomenal state79, it could also be 
described as a reflexive state, insofar as it concerns my awareness of something happening 
inside my body. To experience hunger requires the ability to be aware of the bodily state 
associated to it, which means that hunger is always felt from the perspective of the system80. 
Accordingly, the feeling of hunger exhibits an externalized reflexive character. In 
consequence, the description of the feeling of hunger as a reflexive state would have to 
characterize the reflexivity of the state in terms of a relation between reflexivity and 
phenomenality, to account for the fact that the feeling is experienced from the perspective of 
the system. The reflexivity of the same state of bodily awareness, namely, the feeling of 
hunger, could also be described in terms of reflexivity and intentionality, insofar as the state 
is arguably about something that is happening inside the system’s body. However, I have 
 
77 It should be obvious that only embodied conscious systems are capable of entertaining states of bodily 
awareness; after all, these are states characterized by the system’s awareness of at least some of the states of 
its own body. Nevertheless, embodiment is not conceptually necessary for entertaining reflexive states: if there 
were conscious angels, they would certainly have no bodily awareness. 
78 This should not be taken as a metaphysical claim because it only concerns the conceptual distinction between 
a system’s mentality and its body. 
79 I will address this kind of description in the next section. 
80 Of course, this applies to every sensation, emotion, feeling, etc., because they are all experienced from the 
point of view of the system. 
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argued before that the intentionality of this kind of conscious states consists in their what-
it’-s-like-ness, so their intentionality would have to be described in terms of phenomenality. 
In any case, my goal is to show that the same state could be described in different ways, 
according to our theoretical interests. 
In my view, a full description of a state like the feeling hunger would have to involve 
the three components of consciousness, given that it is possible to identify the three 
characters in it. However, depending on our theoretical interests, we could decide to assign 
a higher theoretical weight to a subset of the components or, to borrow Dennett’s (1971) 
terminology, adopt a different “strategy”. This adds to the general claim of this chapter, 
namely, that we can privilege a subset of the components to describe a conscious state, thus 
implementing different practices of conceptualization. Of course, my view does not imply 
that every state of bodily awareness exhibits all three character81. For instance, according to 
my analysis in the first chapter, somatic experiences do not seem to exhibit specifiable 
presentational characters because their intentionality, if any, points to their phenomenal 
characters. Thus, we could categorize them as reflexive states by describing them in terms 
of reflexivity and phenomenality. What seems to be the case is that every state of bodily 
awareness exhibits an externalized reflexive character and that they can be described as 
reflexive states. 
Other conscious states exhibit internalized reflexive characters, i.e., a reflexivity that 
is projected towards the system’s own mentality, and such reflexivity is often called self-
awareness or self-consciousness82. Broadly speaking, the idea is that some conscious states 
involve the system’s awareness of itself as something distinct; which is why I claim that they 
exhibit internalized reflexive characters. In a sense, the reflexivity of any state of self-
awareness, or self-consciousness, could be described in terms of a relation between 
reflexivity and intentionality, insofar as they are all about the system’s mentality. However, 
we should bear in mind that the intentionality of these states might not be representational, 
in the sense that I do not need to represent myself as a self83 to entertain states about my 
mentality. 
The reflexivity of states of self-consciousness could be described in terms of what 
Carruthers calls the strong notion of self-consciousness, insofar as they involve “higher-
 
81 More precisely, that we can identify all of them. 
82 I take ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ to be equivalent because they both point to the system’s 
ability to entertain states about itself and its mentality. 
83 I could even deny the existence of selves, as independent entities, and still entertain states about myself. 
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order awareness of oneself as a self, as a being with mental states and a subjective inner life” 
(2003, p. 12). However, this characterization seems to imply that the system must have the 
ability to form a representation of itself as, for instance, a self or a subject. The concept of 
self is controversial and some theorists have claimed that it might not point to a distinct 
referent (Siderits et al., 2010). Still, even if self lacks a clear referent, a system could be able 
to entertain states of self-consciousness because their reflexivity seems to point to the 
system’s mentality, not necessarily to a representation of the subject to which that mentality 
is attributed. Thus, it might be argued that states of self-consciousness can be reflexive in 
two senses, some exhibit reflexive characters that consist in the system’s awareness of its 
mentality, some others imply the system’s ability to represent itself as the subject of that 
mentality. The former sense would involve the capacity to entertain states that exhibit 
internalized reflexive characters, while the latter would further require representational 
skills. 
In my view, the reflexivity of states of self-awareness, or self-consciousness, consists 
in the system’s ability to entertain states about its own mentality, which means that the 
system may not be able to form a representation of itself as such-and-such to be self-
conscious. Indeed, many human self-conscious states seem to require representational skills, 
but that does not mean that every human self-conscious state is also a representational state. 
The difference lies in how we describe their reflexivity, i.e., in the practice of 
conceptualization that we adopt. On the one hand, we could say that these are reflexive states 
because they exhibit internalized reflexive characters, which would be a description that 
mainly privileges the reflexivity dimension of the conceptual space of consciousness. On the 
other hand, we could describe them as reflexive states in terms of a relation between 
reflexivity and intentionality, by pointing out that they are states that target the system’s 
mentality. 
It could also be argued that self-conscious states are like something for the system, 
i.e., that they exhibit phenomenal characters, in which case they could be described in terms 
of a relation between reflexivity and phenomenality. For instance, to think about what it is 
like to have a headache seems to be a reflexive state that concerns the phenomenality of my 
previous experiences of a headache. Self-conscious states could even be described in terms 
of the three components of consciousness. For instance, to think about how it felt to get 
married could be described as a reflexive state about the what-it’s-like-ness of my experience 
of getting married. 
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Some self-conscious states exhibit reflexive characters that are closely linked to their 
presentational characters. Particularly, theorists have argued that we are able to entertain 
states of self-knowledge, which are states that involve “knowledge of one’s own sensations, 
thoughts, beliefs, and other mental states” (Gertler, 2019). However, it is noteworthy that 
the reflexivity of states of self-knowledge is not different from that of states of self-
consciousness, they just involve a different set of representational skills. In my view, states 
of self-knowledge are a subset of self-conscious states that result from the system’s adoption 
of propositional attitudes towards its own mentality. In particular, states of self-knowledge 
are reflexive states whose reflexivity is intertwined with their intentionality, insofar as they 
target the system’s mentality in specific ways. Thus, propositional attitudes are modes of 
being aware of our own mentality that are enabled by some of our representational skills 
and, in consequence, they must be described in terms of a relation between reflexivity and 
intentionality84. 
The reflexive characters of conscious states could certainly be manifest in other ways 
or, more precisely, they could be conceptualized differently. Here, I have suggested a 
characterization of the reflexive characters of conscious states that is based on the direction 
in which those characters point. In any case, to say that some conscious states are reflexive 
states is a way to describe some internal states in terms of reflexivity. In other words, my 
claim is that reflexive states are not an independent kind of conscious state, but a category 
that corresponds to a particular practice of conceptualization. 
The latter classification of conscious states assigns a higher theoretical weight to the 
reflexivity dimension of consciousness, i.e., describes conscious states in terms of reflexivity. 
However, I have shown that the reflexivity of some conscious states can only be described 
by making reference to the other two components of consciousness. My characterization of 
reflexive states can be thus illustrated: 
 
84 Of course, states of self-knowledge might also have a what-it’s-like-ness, insofar as they are a subset of 
states of self-consciousness. 
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Figure 4: Reflexive States 
In the next section, I will show a different way to describe conscious states, namely, 
as phenomenal states. In contrast to intentional and reflexive states, phenomenal states are 
descriptions of conscious states in terms of phenomenality, which means that they are not a 
different kind of conscious state, but a different way to describe them. 
3.3. Phenomenal states 
Many, if not all, conscious states exhibit phenomenal characters, thought we may not 
always be able to identify or conceptualize them. In general, the phenomenal character of a 
conscious state is described in terms of what it is like to entertain that state, i.e., in terms of 
phenomenality85. I call phenomenal states to those conscious states that are mainly described 
by conceptualizing their phenomenal characters. Although phenomenal states often exhibit 
either of the other two characters, their description broadly depends on how their 
phenomenal characters are conceptualized, thus making the description of the other 
characters dependent on the phenomenality dimension of the conceptual space of 
consciousness. In this section, I will argue that this way to categorize conscious states is a 
practice of conceptualization that assigns a higher theoretical weight to the phenomenality 
dimension of the conceptual space. 
The conceptual strategy of describing conscious states as phenomenal states suggests 
that consciousness is equivalent to phenomenal consciousness. Many contemporary theorists 
(Brüntrup & Jaskolla, 2017; Coleman, 2015a; Goff, 2017) have argued that the properties of 
conscious states are phenomenal properties and that they are part of the fundamental reality. 
However, notice that my interpretation of consciousness does not necessarily entail that 
 
85 While many theorists characterize phenomenal characters as properties of conscious states, I only assume 
that they are discernible features of conscious states that can be identified and conceptualized according to 
phenomenality. 
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phenomenality is a property of consciousness because I have described it as a discernible 
feature, which means that it may not be independent from the other two features. Put briefly, 
my claim is merely that some internal states exhibit phenomenal characters. In any case, 
even if we grant that phenomenality is a property of consciousness, it seems that not all 
conscious states can be fully described in terms of phenomenality because they often also 
exhibit intentionality and/or reflexivity. 
We seem to be able to identify the phenomenal characters of most of our conscious 
states and to conceptualize them in terms of what it is like to be in them. When we ask a 
child “where does it hurt?” or “how much does it hurt?” what we expect is enough 
information to be able to conceptualize the phenomenal character of the child’s experience. 
Similarly, when we ask, “how is the chicken?” at a restaurant, what we expect is a description 
of what it is like to taste it. Arguably, the phenomenality of conscious states is enabled by 
the system’s sensory/cognitive skills, but its description cannot be reduced to a description 
of those skills. That apples normally taste sweet to us does not mean that they must taste 
sweet to every possible conscious system; in fact, under certain circumstances86, they may 
not even taste sweet to us. Hence, the phenomenality of conscious states must be described 
in terms of consciousness, not awareness. 
While we are able to identify the phenomenal characters of many of our experiences, 
we cannot directly identify the phenomenal characters of the experiences of other conscious 
systems. I can describe the what-it’s-like-ness of tasting an apple by conceptualizing the 
phenomenal character of my experiences tasting apples, but I cannot describe what it is like 
for you to taste an apple by the same means. However, there are indirect ways to infer and 
describe the phenomenality of the experiences of another system. For instance, we could 
infer the what-it’s-like-ness of a system’s experience by associating its behavior to the 
phenomenality of the states that normally precede, underlie or follow such behavior87. We 
could also analyze the neural states of a system while it presumably entertains a particular 
kind of conscious state and stablish a relation between those neural states and the 
phenomenality normally attributed to the kind of conscious state under consideration88. 
 
86 For instance, due to damage to the system’s taste receptors. 
87 Arguably, we employ this strategy when interacting with other humans and with those non-human systems 
to which we attribute at least some aspects of consciousness. 
88 This is surely an oversimplified description of the strategy that is regularly implemented in scientific 
contexts. 
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Since I take phenomenal states to be a category of conscious states that are mainly 
described in terms of phenomenality, I will present I way to describe them by analyzing how 
the conceptualization of their phenomenal characters relates to the other components of 
consciousness. In other words, I will show how conscious states can be described in terms 
of how phenomenality relates to intentionality and reflexivity. 
From the conceptual point of view, there might be conscious states that can be fully 
described in terms of phenomenality. For instance, it seems that moods and emotions could 
be described in terms of what it is like to be in them, regardless of their causes and the 
specific sensory/cognitive skills of the system that experiences them. Consider the 
experience of surprise. The experience of surprise might target many different things, so it 
would be difficult to describe it purely in terms of intentionality89. Furthermore, many kinds 
of systems, besides humans, seem to be able to experience surprise, so it is reasonable to 
assume that the feeling cannot be fully described in terms of reflexivity. While some features 
of the phenomenality of the experience of surprise might depend on the system’s awareness 
of the experience or on its target, its phenomenality must always be relatively constant, 
insofar as every experience of surprise must be like something that can be described 
irrespective of the other characters. Thus, a description of the experience of surprise in terms 
of what it is like to feel surprised, i.e., in terms of phenomenality, would seem to be an 
adequate description of the relevant kind of state. 
A description of a conscious state given only in terms of phenomenality would have 
to be a description in terms of what theorists call phenomenal concepts. I call these pure 
phenomenal states90, not because they only exhibit phenomenal characters, but because their 
description relies entirely in the phenomenality dimension of consciousness. In my view, 
phenomenal concepts result from the abstraction of the what-it’s-like-ness of certain 
paradigmatic conscious states, i.e., they are conceptualizations that disregard the other two 
characters. For instance, the concept of pain points to the characteristic what-it’s-like-ness 
of certain experiences, irrespective of their intentionality and their reflexivity, because all 
experiences of pain seem to have a similar phenomenality. Thus, any conscious system 
capable of experiencing pain is a system capable of entertaining states that exhibit the 
distinctive phenomenal character to which pain refers. 
 
89 That we tend to associate a particular feeling of surprise to its target does not describe the phenomenality of 
the experience. 
90 It might turn out that there are no pure phenomenal states, but they certainly are conceptually possible. 
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Not all conscious states that exhibit phenomenal characters can be fully described by 
means of phenomenal concepts. In particular, there are conscious states whose description 
as phenomenal states requires making reference to intentionality and/or reflexivity. 
Some conscious states exhibit presentational characters that modify or can be 
modified by their phenomenal characters, so their description must be given in terms of a 
relation between phenomenality and intentionality. I call these intentional phenomenal 
states. For instance, I have argued above that the categorization of somatic experiences as 
intentional states requires a description of their intentionality in terms of phenomenality 
because they are about what it is like to experience them. In contrast, now I am arguing that 
the same kind of experience can be categorized as a kind of phenomenal state, by inverting 
the practice of conceptualization employed to describe them91. Thus, somatic experiences 
can be considered phenomenal states by conceptualizing their phenomenality in terms of 
intentionality. 
Intentional phenomenal states are conscious states that exhibit both phenomenal and 
presentational characters but are mainly described in terms of phenomenality. These are 
states that, apart from their identifiable phenomenal characters, have identifiable targets. For 
instance, what I called perceptual states above, namely, intentional states about perceptible 
objects, can also be described as intentional phenomenal states, by assigning a higher 
theoretical weight to the conceptualization of their phenomenal characters. Arguably, every 
perception has a what-it’s-like-ness, so they could be categorized as phenomenal states that 
are about perceptible objects, in which case their descriptions would be focused on what it 
is like to perceive those objects. 
Other conscious states exhibit reflexive characters that modify or can be modified by 
their phenomenal characters, so their description must be given in terms of a relation between 
phenomenality and reflexivity. I call them reflexive phenomenal states. In general, it could 
be argued that every experience is experienced by a system and that, consequently, they all 
have a certain reflexivity. However, their reflexive characters are not always identifiable or 
relevant for their description. Notice that the description of the phenomenality of pain is 
independent of how a particular system experiences it because every experience of pain must 
be painful, i.e., must exhibit the distinctive phenomenal character to which pain refers. 
 
91 This is the reason why I have been claiming throughout this work that different approaches to consciousness 
correspond to different practices of conceptualization, not to different concepts of consciousness. 
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In a sense, reflexive phenomenal states are conscious states that have perspectivity, 
they are states about what it is like to entertain a certain conscious state from the point of 
view of a particular system or kind of system. In other words, these are conscious states 
whose phenomenal characters are modified by the system’s awareness of them. For instance, 
while every experience of pain must be painful, the phenomenal character of an experience 
of pain can be experienced differently depending on its reflexive character. It often happens 
that football players get hurt without being aware of the injury and, by means of becoming 
aware of the injury, they experience the pain it causes in a different way. While it would be 
odd to claim that, before becoming aware of the injury, the player did not feel pain92, it seems 
that becoming aware of the injury modifies how the pain is experienced by the player. Thus, 
it would seem that the reflexive character of a given state can modify its phenomenal 
character. In the case of the football player, it is the awareness of the injury what modifies 
how the player feels the pain because the cause of the pain was already there and, 
presumably, the player was already in pain before becoming aware of the injury. In other 
words, the player’s awareness of the injury changes the way in which the pain is felt, but it 
is not the cause of the pain. Thus, it seems that a proper description of the player’s states, 
before and after becoming aware if the injury, would have to be given in terms of how the 
awareness of the injury modifies how the player experiences the pain, i.e., by means of a 
relation between phenomenality and reflexivity. 
Similarly, it could be argued that the phenomenal and the reflexive characters of, say, 
self-conscious states are interrelated and that, consequently, self-conscious states could be 
described as reflexive phenomenal states93. Self-conscious states clearly exhibit reflexive 
characters, which is why they tend to be described as reflexive states, but it could be argued 
that at least some of them have distinctive phenomenal characters. In this moment, I am 
thinking about the fact that I am the author of this work, and to entertain that thought is like 
something for me. Although the phenomenality of my current conscious state is difficult to 
describe, insofar as it involves many different experiences that I have had during the last two 
years, it should be clear that to think “I am the author of this work” is like something for me, 
precisely because of how my awareness of the thought modifies the what-it’s-like-ness of 
entertaining such thought. Certainly, you can try to imagine what it is like for me to entertain 
the thought, but it is very unlikely that your state will exhibit a similar phenomenal character 
 
92 Because the sensation of pain is not caused by the awareness of the injury. 
93 As I argued before, self-conscious states can also be described as intentional or reflexive states, by means of 
a relation between intentionality and reflexivity. 
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because it would have a different perspective, i.e., a different reflexive character, insofar as 
you are not the author of this work. 
Finally, it seems that some phenomenal states can only be described in terms of the 
three components of consciousness. I call these subjective states, insofar as they are 
described as states about what it is like for a system to experience something. The difference 
between reflexive phenomenal states and subjective states is that the former may not exhibit 
identifiable presentational characters94, while the latter do. In other words, subjective states 
are phenomenal states that exhibit identifiable presentational and reflexive characters. The 
idea is that the reflexive and the presentational characters of some conscious states can 
modify and be modified by their phenomenal characters. 
Subjective states are of great interest to theorists because they seem to be the most 
complex kind of conscious state. However, notice that my approach implies that they are 
descriptions of some internal states given in terms of the three components of consciousness, 
not that they are a special kind of conscious state. In other words, my view does not entail 
that there are conscious states that are more complex than others. In a sense, all conscious 
states could be categorized as subjective states because, one could argue, conscious states 
must always be experienced by a system and presumably, be like something and about 
something. However, I believe that, depending on our theoretical interests, we may not need 
to describe every conscious state in terms of intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. 
For instance, a visual perception of a tomato, which is clearly a conscious state, could be 
described in terms of intentionality and phenomenality, even if the perception must be 
experienced by a system to be a conscious state, because the reflexive character of the 
perception may not be theoretically relevant95. In other cases, a subset of the characters of a 
given conscious state may not be identifiable, which would prevent us from describing them 
as subjective states96. 
 
94 Arguably, the player’s experience of pain is not about the injury but about the sensation of pain. To say that 
the injury is what the sensation of pain is about would be to attribute the state an intentionality that derives 
from the conceptualization of its phenomenal character, i.e., to describe the state according to the practice of 
conceptualization that assigns a higher theoretical weight to intentionality, in which case the state would be 
described as an intentional state. 
95 From a scientific perspective, the description of the perception of a tomato does not need to make reference 
to the system’s awareness of the perception because we can take for granted that there is a system perceiving 
the tomato; unless our interest is in investigating the sensory/cognitive mechanisms that enable the perception 
which, according to my approach, would be an investigation of awareness, not consciousness. 
96 Again, it seems that the presentational characters of, say, moods, emotions and somatic experiences cannot 
be identified, unless we adopt the practice of conceptualization that describes conscious states as intentional 
states, which amounts to a derivation of their intentionality by means of the conceptualization of their other 
characters in terms of intentionality. 
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Nevertheless, the visual perception of a tomato could be described as a subjective 
state under certain circumstances. Let us reconsider Mary’s perception of a tomato after 
leaving her black and white lab. Arguably, Mary is aware of her own mentality, so we could 
assume that she is capable of entertaining states that exhibit reflexive characters. 
Furthermore, since Mary is an unimpaired human, or at least this is what Jackson’s argument 
seems to suggest, we could conjecture that her sensory/cognitive skills are like ours and, 
consequently, that she must be able to entertain states that exhibit presentational and 
phenomenal characters. Hence, all else being equal, Mary’s perception of the tomato could 
be described as a subjective state, insofar as she must be capable of entertaining states that 
exhibit the three characters97. Analogously, my present conscious state, sitting in from of my 
laptop thinking about subjective states while feeling a mild pain on my neck, seems to be a 
clear instance of a subjective state; in fact, I have just described it in terms of the three 
components of consciousness. 
I have presented a way to describe conscious states that assigns a higher theoretical 
weight to the phenomenality dimension of consciousness. The idea is that some conscious 
states can be categorized as phenomenal states because they exhibit phenomenal characters 
that can be conceptualized either in terms of phenomenality or in terms of relations between 
phenomenality and the other components of consciousness. My characterization of 
phenomenal states can be thus illustrated: 
 
Figure 5: Phenomenal States 
 
97 Thus, in my view, the difference between Mary’s conscious states about the color of tomatoes in her black 
and white lab, and her visual perception of a tomato is that her visual perception exhibits a different phenomenal 
character, regardless of the fact that both states presumably target the same thing and that they arguably exhibit 
reflexivity. 
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In this chapter, I have argued that conscious states can be categorized according to 
three different practices of conceptualization, each of which assigns a higher theoretical 
weight to one of the dimensions of the conceptual space of consciousness. My goal was to 
show that conscious states are descriptions of those internal states to which we attribute the 
discernible features of conscious states and that their differences depend on how those 
features are conceptualized and categorized.  
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Chapter 4: Characterizing Non-Human 
Consciousness 
Classical scientific definitions of intelligence use humans as a yardstick by which all other 
species are measured. According to these anthropocentric definitions, humans are always 
at the top of the intelligence rankings, followed by animals that look like us (chimpanzees, 
bonobos, etc.), followed again by other “higher” animals, and onward and downward in a 
league table. 
Merlin Sheldrake (2020, p. 16) 
 
In this chapter I intend to show how my interpretation of consciousness can be 
employed to analyze possible cases of non-human consciousness. Clearly, since my 
approach is mainly conceptual, I will not claim that there are non-human kinds of conscious 
systems. Instead, I will assess whether consciousness could be attributed to non-human kinds 
of systems by relying on my interpretation of consciousness. The difference is that, while 
the assertion of the existence of non-human conscious systems would have significant 
metaphysical implications regarding the extension of consciousness in reality, the attribution 
of consciousness is a practice of conceptualization that solely depends on how we apply 
consciousness98. 
In what follows, I will employ my interpretation of consciousness to assess whether 
consciousness could be attributed to dolphins and bees. Methodologically speaking, I will 
 
98 This is one of the reasons why I believe that my view is metaphysically compatible with most contemporary 
theories of consciousness, namely, because our attributions of consciousness are partially independent of our 
knowledge of its ultimate nature. Consider that, even if it turned out that consciousness does not exist, we 
would still attribute it to ourselves and perhaps to some non-human systems. 
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analyze scientific observations about how dolphins and bees behave under several ordinary 
and artificial circumstances, i.e., when facing tasks that they normally find in their natural 
environments and tasks that are completely novel to them. Of course, it might be argued that 
this methodology entails a sort of functionalization of consciousness99, insofar as I will 
interpret their behavior in terms of consciousness. However, it should be noted that one thing 
is to claim that a certain kind of system is conscious because of how it behaves, and another 
is to interpret the system’s behavior in terms of consciousness. While the first constitutes a 
metaphysical claim regarding the nature of the system, the second has the scope of providing 
an explanation of the system’s behavior. Moreover, it is noteworthy that we regularly 
attribute consciousness to other humans by means of interpreting their behavior as evidence 
of their consciousness, i.e., by functionalizing consciousness. Hence, why should the same 
methodology be inadequate for attributing consciousness to non-human systems? 
Before assessing the possibility of attributing consciousness to dolphins and bees, I 
would like to address a possible objection. In contrast to the approaches to consciousness 
that I have analyzed in the first chapter, my interpretation of the concept is not equivalent to 
human consciousness. Indeed, I have characterized consciousness in terms of our ability to 
identify and conceptualize three paradigmatic characters exhibited by human conscious 
states, but I do not think that our attributions of consciousness are determined by human 
consciousness. In any case, it could be argued that every attribution of consciousness is 
ultimately an attribution of human-like consciousness100, which would mean that every 
possible kind of consciousness must be human-like. However, I do not believe that this is 
the case. That we attribute consciousness by applying a concept that is based on human 
consciousness only means that we interpret the world from our own perspective, not that the 
world is as we interpret it. In my view, what is human-like is the conceptualization of the 
features of conscious states, not the features themselves, which suggests that non-human 
conscious systems might entertain internal states that exhibit either of the characters in non-
human ways. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce a way to study consciousness that 
does not necessitate a set of metaphysical claims and arguments to support it. The attribution 
of consciousness is a practice of conceptualization meant to describe and explain the 
behavior of a system or kind of systems by means of consciousness. In other words, the 
 
99 I thank Sam Coleman for calling my attention to this issue. 
100 I thank Luke Roelofs for calling my attention to this issue. 
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attribution of consciousness consists in the description of at least some of the internal states 
of a system in terms of consciousness as a means to account for the behavior of the system, 
or part of it. Certainly, not every behavior needs to be explained by attributing consciousness 
to the system. We have developed sophisticated methods and models that are capable of 
predicting how some systems behave or will behave under certain circumstances so, one 
might ask, when is the attribution of consciousness necessary? Why would such attribution 
lead to a better or more accurate explanation? 
Perhaps someday we will have theoretical models powerful enough to predict even 
human behavior but, as many theorists have pointed out, such models may never be able to 
tell us why humans behave as they do; indeed, this seems to be the reason why we explain 
our behavior in terms of consciousness, instead of satisfying ourselves with mere causal 
accounts. Throughout this chapter I will build a case for the thesis that the attribution of 
consciousness to non-human systems might provide a more accurate explanation of their 
behavior. But what is a more accurate explanation? Accuracy is certainly a relative term, for 
it depends on our theoretical interests. Hence, I will argue that the attribution of at least some 
aspects of consciousness to dolphins and bees may lead to more accurate explanations, in 
the sense that such explanations seem to be simpler than the functional/computational 
models often employed by scientists. As I have been arguing, the attribution of 
consciousness is a pragmatical choice, a strategy that follows specific theoretical interests. 
We normally explain some of our actions by attributing ourselves the ability to make 
decisions, instead of searching for an algorithm or theoretical model that mirrors those 
actions under similar circumstances. Sure, we can then employ theoretical models and 
algorithms to predict certain behaviors under similar conditions, but those models and 
algorithms do not explain, nor describe, why we act as we do. What explains our actions is 
precisely the attribution of the ability to make decisions. Analogously, I will argue that the 
attribution of consciousness to dolphins and bees provides a more accurate explanation of 
why they behave as they do. In consequence, I will not be arguing against the theoretical 
tools that scientists normally employ, for they may be more accurate to explain the 
functional/cognitive basis that underlies dolphin and bee behavior. Keep in mind that my 
main claim throughout this work has been that the study of consciousness belongs to an 
irreducible conceptual level, not to an independent metaphysical category. Thus, what 
follows is a speculation about why dolphins and bees behave as they do, by attributing them 
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the capacity to entertain at least some kinds of conscious states, not an argument in favor of 
the existence of non-human consciousness. 
4.1. Dolphin101 consciousness 
The scientific study of consciousness in non-human systems mirrors the study of 
human consciousness, especially regarding the conceptual background employed to identify 
the target of the study. For instance, theorists tend to differentiate the cognitive aspects of 
conscious states from what makes them conscious: “[i]t is essential to distinguish between 
“intelligence” (as problem solving) and “consciousness” (as wakeful alertness and conscious 
perception, including the perception of pain and pleasure)” (Baars, 2005, p. 12). I have 
expressed this distinction as one between awareness and consciousness. Broadly speaking, 
the idea is that a system could entertain cognitive states, i.e., have awareness, without being 
a conscious system, while it seems that every conscious system must be a cognitive system. 
Accordingly, theorists often claim that consciousness necessitates awareness, though 
awareness does not guarantee consciousness. 
It seems that a system’s awareness mechanisms shape the way in which the system 
experiences, i.e., entertains conscious states, but the point is that consciousness cannot be 
fully explained in terms of its functional/cognitive basis. In my view, the reason why 
consciousness cannot be explained in terms of awareness is that consciousness and 
awareness are not the same concept and, more importantly, because the study of 
consciousness belongs to an irreducible conceptual level. Notice that I am talking about 
different conceptual levels, not different targets. Conscious states, understood as internal 
states to which we attribute the paradigmatic features of conscious states, could also be 
described as cognitive states, by means of awareness102. Although it could be argued that 
consciousness makes a cognitive difference103, inasmuch as awareness and consciousness 
seem to be somehow intertwined, they must be studied from different conceptual levels. 
In what follows, I will analyze some scientific observations regarding the way in 
which dolphins behave under natural and artificial circumstances, to assess whether we can 
attribute consciousness to them. The purpose of this analysis is to show how my 
interpretation of consciousness could be employed to explain dolphin behavior, not to assert 
 
101 For simplicity, I will use the term ‘dolphin’ to refer to all members of the Delphinidae family. 
102 Just as a conscious state could be categorized, for instance, as an intentional state or as a phenomenal state, 
depending on our theoretical interests and the practice of conceptualization that we adopt. 
103 I thank Sam Coleman for calling my attention to this issue. 
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that dolphins are, in fact, conscious systems. Broadly speaking, this section is inspired by 
the fact that 
[s]cientific study has confirmed that bottlenose dolphins are large-brained, 
highly social mammals with an extended developmental period, flexible 
cognitive capacities, and powerful acoustic abilities including a 
sophisticated echolocation system. These findings have led some to ask if 
dolphins experience aspects of consciousness (Harley, 2013, p. 565). 
At first glance, it seems that, despite the considerable distance between dolphins and 
primates in the phylogenetic tree, dolphins exhibit an impressive capacity for flexible 
behavior and adaptation, which is a sign that they have awareness mechanisms. Since the 
primary source of evidence for supporting this claim about dolphin awareness is behavioral 
analysis, I will now evaluate whether attributing them at least some aspects of consciousness 
would give us a better understanding of their behavior. In particular, I will argue that, while 
the attribution of awareness to dolphins is an empirical task, and there is a vast literature on 
the subject (Herman, 2006, 2012; Herzing & Johnson, 2015; Janik, 2013; Marino et al., 
2007), the attribution of consciousness to them requires a conceptually different approach. 
As Harley points out, 
[t]he existing evidence does not provide a convincing case for 
consciousness in dolphins. For productive scientific work on 
consciousness in dolphins (and other animals including humans), we need 
clearer characterizations of consciousness, better methods for studying it, 
and appropriate paradigms for interpreting outcomes (Harley, 2013, p. 
565). 
My interpretation of consciousness might aid the situation. In the second chapter, I 
have provided a definition of our subject-matter and argued that the conceptual space of 
consciousness can be modelled to account for any possible kind of consciousness. Hence, 
according to my characterization of conscious states in the third chapter, if we can describe 
some of the dolphin’s internal states in terms of the components of consciousness, then we 
might have a case for attributing consciousness to dolphins. 
4.1.1. The dolphin world 
The first thing that we must take into account when we consider the possibility of 
dolphin consciousness is that consciousness, in general, implies perspectivity. Conscious 
systems are conscious of only a portion of their environment, which is determined by their 
awareness mechanisms. For instance, we know that the hearing range of dolphins is far 
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broader than the human (Roitblat, 2002, p. 183), but we also know that their sense of smell 
is considerably limited or even totally absent (Hanke & Erdsack, 2015, p. 56). In 
consequence, if dolphins are conscious, they are not conscious of exactly the same portion 
of the world of which we are104. To properly assess the possibility of dolphin consciousness, 
we must describe the dolphin world in terms of their awareness mechanisms. 
As far as we know, “dolphins obtain information about the identity, location, and 
characteristics of objects in their world by actively interrogating them using their unique 
biological sonar”; in particular, “[u]sing echolocation, dolphins can identify many 
characteristics of submerged objects, including size, structure, shape, and material 
composition” (Roitblat, 2002, p. 183). The dolphin biological sonar is a highly sophisticated 
sensory mechanism that cannot be reduced, nor compared, to our hearing. Moreover, to 
suitably describe the dolphin world we need to account for the integration between the 
dolphin’s hearing, sight and echolocation (Harley et al., 1996). Thus, although “[w]e cannot 
know what the dolphin’s subjective experience of perception is like, […] we can know 
something about what it experiences by identifying the sensory dimensions that are 
available” (Roitblat, 2002, p. 186). 
While there is no objective method to determine whether dolphins entertain 
phenomenal states, there are reliable ways to investigate if some of their internal states 
exhibit presentational and reflexive characters. Thus, I will adopt a two-dimensional model 
of consciousness, constituted by intentionality and reflexivity, to assess the possibility of 
attributing conscious states to dolphins. Let us start by considering the possibility of 
attributing intentional states to them. 
We know that dolphins are capable of identifying and locating things in their aquatic 
environment, as well as distinguishing several characteristics of those things (Roitblat, 
2002). However, the question is whether dolphins entertain internal states that exhibit 
presentational characters. Dolphins are not only capable of identifying objects by means of 
a single perceptual dimension, vision or echolocation105, they are also capable of integrating 
information from both modalities (Harley et al., 1996; Herman et al., 1998; Pack & Herman, 
1995) to make cross-modal identifications. Taken separately, each modality allows the 
dolphin to capture different features of its environment and to discriminate objects: 
 
104 Compared to ours, the dolphin world would have few or no smells, but many more sounds. 
105 The two main sensory dimensions of dolphins. 
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Using echolocation, dolphins can discriminate aspect-dependent objects 
(i.e., objects that produce different echoes depending upon the perspective 
from which they are echolocated) presented at different angles […]. 
Dolphins are well known to use their biological sonar to obtain 
information about objects in their environment […]. Dolphins can 
determine the material from which an object is made, the object’s size, 
shape, and wall thickness […]. 
Dolphins also have good vision in air and underwater […]. Dolphins can 
visually discriminate objects that vary on several features at once. They 
can also distinguish 2-dimensional patterns that vary only in form (Harley 
et al., 1996, p. 165). 
 What these observations suggest is that dolphins can identify and distinguish what I 
called perceptible objects, independently of the sensory dimension with which they first 
perceived the object (Harley et al., 1996). For instance, they have the “ability to learn 
simultaneously about visual and acoustic properties of a set of stimuli” (Harley et al., 1996, 
p. 165), as well as the capacity to integrate visual and echoic information learned separately 
to improve their ability to discriminate objects. Furthermore, dolphins are capable of making 
cross-modal matchings to identify specific features of objects that are only available to one 
sensory dimension. 
The fact that the dolphin could perform a cross-modal matching task 
suggests that her representational system may be hierarchically organized. 
For example, if the dolphin echolocates a sphere, she receives acoustic 
information about that sphere. If she is then required to use vision to 
choose that sphere from among a group of objects, she must have some 
way to connect her visual experience of the sphere with the acoustic 
information she had previously received in order to accomplish her task. 
A hierarchical system might allow her to tag the two experiences as being 
related because they both represent the sphere, or because they both 
represent a round object. This tag, whether it is based on simultaneous 
activation of the two representations or a connection with a third 
representation, is a form of hierarchical organization. That is, the identity 
of the object or object feature is on one level; the dolphin’s different 
sensory experiences are on another level beneath it. Such a system might 
provide a mechanism through which the dolphin could create a stable 
representation of its world (Harley et al., 1996, p. 173). 
 According to these observations, the dolphin’s ability to integrate multimodal 
information to identify and discriminate objects suggests that it “has an object-based 
representational system” (Harley et al., 1996, p. 164). Thus, by means of intentionality, we 
could conjecture that dolphins may be able to entertain perceptual states, i.e., internal states 
that exhibit presentational characters about perceptible objects. However, notice that my 
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description of perceptual states does not necessarily imply that the system represents 
perceptible objects, even less that it must be able to form “hierarchically organized” 
representations. The observations above suggest that dolphins perceive their environment 
and some objects within it, not that they represent those objects as such-and-such. For 
instance, we do not yet have reasons to believe that dolphins are able to represent isolated 
features of the objects they perceive, like roundness. It might well be that dolphins use some 
features of the objects they perceive as cues, but this does not mean that they represent those 
features in a specific way. 
 The ability to represent implies that the system must be able to recall, modify, relate 
and update its representations, which are complex cognitive skills. So now we must enquire 
whether dolphins have those skills. Theorists have observed that dolphins efficiently interact 
and adapt to changes in their environment, which suggests that they have cognitive skills, 
like attention (Ridgway et al., 2006), memory (Herman et al., 1989; Herman & Gordon, 
1974), reasoning (Herman, 2006), and decision making (Johnson et al., 2015). Thus, it would 
seem that dolphins might be able to form representations after all. For instance, they seem 
to be able to remember, recall and update representations of objects that are not directly 
perceivable, or even absent (Herman & Forestell, 1985). 
In response to a trainer producing the gesture for a named object followed 
by a “question” gesture, the dolphin pressed either a paddle to its right (to 
indicate “presence”) or a paddle to its left (to indicate “absence”). After 
learning the contingencies of the paddles using a small set of exemplars, 
the dolphin spontaneously responded accurately when novel queries were 
made about named objects (Pack, 2015, p. 185). 
 These observations evince that dolphins are not only aware of objects but may also 
be able to form representations of those objects to adapt to changes in their environment. 
Thus, it would seem that dolphins might entertain intentional states about non-perceptible 
kinds of objects, i.e., representational states about individual representations, considering 
that the capacity to determine the presence or absence of an object depends on the ability to 
form, store and recall a representation of an object that may not be directly accessible to the 
senses. In particular, dolphins exhibit the ability to associate representations to symbols, 
gestures or names, insofar as the production of a learned gesture by the trainer “evoked the 
mental representation –a “search image”– of the referenced item” (Pack, 2015, p. 185). 
 What about other kinds of representational states? Can dolphins form concepts? Can 
they have states about cultural or theoretical objects? Although it is more difficult to 
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investigate the possibility of entertaining these kinds of intentional states in non-human 
systems, some dolphin behaviors suggest that they might have the cognitive skills that 
underlie such complex representations. In particular, some of their behaviors might be 
explained by describing their internal states as intentional states about cultural objects. 
Bottlenose dolphins at Laguna off the coast of Brazil have an unusual 
group-specific feeding technique which seems to date from 1847 and have 
been transmitted within a matrilineal community since at least three 
generations of dolphin are involved […]. The 25–30 dolphins and local 
fishers follow a strict protocol –involving no training or commands from 
the fishermen– that allows the humans and dolphins to coordinate their 
actions. The dolphins drive fish into the nets of human fishermen, 
indicating as they do so by performing a distinctive rolling dive when the 
humans should cast their nets. The humans can also pick up from how 
much of the body comes out of the water on this roll an idea of how many 
fish are present –it is entirely unclear whether this cue is given 
intentionally or not– and then feed off the fish that are stunned or missed 
by the net (Rendell & Whitehead, 2001, p. 316). 
 Evidently, it all comes down to how we define culture. Compared to the richness of 
human culture, this kind of behavior might not be enough to say that there is anything like a 
dolphin culture. However, the fact that only a localized group of dolphins makes use of this 
feeding technique can be interpreted as a sign that a certain kind of knowledge is transmitted 
from one generation to the other. Thus, it would seem that describing the internal states of 
those dolphins as representational states about cultural objects would provide an explanation 
of their complex behavior. In particular, their internal states could be described as intentional 
states about a certain convention shared by the members of the group, which is precisely 
how I have defined cultural objects. In any case, my point is that a complex behavior like 
the one mentioned above does not seem to be explainable in terms that do not involve 
consciousness, nor in terms of basic cognitive skills, because, if that were the case, then we 
would observe similar behaviors in other groups of dolphins. 
 To have representational states about cultural and theoretical objects, a system must 
be capable of codifying information somehow and of forming concepts. The cognitive skill 
to form concepts, in turn, requires the ability to isolate relevant features or procedures and 
to be able to apply concepts under different and novel circumstances. One key feature of this 
cognitive ability is that the system must be able to identify semantic and syntactic 
differences, i.e., to learn and use a language. 
 76 
Our studies of language comprehension have revealed capabilities in the 
dolphin for processing both semantic and syntactic information. […] The 
dolphin is capable of understanding that changes in word order change 
meaning. It can respond appropriately, for instance, to such semantic 
contrasts as surfboard person fetch (take the person to the surfboard) and 
person surfboard fetch (take the surfboard to the person). 
In these language studies, the dolphin demonstrated an implicit 
representation and understanding of the grammatical structure of the 
language (Herman, 2002a, pp. 278–279). 
 These observations evince that dolphins are capable of understanding semantic 
differences by identifying syntactic features, like the order of the elements of a sentence106, 
which is a sign that they may be able to learn and transfer concepts according to changes in 
their environment. More interestingly, dolphins can recognize anomalous sentences and 
extract only the semantically and syntactically correct sequences from longer sentences 
without additional training (Herman et al., 1993). Furthermore, they are also highly efficient 
in providing judgements of numerosity (Yaman et al., 2012). 
After a dolphin was trained with limited exemplars to respond to 
whichever of two arrays contained the greater number of items, it 
transferred the “more” concept to novel numerical contrasts. The reward 
contingencies were then reversed, requiring the dolphin to respond to the 
array containing the least number of items. After training with one 
numerical contrast, the dolphin readily applied the new “choose less” rule 
at performance levels of 85 percent or greater to other contrasts, including 
some it had responded to previously by choosing “more” (Pack, 2015, p. 
183). 
 The complexity and plasticity of these dolphin behaviors, I suggest, is best explained 
by means of consciousness because the fact that they can invert a concept without any special 
training evinces that they are not just responding to stimuli. Admittedly, that dolphins seem 
to be capable of learning concepts and use them in novel circumstances is not a direct proof 
that they can have representational states about theoretical objects. However, it must also be 
said that the abilities to learn and apply concepts, like numerosity, are often at the base of 
the capacity to entertain intentional states whose contents are those concepts. For this reason, 
I suggest that attributing dolphins the ability to entertain intentional states about concepts 
might enable a better understanding of the complexity of their behavior. 
 
106 They are usually sequences of gestures, not words. 
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 Although an assessment of the possibility to attribute intentional states about cultural 
and theoretical objects to dolphins would require further research, the complexity of their 
behaviors suggests that they might be able to entertain some intentional states, or at least 
that some of their internal states could be described in terms of intentionality. In particular, 
the attribution of intentional states to dolphins would allow us to claim that there is a dolphin 
world, i.e., that dolphins interact with their environment by means of perceiving and 
representing objects around them. In other words, some dolphin behaviors evince that they 
have a perspective and that they can adapt to their environment by means of perceiving and 
representing it according to their sensory/cognitive skills. My intention is not to assert that 
dolphins definitely entertain intentional states, but to suggest that an explanation of some of 
their behaviors would require the description of their corresponding internal states as states 
that exhibit presentational characters. 
Having a perspective does not only depend on the ability to entertain intentional 
states. To have a perspective, a system must also be able to identify itself within its 
environment, as well as its own mentality, which means that the system must be able to 
entertain states that exhibit reflexive characters. 
4.1.2. The social dolphin 
 Dolphins are highly social systems that live in what theorists call fission-fusion 
societies, “where group structure (i.e., both size and composition) may change on timescales 
of hours to minutes” (Würsig & Pearson, 2015, p. 89). The complexity of this kind of social 
organization suggests that dolphins are able to develop and keep track of a variety of social 
relations and bonds. Before examining dolphin social behaviors and relations, we must 
assess whether they have the cognitive skills necessary to enable reflexive states. 
 Dolphins have an outstanding ability to use their bodies to solve complex tasks. Their 
capacity to navigate in an omnidirectional environment and to plan trajectories and actions 
is also noteworthy. Furthermore, dolphins are capable of identifying and deliberately using 
specific parts of their bodies (Herman et al., 2001). In fact, researchers have investigated 
[…] the dolphin’s awareness of its body parts by associating different 
human gestures with nine different body parts and then testing the 
dolphin’s comprehension of different symbolic sequences that requested 
the dolphin to use these body parts in different ways, including ways that 
were novel […]. Overall, the dolphin performed at near-ceiling levels and 
was able to immediately transfer its use of named body parts successfully 
to novel objects and to objects positioned in novel ways. The dolphin’s 
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consistently high levels of performance demonstrated that it understood 
the body part symbols as representing its own body parts (Pack, 2015, p. 
189). 
 These observations suggest that dolphins are aware of their own bodies and that they 
can move and use their body parts deliberately. The fact that dolphins can learn to identify 
and use their body parts could be explained by means of attributing them the ability to 
entertain states that exhibit at least the distinctive reflexive character of states of bodily 
awareness. In particular, the ability to associate gestures to their own body parts to perform 
specific actions does not seem to be explainable in terms of elemental cognitive skills. 
Consider, for instance, that the gestures are fully symbolic, in the sense that they do not point 
towards the body parts they name, so the dolphin must learn to interpret them correctly, 
which implies that dolphins have complex cognitive skills. 
Moreover, since the above observations are about the dolphin’s ability to learn to 
name and use parts of its body and considering that they appear to entertain at least some 
intentional states, it seems that an accurate explanation of the abovementioned behavior 
could be given in terms of a relation between reflexivity and intentionality. To perform the 
action indicated by the human trainer, the dolphin must be able to interpret the gestures, 
make the correct association to its body parts and determine how to act which, in my view, 
should be explained by attributing the dolphin the ability to entertain conscious states about 
parts of its own body, insofar as they exhibit the reflexivity of bodily awareness and the 
intentionality of perceptual states. 
Impressively, dolphins are also capable of learning self-referential symbols and 
interpret them to solve difficult problems. Beyond their ability to identify and use their body 
parts to follow commands, dolphins are also very efficient at imitating and mirroring the 
behavior of others. 
[F]or example, if the human raises his/her leg in the air, the dolphin will 
raise its tail, and if the human moves his/her head side to side or up and 
down, the dolphin will do the same. To accomplish these imitative acts, 
the dolphin must relate its body image to the body plan of the 
demonstrator, creating analogies, if necessary, for those behaviors 
demonstrated by a human (e.g., the dolphin’s tail is analogous to the 
human’s leg) (Herman et al., 2001, pp. 251–252). 
 Although the dolphin’s abilities to imitate the actions of other dolphins are well 
documented (Herman, 2002b), it is clear that its capacity to mirror human actions involves 
far more complex cognitive skills. The fact that dolphins can interpret the movement of a 
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human leg as a tail movement, or the movement of an arm as the movement of a pectoral 
fin, seems to suggest that they are aware of themselves as individuals, insofar as they must 
be able to interpret the movements of the human in terms of their own bodies and according 
to their aquatic environment. For instance, when the human leans back to raise a leg, the 
dolphin turns on its back and raises its tail outside the water, which evinces their ability to 
interpret the human’s action to determine an analogous movement. In my view, such 
behavior enables the attribution of reflexive states whose reflexive character is externalized, 
in the sense that the dolphin interprets its perception of the human action outside of itself, 
thus reproducing the action in a way that mirrors the way in which the dolphin perceives the 
movement from its perspective. 
 Dolphins are excellent imitators and part of their natural forms of association depend 
on their ability to imitate and create different patterns of behavior. For instance, a dolphin 
can “reliably repeat or not repeat its previous behavior”, which indicates that it can maintain 
“a mental representation of the behavior last performed” (Herman, 2002a, p. 280). The 
ability to deliberately repeat a specific behavior suggests that dolphins can form and update 
representations of themselves and their actions to determine their next actions. Moreover, 
they can also decide to perform a completely novel action (Herman, 2002b). These 
observations not only suggest that dolphins can entertain representational states about 
individual representations, namely, representations of themselves, but also reflexive states, 
insofar as those representations result from their awareness of themselves. Thus, it seems 
that we can describe at least some of their internal states as conscious states that result from 
relations between presentational and reflexive characters, which would be descriptions in 
terms of intentionality and reflexivity. 
 What about reflexive states whose reflexive character is internalized? Can dolphins 
be aware of their own mentality? One of the most popular methods aimed at investigating a 
system’s self-awareness is the so-called mirror self-recognition (MSR) experiment, and 
Reiss & Marino (2001) have shown, though inconclusively, that dolphins might have the 
sensory/cognitive skills to track visual changes in their reflection on the mirror, as well as 
environmental changes. However, the method has clear limitations regarding the assessment 
of dolphin self-awareness because “in the dolphin we have a species whose natural 
environment is markedly different from that of the terrestrial animals usually studied in self-
recognition experiments”, especially because “[i]t is difficult to see how, in the wild, 
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dolphins would be likely to encounter and learn to use reflecting surfaces as a source of 
information about self or others” (Loveland, 1995, p. 255). 
 At this point, we can turn back to the issue of dolphin culture. A complex social 
behavior, like the one exhibited by a group of dolphins off the coast of Brazil, entails that 
each member of the group has to learn and follow a specific set of conventions and rules. A 
sophisticated feeding technique, like the one exhibited by that specific group of dolphins, is 
not a merely mechanical procedure, but a series of coordinated actions learned and passed 
from one generation to the other. 
Culture seems to be the kind of thing that requires both self-awareness and social 
awareness, for each individual must be able to pinpoint its role within the group and act 
according to the conventions and rules of the group. Hence, the dolphin’s abilities to imitate 
others, to produce novel actions, and its complex social behaviors could be explained by 
describing their internal states as states of self-awareness, or self-consciousness, in the sense 
that those behaviors seem to require the ability to entertain reflexive states about its own 
mentality. Notice that to determine its role within the group, a dolphin must be able to 
identify itself and to represent the relations it holds with other members of its group, which 
involves complex cognitive skills that are supposed to enable states of self-awareness. Thus, 
their complex social behaviors could be explained by attributing them the ability to entertain 
conscious states that exhibit internalized reflexive characters. 
 Evidently, the attribution of reflexive states to dolphins is highly speculative, insofar 
as there is no direct method to investigate their ability to entertain internal states that exhibit 
reflexive characters107. However, my point is not that there is conclusive evidence that 
dolphins are able to entertain reflexive states, but that some of their behaviors could be 
explained more accurately by describing their internal states in terms of reflexivity. Thus, 
what I have argued so far is that there might be good theoretical reasons to attribute at least 
some intentional and reflexive states to dolphins, in light of the complexity of their behaviors 
and the evidence of their complex sensory/cognitive skills. 
4.1.3. Can we attribute consciousness to dolphins? 
 There seems to be no doubt that dolphins have awareness, insofar as they exhibit 
behaviors that evince complex cognitive skills. However, the question is whether at least 
 
107 Although it must be acknowledged that there is also no direct method to investigate the reflexivity of human 
conscious states. Fortunately, language often serves to communicate the reflexivity of our conscious states, but 
this method is not available to dolphins. 
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some of their internal states can be described in terms of consciousness. As I have argued 
throughout this work, the identification of complex sensory/cognitive skills is not enough to 
attribute consciousness because conscious states further exhibit characters that can only be 
described in terms of consciousness. Thus, the attribution of conscious states to dolphins 
would have to prove that their behaviors are better explained by means of consciousness, 
which would motivate the hypothesis that dolphins might be conscious systems. 
So far, I have argued that some dolphin behaviors can be explained by describing 
some of their internal states according to a two-dimensional model of consciousness based 
on intentionality and reflexivity. In other words, I have shown that some dolphin behaviors 
could be explained by attributing them intentional and reflexive states. Moreover, I have 
argued that some of their internal states could be described in terms of relations between 
intentionality and reflexivity. Nevertheless, I have argued that the intentionality and/or the 
reflexivity of some conscious states can only be described by means of phenomenality, so I 
will now investigate whether some dolphin internal states exhibit phenomenal characters. 
Although there is no direct method to identify the phenomenal character of a conscious state, 
there are indirect ways to do so. For instance, it would seem that a system capable of 
entertaining perceptual states would also be able to entertain states that exhibit phenomenal 
characters. After all, it is reasonable to assume that every perception has a what-it’s-like-
ness. 
 In general, we have no trouble in attributing phenomenal states to ourselves and other 
humans. Nevertheless, when it comes to non-human systems we hesitate, probably because 
we mostly rely on three human-based ways to infer the phenomenal character of a state, 
namely, neuroimaging, behavioral analysis and verbal reports108. On the one hand, we should 
discard verbal reports, insofar as we cannot communicate with non-human systems in a way 
that is precise enough to take a verbal report as evidence of the phenomenality of a system’s 
state109. On the other hand, although neuroimaging seems to be a more reliable method, an 
analysis of the neural states of a system does not provide definite proof of its consciousness, 
 
108 My claim that these are human-based methods is motivated by the fact that they are mainly employed to 
infer features of human conscious states. 
109 Arguably, a parrot that pronounces the phrase “I am in pain” is not reporting the phenomenology of its 
current internal state. Analogously, dolphins cannot say “let’s take five, I’m bored of these experiments”, 
neither cross their fins in a sign of discomfort. 
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especially, of the phenomenology of its states110, because we do not know yet how 
consciousness relates to its apparent neural basis. What about behavioral analysis? 
Although we often take some patterns of behavior as signs of the phenomenal 
characters of our conscious states, it must be acknowledged that the connection between 
those characters and their behavioral manifestations is conceptually contingent. In fact, we 
do not always behave in the same way when we entertain conscious states that are 
conventionally associated to certain patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, behavioral analysis 
could still be an indirect method to attribute phenomenal states to non-human systems, by 
following the same practices of conceptualization that we apply when analyzing our own 
behavior. Notice that the latter does not imply the functionalization of consciousness in terms 
of behavior because we are dealing with attributions of consciousness that have specific 
theoretical interests, not with assertions of consciousness. In other words, my proposal 
concerns the description of some internal states in terms of consciousness to explain 
behavior, which is not the same as taking certain patterns of behavior as evidence of 
consciousness. 
 I have shown that dolphins are very good at identifying and discriminating objects 
based on different features, like shape, size, orientation, etc., to argue that their internal states 
could be described in terms of intentionality. Thus, it seems that dolphins can form 
representations of individual objects, which is evinced by their ability to track the presence 
or absence of those objects in their environment. Dolphins also seem to be able to form 
complex representations of their environment. Consider that, without a complex 
representation of the environment as a frame of reference, dolphin’s would not be capable 
of developing a feeding technique like the one observed off the coast of Brazil, or to use 
marine sponges on the rostrum as a protective tool for looking for prey in the substrate 
(Würsig & Pearson, 2015, pp. 91–92). 
 According to my view, the sensory/cognitive skills observed in dolphins, as well as 
the way in which they interact with their environment, suggests that they might be able to 
entertain states that exhibit phenomenal characters. In particular, the discrimination of 
features like shape and size suggests that dolphins are able to identify phenomenal features 
 
110 According to what I have argued throughout this work, the study of consciousness and the study of its neural 
basis belong to different, irreducible, conceptual levels. Thus, neuroimaging can only serve to infer the 
phenomenology of conscious states once a direct relation between the paradigmatic features of conscious states 
and those of neural states has been conclusively stablished. Unfortunately, theorists do not universally agree 
on how to do this. 
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of their perceptions to modify their behavior. Thus, it would seem that at least some of their 
behaviors could be explained by describing their corresponding internal states in terms of 
phenomenality. Of course, this does not prove that dolphins can identify and conceptualize 
phenomenal features, like roundness, but that is not a requirement for entertaining states that 
exhibit phenomenal characters. My point is that dolphins exhibit sensory/cognitive skills 
that are best explained by attributing them the ability to entertain states that have 
phenomenality. Otherwise, how could they intentionally learn to discriminate the shape of 
an object, if their internal states did not have a what-it’s-like-ness? Hence, to explain the 
complexity of some dolphin behaviors, it seems that the corresponding internal states should 
be described in terms of at least relations between intentionality and phenomenality. 
 Similarly, an explanation of the highly social behavior of dolphins might also imply 
a description of their internal states in terms of phenomenality. For decades, theorists have 
hypothesized that each dolphin has what they call a signature whistle, which is supposed to 
“broadcast their identity and location to other members of their social group” (Lammers & 
Oswald, 2015, p. 118). Although the precise role of these whistles is still unknown, 
“dolphins have been observed to mimic the signature whistles of other dolphins within a 
group […], leading to the hypothesis that these whistles may be used to establish and 
maintain contact between individuals, particularly mother-calf pairs” (Lammers & Oswald, 
2015, p. 118). 
The way in which dolphins use their signature whistles evinces complex cognitive 
skills and it would seem that an explanation of those uses could be given by describing their 
internal states as reflexive states, insofar as the dolphin has to be aware of itself to be able 
to communicate its identity and location to other members of its group. Likewise, to properly 
interpret the function of a whistle, the other members of the group would have to be aware 
of their own identity and location, as well as having a representation of the dolphin emitting 
the whistle. Notice that the latter description of the internal states of dolphins engaging in 
this kind of interaction is given in terms of a relation between intentionality and reflexivity. 
Now, does this further suggest that dolphins might entertain phenomenal states concerning 
the bonds they have with the other members of their group? After all, they are able to 
recognize specific whistles and to adjust their behavior accordingly. Briefly put, could 
dolphins entertain emotions? 
 Although there is no definite evidence that dolphins entertain emotions, it seems that 
some of their social behaviors could be explained by describing their corresponding internal 
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states as phenomenal states; specifically, as what theorists call affective states. For instance, 
“[m]others will discipline their calves using tactile behavior such as making contact to the 
flank of a misbehaving calf with their rostrum, and even pinning their calf to the floor in 
more serious cases” (Kuczaj & Winship, 2015, p. 206), while “[p]ectoral fin rubbing appears 
to play a role in reconciliation between individuals after aggressive interactions and may 
also serve to reduce conflicts in juvenile-adult female relationships” (Kuczaj & Winship, 
2015, p. 207). 
Notice that the observations above already attribute affective states to dolphins, 
insofar as they imply that certain behaviors can be taken as evidence of their ability to 
entertain internal states that exhibit phenomenal characters. In contrast, I have argued that 
the connection between a certain pattern of behavior and consciousness is conceptually 
contingent. Hence, what we need is to show that a description of the internal states of 
dolphins in terms of phenomenality would enable a more accurate explanation of their 
behaviors. 
From the observations mentioned above, we can conclude that dolphin social 
behaviors involve complex cognitive skills, insofar as they suggest that dolphins might be 
able to form bonds with specific members of their group and that they modify their behavior 
according to those bonds. Thus, it might be that those behaviors can be explained by means 
of a description of their internal states in cognitive terms, i.e., as resulting from their social 
skills. However, the question is whether the complexity of their social behaviors can be 
explained in terms that do not involve consciousness. 
In my view, the attribution of phenomenal states to dolphins could explain the way 
in which they form and update representations of the members of their group. For instance, 
it would seem that a reconciliatory behavior could be explained by describing the 
corresponding internal states as exhibiting phenomenal characters that are associated to the 
representation that a dolphin has of itself, the other dolphin, and the bond between them. 
Such a description would explain, among other things, why dolphins engage in 
reconciliatory behaviors with specific members of their group and not with any other system. 
Notice that I am suggesting an explanation of the complexity of dolphin social behaviors in 
terms of consciousness, not a necessary connection between a certain pattern of behavior 
and consciousness. 
 According to the observations that I have reviewed in this section, there are good 
theoretical reasons to attribute consciousness to dolphins. By describing some dolphin 
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behaviors in terms of my interpretation of consciousness, I have shown that the complexity 
of those behaviors could be explained by attributing them the ability to entertain states that 
exhibit at least presentational and reflexive characters. Furthermore, by means of a two-
dimensional model of consciousness based on intentionality and reflexivity, it seems that at 
least some dolphin internal states could be described in terms of phenomenality, insofar as 
the intentionality and the reflexivity exhibited by some of their internal states suggests that 
they may also entertain states that exhibit phenomenality. Of course, this does not definitely 
prove that dolphins are conscious systems, but my aim was to show how my approach could 
lead to a more accurate explanation of their behavior. 
 Briefly, it seems that some dolphin internal states could be described in terms of 
intentionality and reflexivity, as well as relations between them, which enables the attribution 
of consciousness to dolphins. Furthermore, since I have argued that the components of 
consciousness are interrelated, there might be reasons to conjecture that dolphins can also 
entertain internal states that exhibit phenomenal characters. Thus, by means of a two-
dimensional model of consciousness, we could describe the phenomenal characters of at 
least some dolphin conscious states by conceptualizing them in terms of how they relate to 
the intentionality and the reflexivity of those states. In my view, the attribution of 
consciousness depends on how we conceptualized the characters exhibited by some of the 
internal states of a system, which means that my proposal concerns a practice of 
conceptualization based on my interpretation of consciousness, not the assertion that the 
system is a conscious system in the metaphysical sense. 
4.2. Bee111 consciousness 
 Traditionally, bees have been seen as simple systems whose behavior can be fully 
explained in functional/computational terms, or at least this is what traditional ethology 
suggests. Their small brains and their limited repertoire of behaviors is often held as evidence 
that they are natural automata which, in turn, suggests that there is no reason to attribute 
them any aspect of consciousness112. However, theorists have recently argued that some bee 
behaviors could be explained by attributing them at least some aspects of consciousness. In 
this section, I will review some observations that might motivate a different approach to their 
 
111 Most of the observations that I will review are about honeybees and bumblebees. For simplicity, I will use 
the term ‘bee’ to refer to both, though I grant that there might be differences that would deserve a distinction. 
112 Since this reasoning is often generalized to all kinds of insects, my approach could also be adapted to study 
the possibility of attributing consciousness to other kinds of insects. 
 86 
behavior. Before analyzing those observations, allow me to discuss one of the main reasons 
why theorists tend to reject the possibility of explaining insect behavior, in general, by 
attributing them at least some aspects of consciousness. According to the so-called Morgan’s 
Canon: 
In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher 
psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes 
which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development 
(Morgan, 1903, p. 59). 
My main concern about Morgan’s Canon is that there is no obvious way to interpret 
it. On the one hand, it is not clear what a higher psychological process is, insofar as the same 
internal state could be described according to different practices of conceptualization. 
Consider that conscious states could also be described as psychological, cognitive, 
informational, functional or neural states, depending on our theoretical interests. On the 
other hand, what qualifies as a “fair” interpretation of a system’s behavior? The fairness of 
an interpretation is always relative to a certain frame of reference. For instance, if human 
consciousness is our frame of reference, then the observation of bee behavior will hardly 
lead to the hypothesis that they might entertain conscious states because, compared to us, 
bees seem to have a significantly limited repertoire. Finally, Morgan’s Canon implies that 
we must always choose the simpler interpretation available but it often happens that we do 
not know “which explanation is truly the simpler” (Perry & Barron, 2013, p. 19155). 
My goal is to evaluate whether the description of at least some bee internal states in 
terms of consciousness would enable a more accurate explanation of their behavior. In 
contrast to Morgan’s Canon, I will argue that the attribution of some aspects of 
consciousness to bees could lead to a simpler explanation of their behavior, without 
attributing them higher psychological processes. To assess the possibility of attributing 
consciousness to bees, I will employ a one-dimensional model based on intentionality. The 
reason why I have decided to employ said model is that the apparent simplicity of bee 
behavior suggests that most of their internal states result from how they interact with their 
environment, instead of the implementation of highly complex sensory/cognitive skills. 
Hence, if there is evidence that suggests that bees are aware of their environment, then we 
could address the hypothesis that some of their internal states could be described as 
intentional states. 
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4.2.1. Beyond traditional ethology 
 According to traditional ethology, bees are systems that, compared to any mammal, 
have a reasonably small brain and exhibit a limited repertoire of behaviors. However, they 
live in complex environments that require, among other things, the ability to avoid predators 
and to forage efficiently under constantly changing circumstances. In what follows, I will 
evaluate whether they exhibit the sensory/cognitive skills necessary to support the 
hypothesis that at least some of their internal states could exhibit presentational characters. 
In other words, I will investigate if bees are aware of their environment to determine whether 
at least some of their internal states could be described in terms of intentionality. Thus, the 
whole point of considering the possibility of bee consciousness is to challenge the claim that 
their behavior can be fully explained in functional/computational terms. Recent studies 
suggest that bees might not be mere automata. For instance, 
[t]o forage successfully, a bee has to learn and remember the color, shape, 
and fragrance of flowers that are bountiful in these nutrients [nectar and 
pollen], and also how to get to them. Because the flowers that are in bloom 
are likely to change every few days, the bee needs, and has evolved, an 
impressive ability to learn (and re-learn) colors, odors, shapes, and routes 
quickly and accurately (Srinivasan, 2010, p. 268). 
 There is no doubt that bees are highly efficient foragers, but that does not necessarily 
entail that they are aware of their environment. For instance, from the point of view of 
traditional ethology, their foraging behaviors could have resulted from a set of evolutionary 
adaptations, which would mean that their identification and memorization of colors, shapes, 
etc., could be hardwired processes. To make the further claim that bees perceive their 
environment, we must investigate whether they can modify their behavior according to 
atypical circumstances because this would imply that they have legitimate sensory/cognitive 
skills, i.e., awareness mechanisms. 
 One way to investigate whether bees can deliberately modify their behavior 
according to changes in their environment is to test their capacity to learn from sensory 
stimuli, insofar as “[f]lexibility of behavior based on learning may indicate some cognitive 
capacities on the part of the animal” (Giurfa & Lehrer, 2005). Accordingly, if we can find 
reasons to believe that bees can learn from sensory stimuli, then it might be the case that 
they have the sensory/cognitive skills that are often said to enable or underlie internal states 
that exhibit presentational characters. 
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 Recent research suggests that bees might have the cognitive skills that are at the base 
of what I called perceptual states. For instance, there are reasons to believe that they 
discriminate colors and odors to navigate. In a series of experiments (Giurfa et al., 1994, 
1996, 1997), bees were able to learn that a certain color or odor at the entrance of a Y-maze 
indicated the direction to a reward. More interestingly, they were also able to invert the 
association between stimuli and direction in transfer experiments. These observations 
indicate that bees can detect and learn to use features of their environment to solve atypical 
problems. Moreover, there is evidence that bees can make cross-modal associations, like 
linking an odor to a color, or shapes to tactile information (Solvi et al., 2020). Perhaps these 
findings are not too impressive, given that the survival of bees partly depends on their ability 
to identify viable sources of food by discriminating different sensory cues. However, these 
observations show that bees can learn to make atypical associations. 
Clearly, natural food sources are compounds of stimuli offering many cues 
simultaneously. Although bees may learn different cues in different tasks, 
they always use the most salient one, guiding them most reliably to the 
goal […]. This is valid not only for cues belonging to the same sensory 
modality (e.g. vision), but also for cues related to sensory modalities as 
different as odour and colour (Giurfa et al., 1997, p. 241). 
 The fact that bees can learn to identify specific features to solve complex problems, 
as well as to invert associations when needed, suggests that they may have the 
sensory/cognitive skills necessary to modify their behavior in a non-mechanical manner, 
which could be taken as a sign of awareness. In particular, if bees were mere automata, they 
would hardly be able to make novel associations or cross-modal associations of novel 
stimuli. Thus, an explanation of their behavior seems to require at least the attribution of 
awareness, which enables the hypothesis that they might also be able to entertain perceptual 
states. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that bees can form representations of colors, 
odors, shapes, etc., and even less that they “perceive color […] as a distinct sensation” 
(Srinivasan, 2010, p. 269), inasmuch as they could be capable of distinguishing colors 
without having sensations. 
A different approach might give us a better insight into how bees employ their 
apparent sensory/cognitive skills. At first glance, we must acknowledge that, “[i]n their daily 
lives, bees are required to remember a number of different patterns and their properties, such 
as the shape of the nest or hive, shapes representing nectar-bearing flowers, and shapes of 
important landmarks on the way to the food source and back” (Srinivasan, 2010, p. 272). 
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Thus, if it turns out that their foraging and navigational behaviors can be explained by means 
of intentionality, we might have a case to conjecture that those behaviors are best explained 
by describing their internal states in terms of consciousness. 
There is no doubt that bees are able to identify colors, shapes, odors and patterns 
(Giger & Srinivasan, 1995), so it seems reasonable to speculate that they might be able to 
perceive their environment. In other words, to explain the way in which bees interact with 
their environment, we could describe at least some of their internal states as perceptual states. 
Although we must grant that their perceptual states cannot be like ours because their 
sensory/cognitive skills are adapted to their environment, which greatly differs from ours. 
Since bees are able to solve complex problems and to navigate their environment by 
identifying specific features, they could also be able to form representations of those 
features. However, it would seem that, if bees are able to form representations, those 
representations cannot be based on the identification of objects or features of objects, like 
most of our representations. In contrast to the way in which we represent our environment, 
bees could be said to represent features of their environment as directional cues (Horridge, 
2005). Given the significant differences between their environment and ours, we should 
expect that, if bees have representational skills, those skills must be adapted to the way in 
which they perceive their environment. As Wystrach & Graham (2012) point out, 
[…] the ability to recognize an object independently of its visual 
surroundings is necessary only if that object can be displaced and needs to 
be recognized in various locations, which by definition makes the object 
unreliable for navigation. Therefore we can wonder why animals would 
accept the processing cost of isolating and recognizing individual objects 
for navigational purposes, when simple egocentric views can encompass 
the overall structure and layout of a scene and underpin economical and 
robust navigation (Wystrach & Graham, 2012, p. 17). 
 Accordingly, if we attribute the ability to form representations to bees, we must take 
into account that, since their perceptual states have to be described according to their 
sensory/cognitive skills, their representational states are to be described in terms of how they 
appear to identify what they perceive. In particular, we should describe their perceptual 
states as intentional states about the landscape they perceive, as a unit, no about what I called 
perceptible objects113. 
 
113 In a sense, we may be inclined to say that the intentional states attributed to bees could be about what 
Pylyshyn (2001) calls proto-objects, but the use of this term would be inappropriate, insofar as it takes human 
perception as its frame of reference. 
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 One reason to believe that bees can form representations of their environment comes 
from the fact that they are very reliable navigators (Menzel & Giurfa, 2001). In particular, 
bees travel considerable distances to forage without losing their orientation, even in the dark 
(Chittka et al., 1999). For instance, recent scientific observations suggest that forager bees 
may be able to build some kind of representation of the surroundings of their nest or hive 
before traveling longer distances. 
Upon first leaving the nest or hive, a new forager performs a ‘learning 
walk’ or ‘learning flight’, where a carefully orchestrated series of loops 
and turns allows her to learn the visual surroundings from perspectives that 
will be useful on subsequent return journeys […]. Then, when the forager 
finally leaves the vicinity of the nest to forage, she is safely connected to 
it because of her path integration (PI) system. With PI, odometric and 
compass information are continuously combined such that at all times 
during a journey the forager has the approximate direction and distance 
information required to take a direct path home […]. By remembering the 
coordinates of a successful foraging patch, the forager can also use PI to 
chart food-bound routes […] or pass information to nestmates (Wystrach 
& Graham, 2012, p. 14). 
These observations provide good reasons to hypothesize that bees can build, store 
and update representations of their environment to improve their foraging activities. More 
interestingly, it seems that forager bees have individual preferences and routes (Woodgate 
et al., 2016), which is a behavior that may be explained in terms of consciousness. Thus, a 
more suitable explanation of the behavior of forager bees could be based on the description 
of their internal states as representational states, insofar as such an interpretation would 
enable a more accurate explanation of their navigational preferences. Evidently, these 
observations do not prove that bees entertain representational states, but they seem to imply 
that the view of traditional ethology is insufficient. 
According to the observations reviewed so far, we do not seem to have reasons to 
believe that bees could entertain intentional states about complex representations, though it 
remains a matter of empirical research. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether insects exhibit referential behaviors. In line with this hypothesis, Zhang & 
Srinivasan (1994) observed that, after training, bees can detect objects that are camouflaged 
or virtually invisible. However, that is not enough to consider that bees can form complex 
representations; at best, we could claim that they can learn to detect cues with which they 
were already acquainted under challenging circumstances. To further claim that they use 
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those cues referentially, for instance, we would have to investigate whether they can 
determine which cues are present and which are not. 
The ability to entertain representational states about complex representations seems 
to be associated to the capacity to form concepts. In a broad sense, concepts allow conscious 
systems to solve complex problems and to rapidly adapt their behavior to novel situations. 
So, the ability to form concepts implies that the system must have complex cognitive skills 
like decision-making, context learning and problem solving. While there are no reasons to 
believe that bees understand concepts, they seem to be able to learn concept-like rules. In 
particular, it appears that they can learn distinctions like ‘same-different’ (Giurfa et al., 
2001), ‘above-below’ (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2011), and ‘left-right’ (Avarguès-Weber et 
al., 2012); although it is still plausible that bees learn to make those distinctions without 
understanding concepts. However, theorists have argued that the ability to learn to follow a 
concept-like rule may be functionally equivalent to the ability to form concepts. 
Learning of the concepts […] was demonstrated through the protocols of 
delayed matching to sample (DMTS) and delayed non-matching to sample 
(DNMTS), respectively […]. Honey bees foraging in a Y-maze […] were 
trained in a DMTS experiment in which they were presented with a 
changing non-rewarded sample (i.e., one of two differently colored disks 
–‘color group’– or one of two different black-and-white gratings, vertical 
or horizontal –‘pattern group’) at the entrance of a maze […]. The bees 
were rewarded only if they chose the stimulus identical to the sample once 
within the maze. Bees trained with colors and presented in transfer tests 
with black-and-white gratings that they had not experienced before solved 
the problem and chose the grating identical to the sample at the entrance 
of the maze. Similarly, bees trained with the gratings and tested with colors 
in transfer tests also solved the problem and chose the novel color 
corresponding to that of the sample grating at the maze entrance (Giurfa, 
2013, p. 289). 
 While it might be that bees are not simply responding to stimuli in a mechanical 
manner, this does not justify the further claim that they have the cognitive skills to forms 
concepts. That bees seem to be able to understand the task does not imply that they 
understand the concept involved. Perhaps a more plausible interpretation would be to say 
that bees learned to solve what we describe as concept-like problems by identifying relevant 
cues. Thus, in my view, the way in which bees behave under these atypical circumstances is 
not enough to claim that they can form concepts, because concepts are complex 
representations that may not be needed to solve matching tasks. 
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 In a similar line of reasoning, we could assess whether bees can count, inasmuch as 
it requires the cognitive skill to numerically manipulate representations, which in turn would 
suggest that the system might be able to entertain representational states about complex 
representations. Recently, Skorupski and colleagues (2018, p. 7) argued that “[b]ees and 
most probably some other insects show a basic numerical competence, which may be limited 
to around four items”. However, they also acknowledged that the evidence is inconclusive 
because bees could be able to complete numerical tasks by non-numerical means114. In 
consequence, it seems that there is no reason to support the hypothesis that bees might be 
able to entertain representational states about complex representations, like concepts and 
numbers. 
 So far, I have shown that at least some bee behaviors could be explained by 
describing their corresponding internal states in terms of intentionality. In particular, I have 
argued that some of their internal states could be categorized as perceptual states and maybe 
even as representational states about individual representations; though the targets of those 
states have to be identified according to their sensory/cognitive skills, which differs from 
how I have identified them in the previous chapter. However, according to my interpretation 
of consciousness, intentionality is only one of the components of the concept, so I shall now 
investigate whether some bee internal states could also be described in terms of the other 
components of consciousness. Of course, since I am implementing a one-dimensional model 
based on intentionality, if some bee internal states exhibit any of the other two characters, 
namely, the reflexive and/or the phenomenal, I must describe them in terms of their relation 
to the presentational character of those states. Let us start by evaluating whether some bee 
internal states might exhibit reflexive characters. 
 Insects, as well as many other non-human systems, seem to have bodily awareness. 
In other words, insects seem to be able to entertain internal states that exhibit what I called 
an externalized reflexive character. For instance, bees can learn to use their bodies to pull a 
string attached to an artificial flower that would otherwise be inaccessible (Alem et al., 
2016), which suggests that they may be aware of their bodies and that they can deliberately 
use their body parts to solve complex problems. 
String pulling is a challenge that bees rarely find in their natural environment, so the 
fact that they can learn to solve the problem can be interpreted by means of attributing them 
 
114 Similarly, it has been argued that ants are able to measure distance without actually counting steps 
(Wittlinger et al., 2006). 
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states of bodily awareness. Consider that, to solve the problem, bees need to be able to 
associate the string pulling to the movement of the flower towards the edge of the board that 
covers it, which requires the ability to orient their bodies in the appropriate direction and to 
determine how to grab and pull the string. However, we should acknowledge that “solving 
a string pulling task spontaneously is a relatively rare occurrence in bumblebees and might 
either reflect an unusually explorative “personality” in these individuals or simple “luck” in 
the process of random exploration” (Alem et al., 2016, p. 5). 
It might seem that we should not interpret the string-pulling behavior as evidence of 
the ability to entertain reflexive states. Nevertheless, since we are dealing with a complex 
behavior that could be described in terms of intentionality, insofar as it targets the acquisition 
of the nectar by unnatural means, the presentational characters of the corresponding internal 
states could be described by attributing bodily awareness to the system, which is a 
conceptualization of the state’s apparent reflexive character. Briefly put, the string-pulling 
behavior could be explained by describing the bee’s internal state in terms of a relation 
between intentionality and reflexivity. 
 Although bodily awareness is the conceptualization of the reflexive character 
exhibited by many internal states of a variety of systems, including bees, the fact that some 
observations suggest that bees are bodily aware does not imply that they can entertain 
reflexive states. However, my implementation of a one-dimensional model based on 
intentionality suggests that string-pulling could be described in terms of a relation between 
intentionality and reflexivity, insofar as the behavior seems to exhibit identifiable 
presentational characters that can only be described by attributing a sort of reflexivity to the 
system’s state. Consequently, the description of some bee internal states in terms of relations 
between intentionality and reflexivity could lead to a more accurate explanation of some of 
their behaviors. 
Now, can bees entertain states that exhibit what I called internalized reflexive 
characters, i.e., reflexive characters that are projected toward the system’s own mentality? 
There does not seem to be any evidence in support of such hypothesis. Moreover, since bees 
do not seem to be able to form individual representations, it is highly unlikely that they can 
individuate themselves from others. Consider, for instance, the fact that there usually are 
tens of thousands of bees living in the same hive: what would be the evolutionary advantage 
of the capacity to identify individuals? Certainly, we require more research to decide whether 
bees can entertain internal states that exhibit internalized reflexive characters, but the 
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observations reviewed so far suggest that we could explain their behaviors in terms of 
intentionality and, in some cases, in terms of a relation between intentionality and reflexivity. 
What seems to be clear is that the approach of traditional ethology is insufficient and, more 
importantly, that it may not be the simpler explanation of bee behavior. 
4.2.2. Bee emotions? 
 There is no objective way to evaluate whether a system can entertain phenomenal 
states because the phenomenality of a conscious state cannot be identified from a third-
person perspective115. Although theorists have been able to pinpoint neural structures and 
patterns of behavior that seem to be directly correlated to the phenomenal characters of 
human conscious states, the relation between consciousness and its basis, i.e., awareness, is 
still conceptually contingent. 
 So far, I have employed a one-dimensional model of consciousness based on 
intentionality to argue that some bee behaviors are best explained by describing their 
corresponding internal states in terms of intentionality and, in some cases, in terms of a 
relation between intentionality and reflexivity. However, I have not yet said anything about 
the possibility of attributing phenomenality to at least some bee internal states. In my view, 
since the components of consciousness are not independent from each other, we might 
already have reasons to consider that some bee internal states may exhibit phenomenal 
characters. For instance, given that bees can make perceptual distinctions and learn to 
modify their behavior according to context-dependent changes, it is plausible that their 
perceptual states are like something to them. 
 Arguably, a system capable of entertaining perceptual states is a system capable of 
entertaining states that exhibit phenomenal characters, insofar as perceptual features tend to 
be associated to phenomenal features116. The fact that bees can distinguish colors, patterns, 
shapes, etc., to modify their behavior suggests that they may be able to distinguish 
phenomenal features; after all, perceptions of colors and shapes are often said to have 
phenomenal features. If so, we might hypothesize that bees can entertain internal states that 
exhibit phenomenal characters. Hence, the question is whether they can identify and 
discriminate phenomenal features. 
 
115 Notice that we can only make the phenomenality of our conscious states accessible to others by means of 
conceptualizing it according to a convention and expressing it linguistically, but this indirect method is not 
available when studying non-human systems. 
116 Perhaps these are two different ways to describe the same features. 
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 Theorists have recently suggested that bees exhibit emotional responses to a variety 
of stimuli. Broadly speaking, the idea is that “emotions can be identified as internal states 
that alter “cognitive” behavior, such as decision-making under conditions where the outcome 
of the decision is ambiguous” (Adolphs & Anderson, 2018, p. 210). Thus, if bees can modify 
their behavior according to the alleged phenomenality of their internal states, we might have 
a case to argue that they can entertain internal states that exhibit phenomenal characters. For 
instance, theorists have observed that “bees are more likely to classify ambiguous stimuli as 
predicting punishment” (Bateson et al., 2011, p. 1070), which could be a sign that bees can 
entertain states that have phenomenality, insofar as the behavior exhibited could be 
described in terms of the ability to identify and discriminate phenomenal features. However, 
such behaviors could also be explained as adaptive (Giurfa, 2013, pp. 288–289), in which 
case we would have no need to describe the system’s internal state in terms of 
phenomenality. Similarly, the emotion-like behavior exhibited by bumblebees when they 
receive an unexpected reward (Perry et al., 2016) could be explained as an increase of 
appetite (Núñez & Giurfa, 1996). 
 A popular approach to phenomenality is to evaluate whether a certain kind of system 
is capable of feeling pain. Broadly speaking, when we talk about pain, we talk about a certain 
kind of phenomenal character. Hence the common distinction between nociception, i.e., “the 
capacity to respond to potentially damaging stimuli” (Adamo, 2016, p. 75), and pain. 
However, this distinction suggests that the phenomenality of pain can be detached from its 
functional basis, which is a matter of debate. Since my proposal mainly concerns conceptual 
aspects of the study of consciousness, I do not need to take a stand concerning this debate. 
In my view, the study of consciousness belongs to an irreducible conceptual level, which 
does not mean that consciousness must be independent from its basis. 
According to my interpretation of consciousness, the phenomenality of conscious 
states could be identified and conceptualized by relying on the interrelations between the 
components of consciousness. In the case of bees, the one-dimensional model of 
consciousness that I have been employing provides a means to investigate whether bees 
could be able to entertain internal states that exhibit phenomenal characters, insofar as their 
alleged phenomenality could be described in terms of how it relates to the intentionality of 
some of their internal states. Accordingly, while there seems to be no doubt that insects have 
nociception, it must also be acknowledged that they “show some differences in their 
responses to nociception compared to vertebrates. For example, insects tend to continue to 
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use damaged limbs […], will eat their own innards […] and will continue to feed while being 
consumed by another insect” (Adamo, 2016, p. 76). What these observations suggest is that, 
although pain must always be painful, different kinds of systems might experience it 
differently. Hence, 
[…] the observation that insect behaviour differs from human behaviour 
when exposed to noxious stimuli does not necessarily mean that they do 
not have a pain-like experience. Being able to experience the emotional 
component of pain may not be an all-or-none phenomenon. Insects could 
have some aspects of an emotional experience but still lack the full 
subjective experience […]. Moreover, this capacity may vary across 
species, depending on the whether or not a subjective experience of pain 
would provide a fitness advantage (Adamo, 2016, p. 76). 
 I do not know what a “full subjective experience” is, nor what a partial subjective 
experience would be. In any case, it seems that the issue could only be decided by stablishing 
a frame of reference, like human consciousness, which would imply a description of bee 
consciousness in terms of human consciousness. Certainly, this is not what I have been 
proposing here. In my view, we should start by considering the last claim in the passage 
above, i.e., that the ability to experience pain must provide a “fitness advantage”, because 
there is no universal environment to which all systems must adapt. 
 Although we cannot know for sure whether bees are able to experience pain, it seems 
that they do not respond mechanically to noxious stimuli. Thus, a more accurate explanation 
of their behavior could be given in terms of a relation between intentionality and 
phenomenality, where their corresponding internal states could be described as states that 
target specific phenomenal features. For instance, despite the fact that insects behave very 
differently from us when their bodies are damaged, we could explain the complexity of their 
behavior by claiming that they might be able to identify phenomenal features and modify 
their behavior accordingly. What seems to be clear is that insects, in general, modify their 
behavior according to factors, like losing a limb, that only seem to be describable in terms 
of phenomenality because, otherwise, they would continue to behave as if nothing had 
happened. 
 Certainly, I have not provided evidence in favor of the hypothesis that bees are able 
to entertain states that exhibit phenomenal characters, but that was not my aim. My goal was 
to argue that the complexity of some bee behaviors might be best explained by describing 
their corresponding internal states in terms of relations between intentionality and 
phenomenality. Although more research is needed, what seems to be the case is that bees 
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behave in ways that do not seem to be reducible to mere mechanisms, which is why I have 
suggested that a more accurate explanation of bee behavior could be given by describing 
their internal states in terms of consciousness. 
4.2.3. Can we attribute consciousness to bees? 
 In this section, I have analyzed observations of bee behavior in terms of my 
interpretation of consciousness. In particular, I have argued that the complexity of bee 
behavior could be explained in terms of a one-dimensional model of consciousness based on 
intentionality. My analysis suggests that some bee behaviors may be explained in terms of 
consciousness, which motivates my claim that the attribution of at least some aspects of 
consciousness to bees could provide a more accurate explanation of their activities. Of 
course, my analysis does not imply that bees are conscious systems, and the observations 
that I have reviewed do not evince that they are able to entertain conscious states. What my 
proposal implies is that an explanation of some bee behaviors in terms of consciousness 
could lead to a better understanding of why they behave as they do. 
 While it is reasonable to assume that non-human systems might entertain conscious 
states that are significantly different from human conscious states, it should also be 
acknowledged that every approach to non-human systems must be made from the human 
point of view; after all, the study of consciousness is a human endeavor. However, although 
certain patterns of human behavior are often interpreted as signs of consciousness, the 
relation between behavior and consciousness is conceptually contingent. Thus, the 
observations that I have analyzed suggest that, if bees are indeed able to entertain conscious 
states, those states can only be described by accounting for the way in which they interact 
with their environment and in terms of their sensory/cognitive skills, not in terms of human 
consciousness. Hence, my main claim is that, although we cannot be sure of whether bees 
entertain conscious states, an explanation of their behavior in terms of consciousness is 
simpler than what traditional ethology offers. 
My analysis of bee behavior suggests that, although “we have no guarantee that 
animals that behave like humans do so because they have the same subjective experiences 
that humans do” (Barron & Klein, 2016, p. 4900), the fact that bees behave differently from 
humans does not mean that they are unable to entertain conscious states. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this section was to show how my interpretation of consciousness can be employed 
to study non-human systems whose environment is significantly different from ours, as well 
as their sensory/cognitive skills. Consequently, if we have good reasons to describe some 
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bee internal states in terms of consciousness, it might turn out that consciousness is more 
widespread than we normally think. 
By means of a one-dimensional model of consciousness based on intentionality, I 
have argued that some bee behaviors can be explained be attributing intentional states to 
them and that those states might also exhibit reflexive and phenomenal characters. 
Accordingly, the idea is that the reflexivity and the phenomenality of their alleged conscious 
states must be described in terms of how they relate to the intentionality of their 
corresponding internal states. However, we must grant that, if bees entertain intentional 
states, those states cannot be compared to human intentional states, because their 
sensory/cognitive skills are significantly different from ours. Hence, the possibility to 
attribute consciousness to bees is a practice of conceptualization that is mediated by a proper 
interpretation of the way in which they interact with their environment, and not just a 
methodological resource to bypass the limits of traditional ethology. 
Regarding reflexivity, we do not seem to have enough reasons to consider that bees 
could be able to entertain reflexive states, understood as conscious states that are mainly 
described in terms of reflexivity. Likewise, there do not seem to be enough reasons to think 
that bees can entertain phenomenal states, i.e., conscious states that are mainly described in 
terms of phenomenality. However, according to my analysis, the apparent intentionality of 
some of their internal states may have to be described in terms of relations between 
intentionality and the other two components of consciousness. Thus, it seems that attributing 
consciousness to bees could provide a more accurate understanding of their activities. 
Of course, some might argue that a one-dimensional model of consciousness based 
on intentionality is enough to investigate non-human consciousness. Others could even 
suggest that the concept of unconscious intentionality would equally do the trick. Indeed, 
those would be valid pragmatic choices, legitimate theoretical strategies. However, the 
richness of dolphin and bee behavior that I have analyzed here at least suggests that 
consciousness might be a more widespread phenomenon than the latter strategies would 
suggest. The attribution of consciousness, in my view, is a practice of conceptualization and, 
as such, its purpose has to be made explicit. Otherwise, consciousness would seem to be no 
more than a human invention, in which case, consciousness would be consciousness.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 I have presented an interpretation of the concept of consciousness that does not rely 
on any particular metaphysical view concerning its ultimate nature. My goal was to argue 
that the study of consciousness belongs to an irreducible conceptual level and that, 
consequently, it must be explained in its own terms. Of course, this does not mean that 
consciousness is independent from, say, the mechanisms that enable it, its origin, or the role 
it plays. What my approach suggests is that, if consciousness is to be considered a legitimate 
subject-matter of scientific research, then we must explicate its concept. My approach to 
consciousness had two main purposes: 
1. It is meant to be metaphysically compatible with most theories of consciousness and 
views about the ultimately correct analysis of its concept, insofar as it provides a conceptual 
background with which those theories and view can be assessed. By analyzing our uses of 
the term ‘consciousness’ and how theorists seem to characterize the concept of 
consciousness, I have argued that our characterization of the concept depends on the 
identification of three paradigmatic features exhibited by conscious states, namely, 
intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. Accordingly, I have introduced an 
interpretation of the concept of consciousness that is grounded on the thesis that our 
conceptualizations of those features, which I called components of the concept of 
consciousness, are interrelated, and that they form a three-dimensional conceptual space. 
Such conceptual space, I argued, constitutes the concept of consciousness. Since this 
interpretation of the concept is entirely based on considerations that concern our use of the 
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concept, it enables the assessment of different theories of consciousness from a single 
characterization of the concept, instead of a family or hierarchy of concepts of 
consciousness. 
2. It motivates a different kind of theory of consciousness. Instead of providing reasons 
to endorse a specific view regarding the ultimate nature of consciousness, I have argued that 
consciousness can be explained by means of characterizing conscious states as descriptions 
of some of the internal states of a system in terms of the components of the concept of 
consciousness. What distinguishes my approach from most theories of consciousness is that 
it targets consciousness without determining its ontological status or providing a definite 
analysis of its concept. This is the reason why I have focused on how consciousness is 
attributed, not on what it is. In my view, the study of consciousness is motivated by our 
attributions of consciousness, which are always mediated by the implementation of what I 
called practices of conceptualization, not by direct observation. 
What I have presented here is not a theory of consciousness, but a conceptual 
framework meant to explicate the concept of consciousness. A theory of consciousness 
should explain the phenomena to which we refer when we apply the concept of 
consciousness, and my proposal only concerns that concept. However, in the third chapter, 
I introduced a characterization of conscious states that could be interpreted as the basic 
structure of a theory of consciousness, inasmuch as, along with the interpretation of the 
concept of consciousness that I presented in the second chapter, it allows us to theorize about 
possible cases of non-human consciousness, as I showed in the fourth chapter. 
Certainly, my approach does not answer any of the problems that constitute the 
contemporary debate on consciousness, though it suggests some ways to address them. For 
instance, concerning the so-called hard problem of consciousness, my view indicates that 
the reason why an answer to the so-called easy problems would not lead to an answer to the 
hard one is that the latter belongs to a different conceptual level. According to my analysis 
in the first chapter, the easy problems concern the functional basis of consciousness, namely, 
awareness, and I have argued that an explanation of consciousness cannot be reduced to an 
explanation of awareness because and explanation of the mechanisms that allegedly underlie 
consciousness would not explain the nature of experience. However, my approach is silent 
with regards to the problems that concern the metaphysics of consciousness, inasmuch as it 
is equally compatible with the claims that consciousness exists, that it is reducible to 
something else, and that it does not exist. My proposal is grounded on the fact that we 
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attribute consciousness, not on what it is because this, as I have acknowledged since the 
beginning of this work, I do not know. 
One advantage of my approach is that it enables a sort of taxonomy of consciousness 
that does not rely on how we characterize human consciousness. Indeed, the study of 
consciousness is a human endeavor, but that does not mean that every possible kind of 
conscious system must entertain a human-like kind of consciousness. In my view, the 
attribution of consciousness is based on our ability to identify and conceptualize certain 
paradigmatic characters exhibited by conscious states, not on the specific ways in which 
those characters are exhibited by human conscious states. Thus, my approach allows us to 
contrast kinds of conscious systems in terms of a single concept, not in reference to the kind 
of consciousness that we attribute to ourselves. 
Another advantage of my view is that it turns consciousness into a legitimate subject-
matter of scientific research. Our attributions of consciousness suggest that consciousness is 
part of our world, even if it were a mere illusion. The fact that the attribution of 
consciousness is a practice of conceptualization that concerns the way in which we interpret 
the world means that it is part of our worldview, regardless of whether there are conscious 
systems or not in the metaphysical sense. Thus, the study of consciousness is legitimized by 
the fact that it plays a role in the construction of our worldview. 
In summary, what I have presented here is an approach to the study of consciousness 
that is based on how we understand its concept. What motivated my view is the observation 
that, although there are outstanding theories of consciousness, there is no clear way to 
evaluate them or decide which one of them best explains it. Consciousness might be, as 
many theorists claim, a phenomenon with which we are very well acquainted, but that does 
not mean that it can be explained by the standard methods of contemporary science. In my 
opinion, explaining consciousness does not depend on providing irrefutable arguments in 
favor of such-and-such theory or evidence of its existence, for the soundness of an argument 
depends on the practice of conceptualization adopted, as well as the sufficiency of evidence. 
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